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Abstract
Shared capitalism is a diverse set of compensation practices through which worker pay,
or wealth, depends on the performance of the firm or work group; compensation practices
include employee ownership, stock options, and profit sharing. Empirical studies on
whether employee ownership improves firm performance offer mixed results.
Kaarsemaker (2006), in a 30-year review of the literature, documented that "two-thirds of
129 studies on employee ownership and its consequences found favorable effects relating
to employee ownership, while one-tenth found negative effects. However, favorable
effects do not appear to come about automatically, and the specific conditions under
which they do are largely unknown."
This dissertation attempts to address the question: under what conditions do shared
capitalism policies improve firm performance? A system dynamics model of high
performance work systems estimated using the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset and
calibrated to a clean technology startup company is presented. The model provides an
explicit causal mechanism to explain how various shared capitalism policies and HR
practices influence employee behaviors that drive business processes, and how those
business processes interact with market conditions to generate firm performance in a
dynamic feedback system.
Simulation analysis explaining how various combinations of salary, stock grants, stock
options, profit sharing and employee participation influence employee behaviors and firm
performance offers insights into the dynamics of shared capitalism policies. One critical
insight is that employee ownership and profit sharing create and mediate the strength of
the reinforcing feedback loops from firm performance to employee behavior. Salary and
participation are direct effects that influence job satisfaction and productivity but do not
close the firm performance-employee behavior loop. Employee ownership along with
participation effort improves firm performance significantly because closing the firm
performance-employee behavior loop amplifies the direct effects of salary and
participation. Thus, the more wealth is shared through broad-based employee ownership,
the more wealth is created, given the appropriate conditions. Eleven propositions on the
conditions under which shared capitalism policies improve firm performance are
presented.
Thesis Supervisor: John D. Sterman
Title: Jay W. Forrester Professor of Management
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation: the Importance of Shared Capitalism
"Shared Capitalism" is a pervasive phenomenon in the American economy. Kruse,
Freeman and Blasi (2010) define "Shared Capitalism" as "a diverse set of compensation
practices through which worker pay or wealth depends on the performance of the firm or
work group." They found that almost half of US employees participate in some form of
shared capitalism, such as employee ownership, individual employee stock ownership,
stock options, profit sharing or gain sharing. The 2006 General Social Survey estimates
that 47 percent of workers are covered by at least one such form, with 38 percent having
profit sharing, 27 percent having gain sharing, 18 percent owning their company's stock,
9 percent holding company stock options, and 5 percent receiving company stock options
in any year. Based on these figures, shared capitalism covered 53.4 million American
workers in 2006 (Kruse, Freeman and Blasi 2010).
A substantial amount of overlap exists among shared capitalism plans. Over three-
fourths of workers who own company stock also have profit sharing or stock options, and
workers with profit sharing often participate in other programs as well. These patterns
suggest that some firms combine the longer-term incentives associated with employee
stock ownership or deferred profit sharing in retirement accounts with shorter-term
incentives such as cash bonuses and stock options, presumably to maximize worker
commitment and effort over different time horizons, as well as to combine more and less
risky shared capitalism practices (Kruse, Freeman and Blasi 2010).
1.2 Research Question: Under What Conditions Do Shared Capitalism
Policies Improve Firm Performance?
Given the pervasiveness of shared capitalism, it is no surprise that scholars have been
studying employee ownership for a long time. On the question "does employee
ownership improve firm performance?" results from empirical studies, while
predominately positive, are mixed. Kaarsemaker (2006), in a 30-year review of the
literature, found that "two-thirds of 129 studies on employee ownership and its
consequences found favorable effects relating to employee ownership, while one-tenth
found negative effects. However, favorable effects do not appear to come about
automatically, and the specific conditions under which they do are largely unknown."
Why is that? Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) argue that "one of the reasons for the
relative weakness of the results from empirical research on the consequences of employee
ownership is that, as yet, the theory behind many of the studies on the effects of
employee ownership has been underdeveloped. In particular, no research has been done
on comprehensive models of employee ownership and the broader human resource
management system."
This dissertation aims to address the literature gap by building a dynamic causal model of
high performance work systems (HPWS). Instead of asking "do shared capitalism
policies improve firm performance?" I ask "under what conditions do shared capitalism
policies improvefirm performance?" - avoiding any assumption that employee
ownership is a panacea, and instead inquiring into the conditions under which it produces
better or worse effects. To answer this question, we need to untangle the underlying
causal mechanisms that determine how various shared capitalism policies influence
employee behavior and firm performance.
1.3 Research Method
Most of the empirical studies focus on estimating the relationship between some forms of
shared capitalism and firm performance through survey data and regression analysis. To
go beyond estimating a specific linkage in the HR system and develop a theory of the
causal mechanism from HR practices to performance, I employ a system dynamics
simulation approach that is quite different from studies in the existing literature.
System dynamics (SD) is a formal modeling and simulation method designed to explain
dynamic behavior generated from its underlying causal structure, characterized by
feedback, non-linearity and time delay (Forrester 1961, Sterman 2000). By explicitly
modeling the causal paths from HR practices to performance, and simulating the dynamic
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behavior of performance under various HPWS scenarios, one is able to generate and test
a set of causal theories explaining the impact of HPWS on performance.
My approach involves three main steps, using mixed survey data, case study and
simulation methods.
1. Model Building: I build a system dynamics model of HPWS estimated using the
NBER Shared Capitalism dataset and calibrated to a clean technology startup company.
The model provides an explicit causal mechanism to show how various shared capitalism
policies and HR practices influence employee behaviors that drive business processes,
and how those business processes interact with market conditions to generate firm
performance in a dynamic feedback system. This model is built on Miller's (2007) model
of clean technology startup companies. My contribution is to add a detailed HPWS with
various shared capitalism policies such as salary, stock grants, stock options, profit
sharing and employee participation. To build the HPWS structure, I performed a
thorough literature review on the existing theoretical and empirical findings of employee
ownership and Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM), and formally modeled
them in a system dynamics framework.
2. Model Estimation and Calibration: Since employee ownership effects are the main
focus of this study, I have estimated the non-linear functional forms of various employee
ownership effects by regression analysis using the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset
(Kruse, Freeman and Blasi 2010). To calibrate this model, I conducted interviews and
collected archival data of an early-stage clean technology startup company. Given the
inherent limitation of an early-stage startup when there are no later-stage time-series data,
company data was used to parameterize the initial conditions of the model. I interviewed
the executives to identify their decision-making rules for pricing, financing, human
resource and compensation policies and their projections for business performance. The
base run of the model represents closely the executives' expectations and confirms the
general patterns of typical startup companies.
There are three reasons why I focus on a startup company. First, shared capitalism
policies such as stock options, stock grants and profit sharing are important motivational
tools in addition to salary in cash-constrained startup companies (Blasi, Kruse and
Bernstein 2003). Second, I am interested in studying the long-term dynamic effects of
shared capitalism policies across the firm life cycle, starting from the founding stage.
Third, research has shown that founders have long-term imprinting effects on
organizational design and policies (Burton 2001, Burton and Beckman 2007, Beckman
and Burton 2008). Understanding the impact of various shared capitalism policies since
the founding phase is highly relevant to the practice of entrepreneurship.
3. Policy Analysis: I conduct simulation analyses to study how various combinations of
salary, stock options, stock grants, profit sharing schemes and employee participation
efforts influence employee behavior and firm performance over time. The simulation
results offer insights into the dynamic effects of shared capitalism policies. Eleven
propositions on the conditions under which shared capitalism policies improve firm
performance are presented. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to ensure the robustness of
the analyses and guide future research.
1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are, first, while the majority of the SHRM and
HPWS literature tends to focus on testing a specific linkage in isolation, I provide a
dynamic causal feedback model of an integrated HPWS linking HR policies, employee
behaviors, business processes and firm performance. Second, eleven propositions on the
dynamic effects of shared capitalism policies are presented. These propositions can serve
as a guide for future empirical studies to test the dynamic hypotheses stated in the
propositions.
1.5 Outline of Dissertation
This chapter presents the importance of shared capitalism policies and the overall
approach to address the research question: under what conditions do shared capitalism
policies improve firm performance?
Part I: Literature Review
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature in employee ownership and
identifies the gaps in the literature.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature in SHRM and HPWS, and identifies five methodological
challenges in the literature.
Part II: Method
Chapter 4 describes the system dynamics method and how system dynamics can address
the methodological challenges in SHRM and HPWS.
Chapter 5 presents an overview of the research methods used in this dissertation, such as
the methods for model building, model estimation and calibration and model analysis.
Part III: Model Description
Chapter 6 presents a high-level overview of the model such as the model framework, the
firm structure, model sectors and a causal loop diagram of HPWS.
Chapter 7 describes the key model sectors and model formulations in detail and the initial
conditions used to calibrate the model.
Chapter 8 presents the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset and the regression estimates of
the non-linear functional forms of various employee ownership effects.
Chapter 9 describes the employee participation structure in the model, such as the process
of building participation culture and its impact on employee behavior.
Part IV: Model Analysis
Chapter 10 describes the business strategy, employee behavior and firm performance in
the base case scenario.
Chapter 11 presents policy analysis of various shared capitalism policies and offers
eleven propositions regarding the dynamic effects of shared capitalism policies on
employee behavior and firm performance.
Chapter 12 presents two sets of sensitivity analyses: one on the effect of financial
compensation on job satisfaction and the other on a sudden decrease in sales productivity.
Chapter 13 showcases the Clean Technology Startup Management Flight Simulator, a
gaming interface developed for teaching dynamic strategies of running a startup
company.
Part IV: Conclusion
Chapter 14 summarizes the research question, methods and findings of this dissertation.
Chapter 15 presents the theoretical, empirical, methodological and teaching contributions
offered by this thesis.
Chapter 16 describes the limitations and suggests further research in model analysis,
empirical studies and model development.
PART I: LITERATURE REVIEW
2. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
2.1 Theories of Employee Ownership
Employee ownership takes many different forms, ranging from simple bonuses paid in
employee shares (which can hardly be called "ownership"); to more structured and
indirect schemes with recurrent payments to employees' investment accounts; to periodic
trade administered by a trust (which is a bit more like real "ownership"); and to
worker/producer cooperatives (which come closest to real "ownership").
Toscano (1983) developed a typology of employee ownership with three general types:
direct ownership, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), and producer cooperatives.
Within these types, employee ownership forms vary according to at least eight different
factors: the function of the shares, how the shares are allocated and administered, the
principles of control, and the provisions for dealing with the following: sale and transfer,
share concentration, new employees, and outside investors (Toscano, 1983).
Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein (2003) described the "culture of egalitarianism" pioneered by
high-tech startups, or what they called "partnership capitalism." Partnership capitalism in
high-tech startups has two basic strands: empowerment (teamwork, participation in
decision-making, employee board representatives, and information sharing) and share
options (ownership) for everyone.
Rosen, Case and Staubus (2005) derived a model - the "equity model" - of how the
business has to be structured and run in order to succeed in reframing mindsets and
changing behaviors. This equity model contains three key elements: first, stock
ownership is significant enough that "I" matter to all the employees' financial future. The
second is an ownership culture in which people think and feel like owners. The third
element is a shared understanding of key business disciplines and a common commitment
to pursuing them.
Rosen and Rodgers (2007) proposed six essential rules for creating an ownership culture.
First, provide a financially meaningful ownership stake, enough to serve an important
part of each employee's financial security. Second, provide ownership education
teaching people how the ownership plan works. Third, train people in business literacy
so they have the tools to think like entrepreneurs about company performance. Fourth,
share performance data about how the company is doing overall and how each work
group contributes to that. Fifth, share profits through bonuses, profit sharing, or other
tools. Six, build employee involvement not just by allowing employees to contribute
ideas and information but by making that part of their everyday work through teams,
feedback opportunities, devolution of authority, and other structures.
Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) developed a model expressing an "ownership high-
performance work system." They proposed a set of organizational practices that translate
the ownership rights (Table 2.1) and argued that in order to be effective, an HRM system
with employee ownership should include the following HRM practices: participation in
decision-making, profit sharing, information sharing, training for business literacy and
mediation. The relationships between these core HRM practices are partially conditional,
and partially multiplicative. An employee cannot be a real owner if he or she has no say,
if he or she does not share in the returns, if he or she has no information about the
business or does not understand the information that is being shared - i.e., the employee
owner must be "business literate" (Rousseau and Shperling, 2003). The presence or
absence of these core HRM practices determines whether or not the HRM system
consistently sends the message that employees deserve to be owners and that they are
taken seriously as such.
Table 2.1: Translation of Ownership Rights into Organizational Practices
Owesi Coprt Goenac HR Prcie
Rights Prcie
Use e Voting rights e Participation in decision-making
* Shareholders' meetings * Information sharing
* Board membership e Training for business literacy
e Mediation
Returns * Dividends e Profit sharing
* Share price
Sale e Simply decide to sell shares e Participation in decision-making
about employee ownership
* Sharing of information with regard
to employee ownership
* Training for business literacy to
understand and be capable of the
above
Source: Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006)
2.2 Empirical Studies of Employee Ownership
Kaarsemaker (2006) conducted a thorough literature review of employee ownership over
the past thirty years. He found a prototypical quantitative study on the effects of
employee ownership:
e Focuses on company-level issues from either a financial perspective or a
people perspective;
e Uses cross-sectional data (i.e., data from a single point in time);
e Is limited to a single country (the U.S.);
* Analyzes data from many companies if it applies a financial perspective, but
from a small number of companies if it applies a people perspective;
e Concentrates on a single type of employee ownership, mostly ESOPs;
e Finds favorable effects relating to employee ownership;
* Compares shareholders with non-shareholders, or employee ownership
companies with non-employee ownership companies; and
e Ignores interaction effects.
Out of the 129 studies reviewed, 59 employed a people perspective and almost without
exception focused solely on the effects of employee ownership on employee behavior and
attitudes. Turnover (intentions), commitment, job satisfaction, motivation, and
absenteeism are the most commonly researched employee behaviors and attitudes. The
remaining 70 studies employed afinancial perspective and focused on the effects of
employee ownership on the financial performance and productivity of companies.
Examples of commonly used financial performance measures are: profit margins, return
on assets, and Tobin's Q. Value added per employee and sales per employee are
examples of commonly used productivity measures.
By far the majority (87, or 67.4 percent) of studies found clear favorable results relating
to employee ownership: 39 out of 59 studies with a people perspective, 48 out of 70
studies with a financial perspective. The findings of 14 studies (10.9 percent; 8 with a
people perspective, 6 with a financial perspective) could straightforwardly be called
negative. This leaves 28 studies (21.7 percent) that found no significant associations with
employee ownership, or with results that were simply inconclusive (12 with a people
perspective, 16 with a financial perspective).
In sum, two-thirds of employee ownership studies found favorable effects relating to
employee ownership, while one-third did not. One-tenth of all studies found negative
effects. However, positive effects do not appear to come about automatically (Conte and
Svejnar, 1990; Kruse, 2002; Kruse and Blasi, 1995; Sesil et al., 2001). Kaarsemaker
(2006) concluded that "the state of affairs is such that scholars and practitioners are still
largely in the dark with regard to the specific conditions under which employee
ownership yields favorable effects."
Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) in their review of employee ownership and SHRM
literature stated:
One of the reasons for the relative weakness of the results from empirical
research on the consequences of employee ownership is that, as yet, the
theory behind many of the studies on the effects of employee ownership
has been underdeveloped. In particular, no research has been done on
comprehensive models of employee ownership and the broader HRM
system.
Despite a lack of comprehensive models, several researchers have focused on
combinations of employee ownership with specific HRM practices, predominantly
participation in decision-making, and a number of notable findings were documented.
The importance of the workforce philosophy, or management's commitment to employee
ownership, for example, is demonstrated by a number of studies (e.g. Culpepper et al.,
2004; Gamble et al., 2002; Klein, 1987; Klein and Hall, 1988; Long, 1982; Rosen et al.,
1986). Also, several HRM practices have been included in the research with differing
results. This mostly relates to forms of participation in decision-making, but also to, for
example, information-sharing (e.g. Freeman et al., 2004; French and Rosenstein, 1984;
Kalmi, 2002), and profit-sharing (e.g. Brown et al., 1999; Freeman et al., 2004; Wilson
and Peel, 1990). One study (Freeman et al., 2004) included a bundle of HRM practices as
one variable, an 'HRM index'.
Overall, however, the theory behind most of these studies lacks a sophisticated
explanation of why specific practices would be important in relation to employee
ownership, and what would be the added value of employee ownership, or what would be
the added value of combining these other HRM practices with employee ownership. This
lack of theoretical sophistication is reflected in the relatively weak empirical findings.
(Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006)
2.3 Gaps in Employee Ownership Literature
In conclusion, there are four main gaps and potential contributions in the employee
ownership literature:
2.3.1 Contingency Theory
The specific conditions under which employee ownership yields favorable effects are
largely unknown. A contingency theory, as opposed to a universal approach, is needed to
answer under what conditions employee ownership improves firm performance.
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2.3.2 Causal Mechanisms
The theory of the underlying causal mechanisms of employee ownership effects is
underdeveloped. One needs to build a model that captures the causal mechanisms
between HRM practices and firm performance.
2.3.3 Systems Approach
The relationships of employee ownership with other HRM practices and several
contingencies are too "complex and intertwined" (Poole and Jenkins 1990) to assume a
simple isolated relationship with participation in decision-making or some other single
factor or number of factors. One needs an integrated systems approach that connects the
isolated linkages as a whole.
2.3.4 Dynamic Analysis
Most of the empirical studies on employee ownership effects are static in the sense that
they do not take timing into consideration. The field of employee ownership would
benefit from a dynamic analysis of how different timing (span across the industry
lifecycle) of employee ownership policies affects employee behavior and firm
performance over time.
3. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN STRATEGIC HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK
SYSTEM
This chapter reviews the field of Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) and
High Performance Work Systems (HPWS). SHRM and HPWS aim to study two broad
questions: (1) how do human resource management (HRM) systems influence firm
performance? and (2) What determines the form of HRM systems? The first question can
be separated into two types of studies aiming to understand: (LA) the HRM-employee
behavior (productivity, turnover) link; and (iB) the HRM-performance link (see Figure
3.1).
Figure 3.1: SHRM/HPWS Research Questions
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(Ichniowski
Determinants of HRM et al 97) Employee Behavior Firm
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On the first question much progress has already been made. MacDuffie (1995) found in
his sample of worldwide auto assembly plants that HR practices tended to "bundle"
productivity and quality. Huselid (1995) found that HPWS have an economically and
statistically significant impact on both intermediate employee outcomes (turnover and
productivity) as well as short- and long-term measures of corporate financial
performance. Delery and Doty (1996) found that among a sample of banks, significant
relationships occurred between HR practices and accounting profits. Youndt et al. (1996)
found that certain combinations of HR practices were related to operational performance
indicators among their sample of manufacturing firms. Guthrie (2001) surveyed
corporations in New Zealand and found their HR practices were related to turnover and
profitability.
While these and many other studies (see Combs et al. 2006 for a meta-analysis) confirm
the positive relationships between HRM and performance, much less is known about the
causal mechanisms linking work systems and performance (Wright et al., 2001). The
failure to capture the causal mechanisms is in part due to the methodological challenges
in the field (Ichniowski et al. 1996, Guest 1997, Becker and Huselid 1998, Huselid and
Becker 1996, Gerhart et al. 2000, Becker and Huselid 2006). This chapter presents a
review and critique of the SHRM/HPWS literature and identifies five methodological
challenges in the field. The next chapter then addresses how the system dynamics
simulation method could contribute to the field of SHRM/HPWS by addressing its
methodological challenges.
3.1 Lack of Causal Process Modeling
The majority of SHRM/HPWS empirical work relies on survey-based multivariate
regression analysis to estimate the relationship between HRM systems and performance.
This vein of research is epitomized in Huselid and Becker's statement: "based on four
national surveys and observations on more than 2000 firms, our judgment is that the
effect of a one standard deviation change in the HR system is 10-20% of a firm's market
value" (Huselid and Becker 2000, p. 851). One limitation of such an approach is the
correlation observation of what might happen between two variables; the approach lacks
a causal explanation of why correlation happens. To explain why things happen, we need
to go beyond regression analysis and build causal process theory to explain the
underlying mechanisms. "If a regression tells us about a relation between two variables -
for instance, if you wind a watch, it will keep running - mechanisms pry the back off the
watch and show how" (Davis and Marquis 2006). Andersen et al. (2006) in their call for
understanding mechanisms in organizational research state that
Mechanisms allow us to see beyond the surface-level description of a
phenomenon. If we observe two variables, Y and X and some association
between them, we know little more than that X and Y are correlated. Does
X cause Y? Does Y cause X? Or are we observing a spurious correlation
between the two brought about by a third unobserved variable, Z?
Answering this question requires one to move beyond studying the X-Y
relationship to addressing the questions of why and how the relationship
occurs. In other words, what is the process underlying the relationship?
For the field of SHRM to move forward, we need to build process theory to explain the
relationships we observe. This very need has led Becker and Huselid (2006) to call for
the opening of the 'black box" of HRM-performance links: "A clearer articulation of the
"black box" between HR and firm performance is the most pressing theoretical and
empirical challenge in the SHRM literature."
To open the black box, one needs to first propose the underlying causal mechanism and
then conduct empirical testing. On the theoretical front, Becker and Huselid (1998)
provide a model of the HR-shareholder value relationship (Figure 3.2). This model
provides a causal path of how HRM influences firm performance.
Figure 3.2: A model of the HR-shareholder value relationship (Becker and Huselid 1998)
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Another approach is to apply the balanced score card framework to the HR sector and
propose the causal linkages among the HR system, workforce, business process, customer
and financial performance (Figure 3.3). This line of research offers a promising path to
open the black box (Becker et al. 2001, Beatty et al. 2003, Huselid et al. 2005).
Figure 3.3: HR and Business Scorecard (Beatty et al. 2003)
The empirical testing of causal mechanisms lags significantly behind the theoretical front.
Despite the necessity of considering mediating links for understanding the impact of HR
practices on firm performance (Becker and Gerhart 1996), prior studies have rarely
specified or tested specific HR practices or the underlying organizational capabilities for
establishing these links (Wright et al. 2001). Collins and Smith (2006) are among the first
to empirically test the mediating factors between HRM and performance. They proposed
a model linking commitment-based HR practices to firm performance (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Model Linking Commitment-Based HR Practices to Firm Performance (Collin and Smith 2006)
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Through a field study of 136 technology companies, Collins and Smith found that
commitment-based HR practices were positively related to the organizational social
climates of trust, cooperation, and shared codes and language. In turn, these measures of
a firm's social climate were related to the firm's capability to exchange and combine
knowledge, a relationship that predicted firm revenue from new products and services
and firm sales growth. They argue that researchers "must explore mediating firm
capabilities to fully understand the role of HR practices on firm performance" (Collins
and Smith 2006, p. 553).
Collins and Smith expressed surprise at discovering that relationships between the social
climate variables were only partially mediated through employee knowledge exchange
and combination. They concluded "it is likely that climates of trust, cooperation, and
shared codes and language are strategic variables yielding other firm-level performance
benefits beyond knowledge creation" (p. 555). This hints at the other causal paths in the
HRM-performance black box. As I will argue in later sections, system dynamics is
particularly well suited for modeling the causal mechanism of how HR practices
influence organizational performance, thus helping to open this "black box".
3.2 Recursive Model
Another common concern in the SHRM/HPWS empirical literature is "the caveat that the
positive cross-sectional HR-firm performance relationship is, in part, influenced by
mutual causation or simultaneity bias" (Becker and Huselid 2006). Most of the empirical
work in SHRM/HPWS adopts the recursive model assumption for examining the HRM-
performance link. Recursive models meet the following conditions: 1) Models are
hierarchical. All causal effects in the model are unidirectional in nature, i.e., no two
variables in the model are reciprocally related, either directly or indirectly. 2) All pairs of
error (or disturbance) terms in the model are assumed to be uncorrelated (Barry 1984).
An advantage of recursive models is that they are easy to estimate. All recursive models
are identified. OLS regression can be used to obtain unbiased estimates of the model's
coefficients. If a recursive model is employed when the assumptions required are violated
and if OLS regression is used to estimate the coefficients of the model, the resulting
estimates will be biased and inconsistent and therefore give an inaccurate assessment of
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the nature of the magnitude of the causal effects. Thus, unless one is convinced that (1)
causation among the variables is strictly unidirectional, and (2) the factors constituting
the error terms in the model are fundamentally different for each equation, recursive
models should not be used; more realistic non-recursive models should be estimated
instead (Barry 1984).
Unfortunately, in many situations the assumptions of recursive models do not in fact
hold. Take Huselid (1995), one of the most highly cited works in this area, as an example.
Huselid assumes a recursive model of HRM-performance link by regressing:
Firm Performance =f (HR Strategy, Firm Employment, Capital Intensity, Unionization,
Sales Growth, R&D intensity)
The inherent assumption is that HR strategy influences firm performance unidirectionally
and that HR managers do not consider past performance when they decide on HRM. This
seems unrealistic. What is missing in the past recursive model studies is the concept of
dual causation, or feedback loops (in system dynamics terms). A more realistic model
recognizes the possibility of dual causation from HRM to performance and from
performance to HRM in a feedback system.
Guest et al. (2003) and Wright et al. (2005) are among the first to study dual causation.
They rely on analyses of HR measures at Time T and measures of firm performance at
Times T+ I and T- 1. They argue that the absence of a HR effect on Performance at T+ 1,
controlling for Performance at T- 1, calls into question any interpretation that HR's effect
in prior cross-sectional research is a causal relationship. Guest et al. (2003) and Wright et
al. (2005) have done the field a service by raising the right question of dual causation, but
their empirical tests fall short of tackling the complexity of the problem. Aside from
relying on pre- and post-performance measures to capture dual causation, Wright et al.
(2005) limited their analysis to simple and partial correlations. Although their reliance on
data from a single firm arguably should reduce the variance in the firm performance
measures, the simple correlation between HR practices and profitability never explains
more than 10% of the variance in their profitability measure (Table 4, p. 429). By relying
on simple and partial correlations, they fail to provide an explicit causal explanation of
how past performance influences HRM.
One problem with this literature is that it is mainly based on regression analysis from
survey data. To understand how performance feeds back to HRM, we need to have a
more elaborate theory of how HRM systems are determined, followed by empirical
testing. To have a better sense of how HR managers make decisions on what HRM to
adopt and why, we need to rely on qualitative methods to elicit the mental models of HR
managers, such as what information cues they use to decide whether to adopt HPWS or
not. Some HR managers argue that more performance leads to more HPWS because
more financial resources are available. Others argue that HPWS is introduced precisely
when performance is low in order to improve it. Other hypotheses also likely exist. We
need more in-depth qualitative fieldwork to understand what is really going on in HR
managers' minds. Ichniowski et al. (1996) concluded their seminar review paper with a
similar statement:
To complement these quantitative studies, we will always need detailed
qualitative studies that observe hard-to-quantify data and shed light on
crucial details of how to implement innovative practices successfully - in
other words, to get into the 'black box' that explains how and why people
perform as they do. Ultimately, results will only be convincing if they
show up in both qualitative and quantitative studies.
I will argue in the later section that system dynamics (SD), with qualitative grounded
theory building as a core method for building the model, is well suited to address this
issue. I will also point out that the concept of feedback is central to SD models, where
the underlying causal mechanism of how dual causation could occur in the HRM-
performance relationship could be captured.
3.3 Concurrent Measures
Timing of data collection on the dependent and independent variables is also another
issue in the SHRM/HPWS empirical literature. Wright et al. (2005) conducted a literature
review of sixty-eight empirical studies examining the relationship between multiple HR
practices and performance. They categorized the studies into four types of research
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design. First, "post-predictive" are studies measuring HR practices after the performance
period, resulting in actually "predicting" past performance. Such designs ask respondents
for their firm's current HR practices but measures their past performance (i.e.,
performance up until the point of the response), presenting a logical inconsistency for
arguing that HR practices cause performance. Second, "retrospective" studies ask
respondents to recall HR practices existing before the performance period. The primary
problem here is that key informants may not be able to accurately recall sets of HR
practices used in previous years due to inappropriate rationalizations, oversimplifications,
faulty post hoc attributions and simple lapses of memory (Golden 1992, Huber and Power
1985). Third, "contemporaneous" design collects contemporaneous HR practice and
performance data. Fourth, "predictive" design assesses how the HR practices at one
point in time relate to the subsequent firm performance at a later period.
Post-predictive design is the weakest form among the four types of research design for
explaining whether HR practices cause performance. Unfortunately, Wright et al. (2005)
found the vast majority of studies (50 out of the 70 designs) used a "post-predictive"
design, and stated that "it is not surprising given the relative ease of data collection, but it
does make one wonder how such studies can legitimately suggest that HR practices
'cause' performance." Six studies used a retrospective and four used a contemporaneous
design. Predictive design, the strongest of the four for arguing a causal relationship, was
used in only 10 studies. This is a disturbing summary of the state of empirical studies in
SHRM/HPWS and seriously highlights the importance of timing in our data collection.
3.4 Linear Assumption
Another issue in the SHRM/HPWS empirical literature is the linear assumption in the
OLS model specification. A typical regression takes some variant of the form:
Organizational Performance = a + b*HPWS + c*Control Variables + Error Term
The assumption is that there is a linear relationship between HPWS and performance.
Huselid (1995), for example, found "a one-standard-deviation increase in [HPWS]
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associated with a relative 7.05 percent decrease in turnover and, on a per employee basis,
$27,044 more in sales and $18,641 and $3,814 more in market value and profits,
respectively" (p. 667). The problem with such findings is it assumes the same
incremental impact regardless of the current HRM level of sophistication, which is most
likely unrealistic. One would expect the link between HRM and performance to be
nonlinear. Becker and Huselid (1998 p. 75) find a nonlinear relationship between quintile
changes in HR architecture sophistication and shareholder equity (Figure 3.5). They
reason:
The first of these strategies, where the firm improves their HRM system to
the point where they are 'part of the pack,' has a high payoff is because it
represents a minimum threshold. Beyond that point (i.e. plus or minus one
standard deviation around the mean), changes in the HRM system have
much smaller effects. At this point firms are competitive, but they have not
optimized their HRM system to the point where they have begun to enjoy
a sustained competitive advantage. Firms only begin to build that
competitive advantage when they have moved at least one standard
deviation above the mean, or the upper 16% of the distribution (Becker
and Huselid 1998)




Source: Huselid and Becker (1995)
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Other hypotheses could emerge, however; by explicitly modeling the causal path of HRM
on performance in a system dynamics model, one could simulate the incremental impact
of HRM on performance at different HRM levels. Such a relationship will most likely be
nonlinear as one causal loop dominates another at different time periods (Sterman 2000).
This depiction, as in Figure 3.3, enables deeper understanding of the underlying causes
giving rise to nonlinear relationships.
3.5 Omitted Variable Bias
Omitted variable bias occurs if an omitted variable is correlated with both the HPWS
variable and the dependent variable. The direction and magnitude of that bias depend on
the direction and magnitude of those correlations. For instance, organizations adopting
HPWS may have both higher-quality and more productive employees. To what extent is
improved performance due to HPWS alone? The higher the effect of the omitted
employee quality on performance, the more upwardly biased is the HPWS coefficient, as
it "absorbs" the omitted effect.
If the omitted variables are relatively stable over the study period, then the use of
longitudinal data examining whether changes in HPWS predict changes in performance
will be better able to control for the omitted variables. If the omitted variables are not
stable, however, then the only remedy is to identify them from theory, measure them, and
attempt to control them statistically (Ichniowski et al. 1996). I argue that another
alternative is to explicitly model the causal path of the mediating and direct effects of
these variables in the HPWS-performance link by using system dynamics. The more one
is able to capture the relevant variables and to structure them in the model boundary, the
more one is able to isolate the specific impact of HPWS on performance.
PART 11: METHOD
4. SYSTEM DYNAMICS METHOD
4.1 Why System Dynamics?
To develop theory of the causal mechanism from HPWS to performance, one needs to go
beyond survey-based regression analysis and employ other methods such as process
theory building and simulation. Davis et al. (2007) call for developing theory through
simulation methods:
Simulation enables the elaboration of rough, basic (or what we term
simple) theory that is often derived from inductive cases or formal
modeling into logically precise and comprehensive theory. This theory can
then be effectively examined further using deductive logic and empirical
evidence. Simulation is particularly useful when the theoretical focus is
longitudinal, nonlinear, or processual, or when empirical data are
challenging to obtain. (Davis et al. 2007)
With this in mind, I take a simulation approach that is quite different from those present
in the existing literature. It is difficult to test hypotheses to explain the impact of various
forms of employee ownership because it is not possible to conduct experiments with real
organizations. Models provide a means to explore the consequences of alternative
policies and environmental conditions in target settings. Capturing complex interactions
among various employee ownership policies in a model requires a methodology that can
represent the physical and institutional structure of a firm and its markets, that can
portray the decision rules of the actors in the system, and that can deal with multiple
levels of analysis (product development, sales, human resource, market, the stock market)
and link them in causal feedback systems (Sterman, Repenning and Kofman 1997). For
these reasons I choose to use the system dynamics method to develop the theory and
build the model.
System dynamics (SD) is a formal modeling and simulation method designed to explain
dynamic behavior generated from underlying causal structures characterized by
feedbacks, nonlinearity and time delays (Forrester 1961, Sterman 2000). SD starts with a
problem definition illustrated in a behavior-over-time graph, such as "why does firm
performance vary over time, given a set of HPWS?" The assumption that "structure
determines behavior" is core to SD methodology. To understand the dynamic effects of
HPWS on performance, one maps out the underlying causal structure using qualitative
grounded theory building methods through ethnography, interview, case study and
archival data. That structure is represented in a set of reinforcing and balancing feedback
loops, called a Causal Loop Diagram, capturing dynamic hypotheses responsible for the
problem. By explicitly modeling the causal paths from HPWS to performance, and
simulating the dynamic behavior of performance under various HPWS scenarios, one is
able to generate and test a set of causal theories explaining the impact of HPWS on
performance.
SD has been used to study the behavior of the firm (e.g., Forrester 1961; Lyneis 1980;
Morecroft 1985; Sterman, Repenning and Kofman 1997; Oliva, Sterman and Giese
2003), organizational dynamics (Repenning and Sterman 2002, Repenning 2001, 2002,
Rudolph and Repenning 2002, Sastry 1997) and managerial decision making (Sterman
1989a, 1989b; Paich and Sterman 1993).
4.2 Benefits of System Dynamics
Table 4.1 summarizes how system dynamics could help address the current
methodological challenges in SHRM that cause the failure to capture the causal
mechanisms and paths linking work systems and performance.
Table 4.1: SHRM Methodological Challenge and System Dynamics Approach
1 Lack of causal process model Causal process model
2 Recursive assumption Feedback loops
3 Linear assumption Nonlinear dynamics
4 Timing of data collection Time delay
5 Omitted variable bias Mediating and moderating causal paths
4.2.1 Causal Process Model
With regard to the black box criticism, a SD model provides an explicit causal theory of
why and under what conditions various HPWS improve performance. Such a formal
model building process helps us better understand the causal logics proposed in the
existing literature as we attempt to formalize them. It also allows us to test the internal
consistency of the proposed theories and to identify potential gaps for further
development similar to Sastry's (1997) SD model of the punctuated equilibrium theory.
4.2.2 Feedback Loops
To turn the existing recursive models into non-recursive ones, SD uses various
reinforcing and balancing feedback loops to capture the underlying structures. Such
feedback loops are grounded in the actual processes discovered through prior literature
and fieldwork research. SD allows one to address the dual causation or simultaneity issue
raised by Wright et al. (2005). For example, SD could model explicitly how performance
influences HR managers' decisions to adopt HR practices and close the HRM-
performance-HRM loop. Through partial model testing (Homer 1983, Morecroft 1985),
one is able to test the intended rationality of HR managers and shed light on the question:
if HPWS have positive results, why are they so slow to diffuse within and across
organizations?
4.2.3 Nonlinear Dynamics
Instead of assuming linearity, SD is rooted in the theory of nonlinear dynamics and
explicitly models nonlinear relationships among variables. One is able to study tipping
dynamics, such as the reverse effect of stock options when they go underwater, using
loop dominance analysis (Richardson 1984, Sterman 2000). Also, through simulation
analysis, one could not only estimate the direction of a HPWS effect, but also its
magnitude over time at various levels of sophistication.
4.2.4 Time Delays
To address issues of timing of data collection, SD explicitly models time delays in
physical, administrative and mental processes through the construct of stocks and flows
(Sterman 2000). For example, SD is able to capture the time it takes for training to have
an impact on productivity and the time it takes to make HR decisions. Both delays help
explain why some companies fail to adopt HPWS after a short experiment, and why some
go through the worse-before-better performance after adopting HPWS successfully (Pil
and MacDuffie 1996).
4.2.5 Mediating and Moderating Causal Paths
SD addresses the omitted variable bias by modeling how individual HR practices
influence performance through various mediating causal paths. It also captures the
moderating effects of how other factors such as business processes and market conditions
influence performance. By controlling for these factors, one is able to isolate the effects
of HPWS as much as possible.
These are clearly some contributions SD can make to the field of SHRM/HPWS and
there could be more, as SD is increasingly adopted as a legitimate method. Like any other
method, there are limitations to the SD method. Further research is needed to identify
under what conditions SD is a useful method in SHRMI/HPWS and how SD could be
combined with regression analysis to help open the black box. This dissertation serves as
one first step.
4.3 How Can System Dynamics Contribute to Strategic Human
Resource Management?
This section proposes four generic steps of how SD can contribute to SHRM/HPWS.
Their sequential process is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Steps of System Dynamics Method
1. System Dynamics
Model Building
Qualitative Field Regression Existing 2. Simulation
Research Anal sis Theory Analysis
3. Dynamic
Theory Building
1. System Dynamics Model Building: to open the black box generating the correlation
observations, system dynamics is used to build a causal process model of how HR
practices, through various causal paths, lead to firm performance. The model is
constructed based on existing theoretical and empirical findings in the literature. This
process allows one to clarify and test the causal logic of existing theories by turning
verbal theories into formal mathematical models. If we find incompleteness or
inconsistency, it allows us to identify the gap and to propose new theories. Sastry's
(1997) formal model of punctuated equilibrium helps identify gaps in the original
theory and provides a refined theory. Similar approaches could be applied to
SHRM/HPWS.
When there are gaps in the causal mechanisms found in the existing literature, one
can conduct qualitative field research to map out the actual causal process. This
engages the grounded theory building approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) to generate
new theory when the existing theory is unclear. Such mixed methods among
quantitative regression analysis, qualitative field research and simulation methods
allow the model to draw on the strength of each method to improve our understanding
of the underlying causal mechanisms.
2. Simulation Analysis: Once a causal model is built with a set of differential equations
characterizing the causal relationships among variables, one can conduct simulation
analysis by changing the independent variable that we care about, such as the profit
sharing percentage. One can test how different levels of profit sharing in turn
influence firm performance over time. Simulation data is generated to show the
relationship between profit sharing and performance.
3. Dynamic Theory Building: If the simulated data confirms the previous empirical
findings, one gains confidence that the model may have captured the underlying
causal mechanism between profit sharing and firm performance. The model
contributes to the field by providing a dynamic theory of how profit sharing leads to
higher (or lower) performance.
4. Regression Analysis: If the simulated data does not confirm the empirical finding,
this informs us that either something is missing in the model or the previous
regression model was mis-specified. If one is reasonably confident about the model,
one can specify the regression equation on the real data based on the causal model
and collect additional data if needed. The new regression analysis can test the
dynamic hypothesis from step 3 and provide further empirical evidence.
It may well be that the system dynamics model is mis-specified. Perhaps a function is
not correctly estimated, or a feedback loop is missing from the model. One can
conduct further field research and data collection to revise the system dynamics
model and propose a new dynamic theory.
This process not only allows us to identify gaps in the existing theory, but also
enables the generation of new theories that can then be tested empirically using
regression analysis. The iterative process goes on (as illustrated by the circular loop
above) between empirical testing and theory building. As a result, our understanding
of the underlying causal mechanisms improves over time.
5. METHODS OF DISSERTATION RESEARCH
This chapter presents the methods and data sources used for building the model in this
dissertation. It includes mixed quantitative, qualitative and simulation methods.
5.1 Method for Model Building
To study the causal mechanisms of how HR practices influence firm performance, I
develop a system dynamics model of a clean technology startup company with a detailed
HPWS. The model captures how various compensation and HR practices influence the
employee behaviors that drive business processes. The model further expresses how
those business processes interact with market conditions and generates firm performance
in a dynamic feedback system.
The model is grounded on prior literature and multiple data sources shown in Figure 5.1.
There are three core structures in the model: a clean technology startup structure
(business processes and customers), a HPWS, and an accounting and corporate finance
structure.
Figure 5.1: Sources for Model Building
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5.1.1 Clean Technology Startup Model
The core clean technology startup structure is based on Miller's (2007) dissertation "New
Venture Commercialization of Clean Energy Technologies." My contribution is refining
the Miller model and adding a detailed HPWS, a detailed corporate finance and
accounting system and a multiple competitor structure.
5.1.2 High Performance Work System
The detailed HPWS captures a set of "hard" financial compensation policies such as
salary, stock grants, stock options and profit sharing along with "soft" HR practices such
as employee participation, training, coaching and job security. To build the HRM
structure in the model, I perform a thorough literature review on the existing theoretical
and empirical findings in SHRM, HPWS and Employee Ownership and then transform
the proposed relationships into a formal differential equation model. This process
enables me to better understand the causal logics proposed in the current literature as I
formalize them.
In addition to the HR literature, the model is also grounded on prior system dynamics
literature on human resource management thanks to system dynamics' rich history in
modeling workforce flow and management (Sterman 2000).
5.1.3 Accounting and Corporate Finance Structure
To the accounting and corporate finance structure I add a detailed balance sheet, income
statement, cash flow, firm valuation and shares outstanding, ownership structure,
government grants and venture capital structure. To ground my model, I draw on a prior
system dynamics model (Oliva, Sterman and Giese 2003) and on existing accounting and
corporate finance literature and textbooks. To clarify some internal firm processes, I
conduct interviews with scholars, professionals and managers to ensure the proposed
structure and behavior is robust in their experience.
5.2 Method for Model Estimation and Calibration
To ensure the model is grounded in rigorous empirical evidence, I conduct both
quantitative regression analysis for estimating the functional forms and qualitative field
research for calibrating the model of a startup company.
5.2.1 Regression Estimation using the NBER Shared Capitalism Dataset
One of the main empirical contributions of this dissertation is the estimation of various
employee ownership effects. As understanding employee ownership effects is the main
purpose of this dissertation, I estimated the non-linear functional forms of various
employee ownership effects. I was able to collaborate with Professors Joseph Blasi and
Douglas Kruse from Rutgers University to run regression estimates using their National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Shared Capitalism dataset (Kruse, Freeman and
Blasi 2010).' The NBER survey administered 80 to 100 questions to 41,206 employees
in fourteen firms at 323 work sites that had some shared capitalism modes of
compensation. This data set is the largest one ever conducted on workers in shared
capitalism firms. The 80 to 100 survey questions cover most of the variables found in a
typical HPWS with shared capitalism modes of compensation, making it the best source
available for estimating the employee ownership effects.
5.2.2 Field Research of a Clean Technology Startup Company
To calibrate the model, I conducted interviews and collected archival data on an early-
stage clean technology startup company that produces energy efficiency systems for
commercial and industrial buildings. Given the inherent limitation of an early-stage
startup - there is no later-stage time-series data - the company data was used to
parameterize the initial conditions of the model. I interviewed the executives to identify
their decision-making rules for pricing, financing, human resource and- compensation
policies and their projections for business performance. The reasons for modeling a
startup company are stated in Section 1.3.
5.2.3 Base Case Validation
While the model cannot perform a historical fit analysis as there is no time-series data
available, the stylized pattern of behavior shown in the base case scenario is consistent
with the entrepreneurship literature: the "valley of death" dynamics (the period of time
from when a startup firm receives an initial capital contribution to when it begins
generating revenues and a positive cash flow); the need for several rounds of VC
financing in a long product development and sales cycle industry; the product life cycle
of going from infancy, growth, maturity to decline; and the strategic shifting from
product development at the early stage to a sales-focused strategy in the growth stage and
service model at the mature and decline stage. Future work can be done to calibrate the
model to a startup with a long enough time-series data set.
'I would like to thank Professors Joseph Blasi and Douglas Kruse of Rutgers University for their
generosity in sharing their valuable data with me.
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5.3 Method for Model Analysis
5.3.1 Policy Analysis
I conducted simulation analyses to study how various combinations of salary, stock
grants, stock options, profit sharing schemes and employee participation efforts influence
employee behavior and firm performance over time. The simulation results offer insights
into the dynamic effects of shared capitalism policies and allow one to tease out the direct
versus mediating effects through various causal paths in the system. Eleven propositions
addressing the research question - under what conditions do shared capitalism policies
improve firm performance? - are proposed. Several thresholds are identified to explain
the tipping dynamics observed in the simulated employee ownership effects on firm
performance.
5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To ensure the robustness of model analysis, I conducted two sensitivity analyses. The
first studies the extent to which firm performance is sensitive to the effect of financial
compensation on job satisfaction. The second sensitivity analysis focuses on uncertainty
in competitive pressure and tests how sensitive firm performance is to a sudden decrease
in sales productivity.
PART III: MODEL DESCRIPTION
6. MODEL OVERVIEW
This chapter provides a high-level overview of the model. Detailed model formulations
are explained in Chapter 7.
6.1 Model Framework and Boundary
Figure 6.1 illustrates the model framework. The inner four thick boxes capture the
internal processes within a firm. The outer boxes are leverage points or strategies
managers can employ to potentially influence the processes. This model offers a generic
process theory of the firm and the role of managers. The four internal processes are
employee behaviors, business processes, market conditions and financial performance.
They resemble the balanced scorecard framework: learning and growth, business
processes, customers and finance (Kaplan and Norton 1992, 1996a, 1996b). What is
different about this framework is its transformation of the traditional balanced scorecard
into a dynamic feedback framework with explicit causal linkages connecting across the
four quadrants; system dynamics is particularly suited to developing dynamic balanced
scorecards (Kaplan and Norton 1996a, Akkermans and Oorschot 2002) using causal
feedback modeling. Given that this dissertation focuses on the internal processes of a
startup company, this model helps make the framework more explicit and can be used to
guide strategic planning for a startup company.
The model's inner quadrants capture the various reinforcing growth loops (Sterman 2000,
Chapter 10) propelling a company as well as capturing the balancing loops that constrain
growth. In particular, the model captures how various HR policies (hiring, selection,
training, salary, stock grants, stock options and profit sharing) drive employee attitudes
and behaviors (financial compensation, psychological ownership, burnout, Job
satisfaction, employee quality, turnover, experience, learning, productivity, and work
effort); how employee behaviors drive business processes (product development,
customer service, sales, and marketing); and how business processes interact with market
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conditions (industry demand, sales cycle, competition, and government regulation) to
generate firm performance (sales, revenue, cost, profit, stock price, ownership share and
net worth). By knowing both the internal firm processes and the managerial policies, one
is able to identify the high leverage points (Sterman 2000) for managers' intervention.
Given that the focus of this dissertation is on the employee ownership effects, I will
analyze various shared capitalism HR policies (located in the lower left-hand corner),
while holding the business strategy, exogenous conditions and funding strategy constant
in Chapter 11.
Figure 6.1: Overall Model Framework
Figure 6.2 shows the model boundary. The four quadrants of firm processes - human
resources, business processes, customers and finance - are endogenously determined.
Inside each box are the model subsectors. Decision rules for compensation policies are
exogenous, because the purpose of the model is to study how various shared capitalism
policies influence internal firm processes and performance. Excluded from the model are
tax regulation of specific employee ownership plans, corporate governance,
disaggregated policy recipients, unions, labor market, venture capital control, debt
financing and multiple startups.
Figure 6.2: Model Boundary
Tax Regulation Corporate Disaggregated








While the model framework provides a high-level overview of the four main sectors in
the model and their corresponding strategies, it does not capture the specific causal
linkages among them. Figure 6.3 shows a more detailed causal loop diagram of key
variables in the firm structure. Causal loop diagrams capture causal linkages among
variables in a set of reinforcing and balancing feedback loops (Sterman 2000). The red
variables are key managerial decision variables and the blue variables are key
performance indicators. To specify model structure and the decision rules for the actors I
drew upon established system dynamics models of the firm (e.g., Forrester 1961; Lyneis
1980; Morecroft 1985; Sterman, Repenning and Kofman 1997; Oliva, Sterman and Giese
2003) and experimental studies of managerial decision making (Sterman 1989a, 1989b;
Paich and Sterman 1993).
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Arrows represent a causal direction moving from the cause (e.g., product feature) to the effect (e.g., unit
cost). Signs ('+' or '-') at arrow heads indicate the polarity of relationships: a '+' denotes that an increase
in the independent variable causes the dependent variable to increase, ceteris paribus (and a decrease
causes a decrease). Similarly, '-'indicates that an increase in the independent variable causes the
dependent variable to decrease (e.g., an increase in product feature causes a decrease in unit cost). The








Table 6.1 shows a list of model sectors. There are four main sectors in the model:
market, product development, HPWS, and accounting and corporate finance. Each sector
has several sub-sectors that detail the specific internal processes. The full model
documentation is listed in the appendix.
Table 6.1: Model Sectors
Market




* Competition: incumbent vs. startup
Product Development
" Product development chain
* Customer support
* Unit costs
" Energy cost savings and customer payback period
Human Resource Management System
" Employee chain: hiring, promotion, turnover and layoff
" Employee types: engineers and sales force
" Employee experience: work experience, coaching and training
* Employee quality
" Compensation policies: salary, stock grants, stock options, profit sharing
" Employee participation
" Job satisfaction: compensation, psychological ownership, burnout, job security
" Employee productivity and work effort
Accounting and Corporate Finance
" Accounting: balance sheet, income statement and cash flow
" Firm valuation and stock price
* Shares outstanding and ownership structure
" Government grants
* Venture capital
" Initial Public Offering
6.4 Causal Loop Diagram of High Performance Work System
Figure 6.4 illustrates some of the key reinforcing loops of the HPWS in the model. All
the red variables are human resource policy variables; the green are job satisfaction
drivers, and the blue are employee behaviors. Job satisfaction is modeled as the central
mediating variable between various HR policies and employee behaviors.
The drivers of job satisfaction are financial compensation and other non-financial drivers
such as job security, psychological ownership and burnout effects. Financial
compensation includes salary, profit sharing and employee net worth; they are determined
by the amount of stock options, stock grants accumulated and the current stock price.
Psychological ownership is driven by the relative share of employee ownership and
participation in the company. Employee ownership without participation has a limited
effect, whereas combining both tends to produce positive results (Kruse, Freeman and
Blasi 2010). Kaarsemaker (2006) found sixteen previous studies of the combination of
employee ownership with participation in decision-making, or with an index of a number
of people management practices: sixty-five percent produced favorable effects, while
none produced negative effects.
Job satisfaction affects turnover, employee quality, employee productivity and work time.
Higher job satisfaction lowers turnover rate and attracts better employee quality at
recruiting. Employee productivity and work time increase as employees are willing to
work harder when they are happier (R6 Work Harder).
Productivity effects are driven by employee experience, employee quality, job
satisfaction and employee participation. Higher turnover decreases average employee
experience as people leave with accumulated experience and the firm must hire rookies,
which lowers the average employee experience level (R3 Turnover). Training increases
employee experience by speeding up learning. Employee quality represents the initial
quality of employees upon recruiting, such as education and skills levels. This quality
variable captures the recruiting selection effect. A company with high job satisfaction
tends to attract and select employees of higher quality, which raises productivity (R4
Employee Quality). Higher job satisfaction can also directly increase productivity
because people are happy with the work and the environment (R5 Happily Productive).
Effective work effort (separated into product development and sales efforts in the model)
raises sales volume and net income. Higher net income leads to higher working capital
and enables the firm to increase hiring. More hiring leads to more employees and greater
effective work effort; this closes the R1 Hiring reinforcing loop. More hiring also leads
to higher perception of job security, which increases job satisfaction and closes the R2
Job Security loop. The R7 Burnout loop captures the burnout effect from working
overtime for too long.
In addition to the seven reinforcing loops, two additional loops close the feedback from
firm performance to employee behavior. Higher net income leads to higher profit
sharing, given a certain profit sharing percentage, which raises job satisfaction and
productivity (R8 Profit Sharing). Higher net income also leads to higher stock price,
which increases employee net worth, given the stock options and grants awarded in the
past (R9 Employee Ownership).
It is important to note that the same reinforcing loop can work as either a virtuous or
vicious cycle. R8 and R9 explain why profit sharing and employee ownership work well
in virtuous cycles when the company is doing well. However, the same loops could turn
into vicious cycles when profit is so low that stock options go under water, which lowers
Job satisfaction and productivity and further reduces sales and profit, as witnessed during
the dot.com bubble (Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein 2003).








Red: Human resource policies.
Green: Job satisfaction driers.
Blue: Employee beha\Aor indicators.
7. MODEL FORMULATION
This chapter explains key model sectors and formulations in detail. Full model
documentation is listed in the appendix.
7.1 Employee Chain and Employee Experience
The human resource sector of the model is closely based on the labor supply chain
introduced in Section 19.1 of Sterman (2000). Following Miller (2007), two types of
employees are represented in the model: engineers and sales people. Engineers are
considered to be employees with any technical or product development responsibilities,
including customer and technical support, engineering or technology management and
strategy positions, etc. Sales people are considered employees with any sales or
marketing responsibilities, including sales or marketing management, production of
materials, etc. Administrative employees (from the CEO to support personnel) are
considered to be split up between the engineering and sales functions (e.g., a CEO who
focuses on technical strategy and product development, but spends 25% of her time
meeting with prospective customers, may be considered 75% an engineer and 25% a
sales person).
Figure 7.1 shows the human resource structure. It takes into account the experience of the
labor force, which is based on the labor co-flow structure detailed in Section 12.2 of
Sterman (2000) and on Miller (2007). I expanded the single employee stock from the
Miller model to stocks of rookies, experienced and former employees. The rookies are
hired into the rookie employee stock through the Rookie Hire Rate. Rookies can either
assimilate to experienced employees after a certain period in the firm, be laid off or
voluntarily quit the firm. Similarly, the experienced employees can either stay in the firm,
be laid off or choose to quit. The turnover rate (or voluntary quit rate) is driven by the
effect of job satisfaction. The higher is the job satisfaction; the lower is the turnover rate.
The actual functional form is estimated using the NBER shared capitalism dataset to be
explained in Chapter 8.
The employee experience co-flow structure captures the number of years employees have
been with the firm. Hiring rookies increases the total rookie fraction and lowers average
employee experience. Layoff and turnover decrease employee experience as people leave
the firm with the experience they have accumulated over the years. Experience gets
accumulated as employees continue working in the firm (captured by the "Increase in
On-the-Job Experience" inflows from Rookies and Experienced): the longer they stay
working, the higher the experience. This is one reason why high voluntary turnover of
experienced employees is costly to employee productivity and firm performance. The
firm can also increase rookie experience through training and coaching (signified by the
variable Learning per Hour for Rookies). Higher experience leads to higher employee
productivity (to be explained later).
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7.2 Work Effort and Productivity
Figure 7.2 shows the work effort and productivity structure. Effective work effort is the
sum of rookie and experienced employee effective work effort. [vendor,department]
denotes the subscripts used in the model. The subscript range for vendor is incumbent
and startup, meaning there is one startup company competing with the incumbent firm.
The subscript range for department is engineer and sales, meaning there are two types of
employees, engineers and sales force, in the model.
Effective Work Effort[vendor, department]
= Rookie Effective Work Effort[vendor,department] + Experienced Effective Work Effort
[vendor,department] (7.1)
Actual rookie work effort equals the number of rookie employees times the working
hours per year net of work effort spent on employee participation (such as attending
participation training and meetings). Effective rookie work effort is modeled as actual
rookie work effort times total rookie productivity effects. Thus, when productivity effect
= 1.05, one person*hour/year of work effort can produce an effective work effort of 1.05
person*hour/year. That is 5% more work effort generated, given the same amount of
actual work time. Experienced effective work effort has the same parallel formulation as
the rookie effective work effort.
Rookie Effective Work Effort[vendor,department]
= (Rookie Work Effort[vendordepartment] - Rookie Participation Effort
[vendor,department]) * Total Rookie Productivity Effect[vendor,department] (7.2)
Rookie Work Effort[vendor, department] = Rookie Employees[vendor,department] *
Working Hours per Year[vendor,department] (7.3)
There are four employee productivity effects: employee quality, work experience, job
satisfaction and employee participation. The better the average employee quality upon
hiring is, the higher the employee productivity. Employee quality captures the selection
Figure 7.2: Work Effort and Productivity Sector
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of the initial quality of employees upon recruiting, such as education and skills levels. A
firm with high job satisfaction tends to attract employees of higher quality, which raises
productivity. Figure 7.3 shows the co-flow structure of employee quality, which is
similar to the employee experience structure.
The effect of rookie employee experience on productivity is based on learning curve
theory, referenced in Section 12.2 of Sterman (2000) and derived in Zangwill and Kantor
(1998). The theory posits that productivity will rise by a given amount for every doubling
of experience from an initial reference value.
Higher job satisfaction can also directly increase productivity because people are satisfied
with the work and the environment. The functional form of the effect of job satisfaction
on productivity is estimated using the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset explained in
Chapter 8.
Total Rookie Productivity Effect[vendor,department]
= Effect of Rookie Employee Quality on Productivity[vendor,department]
* Effect of Rookie Employee Experience on Productivity[vendor,department]
* Effect of Job Satisfaction on Productivity[vendor,department]
* Effect of Participation on Productivity[vendor,department] (7.4)
Effect of Rookie Employee Experience on Productivity[vendor,department]
= (Relative Rookie Experience[vendor,department])^(LN (1 + Employee Productivity
Change Per Doubling of Experience[vendor,department])/LN(2)) (7.5)
Relative Rookie Experience[vendor,department]
= Average Rookie Experience[vendor,department]/Reference Employee Experience
[vendor,department] (7.6)





Job satisfaction is composed of reference job satisfaction plus four effects on job
satisfaction: financial compensation, psychological ownership, burnout and layoff (Figure
7.4). Reference job satisfaction is 3 on a 1 to 4 scale used in the NBER Shared Capitalism
data set to be explained later. The additive as opposed to multiplicative formulation is
chosen because the four effects are arguably strongly separable: the impact of a change in
any one input is the same no matter what values the other inputs have (Sterman 2000, p.
528). For example, when the effect of psychological ownership on job satisfaction is
zero in the case of zero employee ownership, the effect of financial compensation on job
satisfaction does not become zero as it would should one use a multiplicative
formulation. The isolated effect of a 5% increase in pay on job satisfaction is assumed to
be the same when there is zero employee ownership as when there is 10% employee
ownership. The impact of different levels of employee ownership on job satisfaction is
captured separately through the effect of psychological ownership on job satisfaction.
Job Satisfaction[vendor,department] = Reference Job Satisfaction[vendor,department]
+ Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction[vendor,department]
+ Effect of Psychological Ownership on Job Satisfaction[vendor,department]
± Effect of Burnout on Job Satisfaction[vendordepartment]
+ Effect of Layoff on Job Satisfaction[vendor,department] (7.7)
Figure 7.4: Job Satisfaction Sector
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Stock grants, stock options and profit sharing drive job satisfaction through two channels:
financial compensation and psychological ownership effects. Psychological ownership
effects (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2001, 2003) capture the satisfaction from the feeling
of being an owner of a company in addition to its financial value. There are two
psychological ownership effects: the employee ownership stake and profit sharing
(Figure 7.5). Job satisfaction from the employee ownership stake captures the satisfaction
derived from owning the stock of employee shares accumulated from the past. The
employee ownership stake is the dollar value of average employee shares outstanding
relative to the average salary. The more stock grants are awarded, the higher the number
of vested employee shares. When the stock price increases as the firm starts to make a
profit, the value of the employee ownership stake increases. Job satisfaction increases as
employee net worth increases. Note that this captures the psychological effect from the
accumulated "stock" of employee shares, which is different from the financial effect from
the "inflow" of stock grants awarded each year. Job satisfaction increases when
employees are awarded new stock grants in the current year; however, they also derive a
psychological effect of feeling wealthy when the value of their vested stock grants
increases. The functional forms of psychological effects from the employee ownership
stake and profit sharing are estimated in Chapter 8.
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Job Satisfaction from Psychological Owners11ip[vendor,department]
= Job Satisfaction from Employee Ownership Stake[vendor,department]
+ Job Satisfaction from Profit Sharing[vendor,department] (7.8)
Job Satisfaction from Employee Ownership Stake[vendor,department]
= Function for Job Satisfaction from Employee Ownership(Employee Ownership Stake
Relative to Salary[vendor,department]/Reference Employee Ownership Stake Relative to
Salary) (7.9)
Employee Ownership Stake Relative to Salary[vendor,department] = Value of Average
Employee Shares Outstanding[vendor,department]/Average Salary[vendor] (7.10)
Value of Average Employee Shares Outstanding[vendor,department]= Average
Employee Shares Outstanding[vendor,department] *Stock Price[vendor] (7.11)
Average Employee Shares Outstanding[vendor,department]= Employee Shares
[vendor,department]/Total Employees per Department [vendor,department] (7.12)
Employees experience psychological ownership when the firm is willing to share its
profit with employees. It is modeled relative to one's salary, to capture the psychological
effect of comparing the bonus one receives relative to one's salary level. Calculating the
psychological effects on a relative basis provides a convenient normalization and is
consistent with basic perception theory, which suggests that people evaluate rates of
change on a proportional rather than absolute basis (Plous 1993). A bonus of $10,000
may mean more to an employee with a $50,000 salary (a 20% increase) than one with a
$200,000 salary (a 5% increase). Note that this captures the psychological effect of profit
sharing; thefinancial effect of the actual dollar amount of profit sharing is captured
through the financial compensation effect in Equations 7.15 and 7.16 below.
Job Satisfaction from Profit Sharing[vendor,department]= Function for Job Satisfaction
from Profit Sharing(Profit Sharing as Percentage of Salary[vendor,department]) (7.13)
Profit Sharing as Percentage of Salary[vendor,department]= Expected Profit Sharing per
Employee[vendor,department]/Average Salary[vendor]) * 100 (7.14)
7.5 Financial Compensation
The effect of financial compensation on job satisfaction captures the financial value of a
shared capitalism mode of compensation (Figure 7.6). The expected present value of
total compensation (composed of salary, stock grants, stock options and profit sharing) is
calculated and then divided by the reference present value of total compensation. The
functional form for the Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction is non-
linear. Its estimated function is explained in Chapter 8.
Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction[vendor,department]
= Function for Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction (Expected Present
Value of Total Compensation[vendor,department]/Reference Present Value of Total
Compensation) (7.15)
Expected Present Value of Total Compensation[vendor,department]
= Expected Present Value of Salary[vendor,department]
± Expected Present Value of Stock Grants[vendordepartment]
± Expected Present Value of Stock Options[vendor,department]
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Employee
7.5.1 Expected Present Value of Salary
Expected present value of salary equals salary divided by the discount rate for total
compensation. This assumes the employees value salary as perpetuity or a stream of
equal payments of infinite horizon.
Expected Present Value of Salary[vendor,department]
= Salary[vendor,department]/Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor] (7.17)
7.5.2 Discount Rate
Discount rate for total compensation assumes a normal discount rate to capture the time
value of money plus a risk premium based on the probability of being laid off or of the
firm failing. The hazard rate that the firm will fail or lay off its employees rises as
perceived liquidity falls. For simplicity, I assume that the annual hazard rate of failure is
a normal rate divided by perceived liquidity, that is, the hazard rises in inverse proportion
to liquidity.
Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor] = Normal Discount Rate for
Compensation + Expected Layoff or Failure Hazard Rate[vendor] (7.18)
Expected Layoff or Failure Hazard Rate[vendor]= Normal Layoff or Failure Hazard
Rate/Relevant Liquidity for Hazard Rate [vendor] (7.19)
The relevant liquidity for affecting hazard rate is when perceived liquidity is lower than
1. When it is greater than 1, hazard rate stays at the normal rate. Perceived liquidity is the
ratio of working capital to target cash required to support the firm's expenditures. Note
that I assume there is no significant delay or bias in the employee's perception of the
firm's cash position (i.e., transparency). This assumption could be relaxed by including
delays or biases that would, for example, prevent employees from discovering that a firm
was in financial difficulty, as at Enron and WorldCom. Target cash on hand is determined
by desired cash coverage as the firm seeks to maintain cash sufficient to provide certain
coverage of its required expenditures.
Relevant Liquidity for Hazard Rate[vendor]
= MIN(1, Perceived Liquidity[vendor]) (7.20)
Perceived Liquidity[vendor]
= Working Capital[vendor]/Target Cash on Hand[vendor] (7.21)
Target Cash on Hand[vendor]
= Desired Cash Coverage[vendor] * Required Payments[vendor] (7.22)
7.5.3 Expected Present Value of Profit Sharing
Expected present value of profit sharing equals expected profit sharing discounted at the
discount rate for total compensation. The expected profit sharing per employee is a
smooth function of the actual profit sharing per employee. Profit sharing amount equals
net income multiplied by profit sharing as percentage of net income, provided that net
income is positive.
Expected Present Value of Profit Sharing[vendor, department]
= Expected Profit Sharing per Employee[vendor,department]/Discount Rate for Total
Compensation[vendor] (7.23)
Expected Profit Sharing per Employee[vendor,department]
= SMOOTH(Profit Sharing per Employee[vendor,department], Time to Adjust Expected
Profit Sharing) (7.24)
Profit Sharing per Employee[vendor,department]
= Profit Sharing Amount[vendor]/Total Employees[vendor] (7.25)
Profit Sharing Amount[vendor]
= MAX(0, Net Income Before Profit Sharing[vendor] * Profit Sharing as Percentage of
Net Income[vendor]/100) (7.26)
7.5.4 Expected Present Value of Stock Grants
Expected present value of stock grants equals the average stock granted per employee
times the expected value of non-vested stock grants discounted at the discount rate for
total compensation.
Expected Present Value of Stock Grants[vendor,department]
= Stock Granted per Existing Employee[vendor,department] * Expected Value of Non
Vested Stock Grants[vendor,department]/Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor]
(7.27)
Expected value of non-vested stock grants equals the expected stock price discounted at a
specified rate over the vesting period - the higher the discount rate or longer the vesting
period, the lower the expected value of non-vested stock grants held.
Expected Value of Non Vested Stock Grants[vendor,department]
= Expected Stock Price[vendor] * exp(-Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor] *
Stock Grant Vesting Period[vendor,department]) (7.28)
7.5.5 Expected Present Value of Stock Options
Expected present value of stock options is the average employee's non-vested option
holdings discounted at a specified rate over the vesting period - the higher the discount
rate or longer the vesting period, the lower the present value of the options held.
Expected Present Value of Stock Options[vendor,department]
= Expected Value of Non Vested Stock Options\[vendor,department] * exp(-Discount
Rate for Total Compensation[vendor] * Vesting Period[vendor,department]) (7.29)
Expected Value of Non Vested Stock Options[vendor,department]
= Expected per Share Option Value[vendordepartment] * Non Vested Options per
employee[vendor,department] (7.30)
The per-share value of the non-vested options of each employee is a function of the
difference between the expected share price and the average strike price of their non-
vested options. The function represents the subjective valuation, in the minds of
employees, of the option value (roughly the Black-Scholes value but potentially biased
by employee optimism about future share value or volatility). When stock options are in
the money, employees value them close to the current value. As they begin to go
underwater, the subjective value gradually declines to zero (Figure 7.7).
Expected per Share Option Value[vendor,department]
= Average Strike Price of Non Vested Options[vendor,department] * Option Value as
Fraction of Strike Price[vendor,department] (7.31)
Option Value as Fraction of Strike Price[vendor,department]= Function for Expected
Option Value(Fractional Option Value[vendor,department]) (7.32)
Figure 7.7: Function for Expected Option Value
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Fractional Option Value
Fractional Option Value[vendor,department] = (Expected Stock Price[vendor]-Average
Strike Price of Non Vested Options [vendor,department])/Average Strike Price of Non
Vested Options[vendor,department] (7.33)
Expected Stock Price[vendor]= SMOOTH(Stock Price[vendor], Time for Adjust
Expectations for Stock Price) (7.34)
7.6 Stock Grants
See Figure 7.8 for the diagram of the stock grant sector. Stock grants can be awarded to
each new hire and existing employee. The total number of stock grants equals the sum of
stock granted to new and existing employees.
Stock Grants Awarded[vendor,department]
= Stock Grants Awarded to New Hires[vendor,department] + Stock Grants Awarded to
Existing Employees[vendor,department] (7.35)
Each new hire receives the number of stock grants worth a certain target value set by
managers. The current share price is used to determine the number of shares awarded.
Stock Grants Awarded to New Hires[vendor,department] = Stock Granted per
Hire[vendor,department] * Rookie Hire Rate[vendor,department] (7.36)
Stock Granted per Hire[vendor,department] = Target Value of Stock Grants for New
Hires[vendordepartment]/Stock Price[vendor] (7.37)
Each existing employee receives a certain number of stock grants worth a certain value
set by the manager. The value of stock granted to each employee annually is modeled as
a percentage of industry average compensation. For example, suppose the industry
average compensation is $100,000 per person per year. If one would like to award stock
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internal stock price is $10 per share at the time stock is granted, each employee would
receive 1000 shares per year. Shares granted per existing employees equals the total
value of stock granted per employees ($/year/person) divided by the stock price ($/share),
capped at minimum stock price = 1 to prevent extremely large shares being granted when
the stock price is infinitely small.
Stock Grants Awarded to Existing Employees[vendordepartment]
= Stock Granted per Existing Employee[vendor,department] * Total Employees per
Department[vendor,department] (7.38)
Stock Granted per Existing Employee[vendor,department] = Value of Stock Granted per
Existing Employee[vendor,department]/MAX( 1,Stock Price[vendor]) (7.39)
Value of Stock Granted per Existing Employee[vendor,department]
= Reference Total Compensation[department] * Stock Granted for Existing Employees as
Percentage of Industry Compensation[vendor]/ 100 (7.40)
Stock grants are restricted stock that transits from a non-vested stock grant to vested
employee shares to former employee shares when employees leave the company. The
total number of non-vested shares held by employees increases as stocks are awarded,
decreases as stocks vest or expire on the attrition of employees.
Non Vested Stock Grants[vendor,department]
= INTEG (Stock Grants Awarded[vendor,department] - Non Vested Stock Grants
Expiring[vendor,department] - Stock Grants Vested[vendordepartment], Initial Non
Vested Stock Grants[vendor,department]) (7.41)
Initial Non Vested Stock Grants[vendor,department]= Total Employees per
Department[vendor,department] * Stock Granted per Hire[vendor,department] (7.42)
Non-vested shares expire when the employees holding them leave the firm. Each
employee leaving is assumed to reduce the stock of non-vested shares by the average
number of non-vested shares per employee. Stock grants are assumed to be vested over a
vesting period of 3 years.
Non Vested Stock Grants Expiring[vendor,department] = Non Vested Stock Grants per
Employee[vendor,department] * Total Quit Rate[vendor,department] (7.43)
Stock Grants Vested[vendor,department] = Non Vested Stock Grants[vendor,department]/
Stock Grant Vesting Period[vendor,department] (7.44)
The number of vested stock grants increases as non-vested stock grants vest. When
employees quit, they take their vested stock with them. These shares enter into the
accumulated stock of Former Employee Shares. Former employees can decide how many
shares they would like to sell to the existing employees at the current stock price. This
assumes there is an internal stock valuation where employees can buy and sell shares
with each other. This is similar to the mechanism set up by the employee-owned
company Scientific Application International Corporation (Beyster and Economy 2007).
Employee Shares[vendor,department] (7.45)
= INTEG (Stock Grants Vested[vendor,department] - Employee Shares
Exiting[vendor,department] + Repurchased Employee Shares[vendor, department], 0)
Employee Shares Exiting[vendor,department] (7.46)
= Total Quit Rate[vendor,department] * Shares per Employee[vendor,department]
Repurchased Employee Shares[vendor,department] (7.47)
= Employee Shares Exiting[vendor,department] * Fraction of Repurchased Employee
Shares Upon Termination[vendor]
Former Employee Shares[vendor,department] (7.48)
= INTEG (Employee Shares Exiting[vendor,department] - Repurchased Employee
Shares[vendor, department],0)
Cost of Repurchased Employee Shares per Employee[vendor,department] (7.49)
= Stock Price[vendor] * Repurchased Employee Shares per Employee
[vendor,department]
Repurchased Employee Shares per Employee[vendor,department] (7.50)
= Repurchased Employee Shares[vendor,department]/Total Employees per Department
[vendor,department]
7.7 Stock Options
Figure 7.9 shows the stock options sector based on Oliva, Sterman and Giese (2003).
Similar to the stock grants structure, options can be awarded to new hires and existing
employees with a vesting period of 3 years. Non-vested options expire when the
employees holding them leave the firm. Each employee leaving reduces the stock of non-
vested options by the average number of non-vested options per employee. Vested
options either get exercised when it is in the money (stock price greater than average
strike price of vested options), or expired after an average life of 5 years. There is a co-
flow structure tracks the total basis cost of the non-vested and vested options. The
average basis cost of the vested options is the sum of all strike prices divided by the
number of vested options outstanding.
Annual Stock Options per Employee as a Basis Point of Total Shares (ASO) captures the
policy of compensating employees by offering them annual stock options. The number of
stock options is modeled as a basis point of the total shares outstanding. Thus, a policy of
5 basis points of ASO means granting each employee the number of options worth of
0.0005 of total shares. For instance, if the firm starts with one million shares, each
employee will receive 500 options per year.
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Figure 7.10 shows the financial market sector, drawn from Oliva, Sterman and Giese
(2003). Stock price is the firm's total market value divided by the number of shares
outstanding. The market value of the firm is assumed to be the greater of the expected
present value of future profits or the breakup value of the firm. Expected profits are
discounted prior to the IPO because the stock is less liquid as an investment. The
minimum value of the firm is its breakup or liquidation value, given by its cash less its
liabilities.
Stock Price[vendor] (7.51)
= Market Capitalization[vendor]/Shares Outstanding[vendor]
Market Capitalization[vendor] (7.52)
= MAX (Breakup Value[vendor], Expected Present Value of Profit[vendor] * Pre IPO
Discount[vendor])
Breakup Value[vendor] (7.53)
= MAX (0, Working Capital[vendor] - Total Liabilities[vendor])
Pre IPO Discount[vendor] (7.54)
= IF THEN ELSE (Time <= IPO Date[vendor], 0.75, 1)
The expected present value of the firm's profit is the net present value of expected net
income, adjusted for future expected growth. The growth-adjusted discount factor is
based on the discount rate for earnings, adjusted to reflect investors' expectations for
future growth in earnings, and constrained to be nonnegative (in the case where expected
net income is negative, such as when the firm consistently loses money). The discount
rate used to value the expected earnings of the firm is a nonlinear function of the discount
rate and the expected rate of growth in future earnings. The nonlinear function keeps the
effective discount rate nonnegative when the denominator is less than zero. The minimum
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value of the function is the inverse of the maximum P/E ratio the capital markets are
willing to pay.
Expected Present Value of Profit[vendor] (7.55)
= MAX (0, Expected Net Income[vendor])/Growth Adjusted Discount Factor[vendor]
Growth Adjusted Discount Factor[vendor] (7.56)
= IF THEN ELSE (Discount Rate - Expected Growth in Revenue[vendor] > 0.04,
Discount Rate - Expected Growth in Revenue[vendor], 0.04 * exp (Sensitivity of
Valuation to Rapid Growth * (Discount Rate - Expected Growth in Revenue[vendor] -
0.04)))
The expected profit of the firm used to value the firm is a weighted average of current
profit and the expected steady-state profit the firm is expected to achieve. The weight on
actual net income is low during the startup honeymoon period, when investors are willing
to tolerate losses while the firm invests in growth (through high expenditures and low
prices). After the startup honeymoon, however, investors revert to traditional valuation
measures based on the actual profitability of the firm. The financial results of the firm are
reported with a delay.
Expected Net Income[vendor] (7.57)
= Weight on Actual Net Income for Valuation[vendor] * Recent Net Income[vendor] + (1
- Weight on Actual Net Income for Valuation[vendor]) * Expected Steady State Net
Income[vendor]
Recent Net Income[vendor] (7.58)
= SMOOTH (Net Income[vendor], Financial Results Reporting Time)
Once the startup honeymoon period ends, the weight investors give to actual net income
in their valuation of the firm is assumed to adjust with a delay.
Weight on Actual Net Income for Valuation[vendor] (7.59)
= SMOOTH3i (Weight on Actual Net Income After Startup Honeymoon Period
83
[vendor], Valuation Weight Adjustment Time, 0)
Investors expect the profits of the firm, over the long haul, to be a certain fraction of
recent sales revenue.
Expected Steady State Net Income[vendor] (7.60)
= Expected Long Run Return on Sales[vendor] * Recent Sales Revenue for Growth
Rate[vendor]
Recent sales revenue for growth rate is smoothed over a short period to filter out noise. It
is initialized in steady state at the initial expected growth rate (see Sterman 2000, Chapter
16).
Recent Sales Revenue for Growth Rate[vendor] (7.61)
= SMOOTHI (Effective Sales Revenue for Expected Growth[vendor], Financial Results
Reporting Time, Effective Sales Revenue for Expected Growth[vendor]/(1 + Initial
Expected Revenue Growth[vendor] * Financial Results Reporting Time))
Effective sales revenue for expected growth is the greater of actual sales or a base that
represents a minimum revenue level, so that expected growth rates remain reasonable
when sales are very small (the growth rate on the first sale is infinite, but expectations
will not rise to infinity).
Effective Sales Revenue for Expected Growth[vendor] (7.62)
= MAX (Base for Growth Rate Calculation, Revenue[vendor])
Base for Growth Rate Calculation = le+006 (7.63)
Investors' expected long-run return on sales is adjusted gradually from the initial level to
the indicated level of industry return on sales. The indicated level is set to the initial
expectation until a sufficient time has passed for investors to compile data on and assess
industry experience.
Expected Long Run Return on Sales[vendor] (7.64)
= SMOOTH3i (Indicated Industry Return on Sales[vendor], Time to Adjust Expected
Long Run Return on Sales, Initial Expected Return on Sales)
Indicated Industry Return on Sales[vendor] (7.65)
= IF THEN ELSE (Time > Honeymoon Period End Date[vendor], Industry Average
Return on Sales, Initial Expected Return on Sales)
Industry average return on sales is the return on sales of each firm weighted by its market
share.
(7.66)Industry Average Return on Sales
= SUM (Market share[vendor!] * Return on Sales[vendor!])
(7.67)Honeymoon Period End Date[vendor]
= Startup Date[vendor] + Honeymoon Period
Honeymoon Period = 4 (7.68)
7.9 Accounting
Accounting sector includes income statement, cash flow and balance sheet of the firm. It
is based on Oliva, Sterman and Giese (2003) and the standard accounting procedure.
7.9.1 Income Statement
Figure 7.11 shows the income statement. Net income equals revenue subtracting profit-
sharing amount, required tax payment, extraordinary charges, operating expenses (which
are composed of salary, general and administrative (G&A) expenses and marketing
expenses), depreciation and cost of goods sold.
Net Income[vendor] (7.(
= Net Income Before Profit Sharing[vendor] - Profit Sharing Amount[vendor]
Net Income Before Profit Sharing[vendor] (7.
= Net Income Before Tax[vendor] - Required Tax Payment[vendor]
Net Income Before Tax[vendor] (7.
= Operating Income[vendor] - Extraordinary Charges[vendor]
Operating Income[vendor] (7.
= Gross Profit[vendor] - Operating Expenses[vendor] - Depreciation[vendor]
Operating Expenses[vendor] = Salary Expense[vendor] + General and Administrative
Expense[vendor]+ Billing for Marketing Spending (7.7
Gross Profit[vendor]= Revenue[vendor] - Billing for COGS[vendor] (7.7
Billing for COGS[vendor] (7.7
= Product COGS[vendor] + Maintenance COGS[vendor]
Total revenue is the sum of revenue from new sales and subsequent service fee.
Revenue[vendor] (7.7
= Revenue from New Sales[vendor] + Revenue from Service[vendor]
Revenue from New Sales[vendor]= Price[vendor] * Purchase Rate[vendor] (7.7
Revenue from Service[vendor] (7.7
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7.9.2 Cash Flow
Figure 7.12 shows the sector of cash flow. Cash flow equals to the sum of cash flows
from operations, investing and financing.
Cash Flow[vendor] = Cash Flow from Operations[vendor] + Cash Flow from
Investing[vendor] + Cash Flow from Financing[vendor] (7.79)
Cash Flow from Operations[vendor] (7.80)
= Receipt of Accounts Receivable[vendor] - Payments for Operating Expense[vendor]
Cash Flow from Investing[vendor] (7.81)
= Proceeds from Sale of Assets[vendor] - Proceeds from Acquisition of Assets
Cash Flow from Financing[vendor] (7.82)
= Proceeds from Sale of Equity[vendor] - Proceeds from Acquisition of Equity[vendor]
The rate at which money is raised by sale of equity depends on the value of shares sold in
the IPO, to VCs, plus the value of any shares sold in secondary offerings, and the funds
received from the proceeds from options exercised by employees (the strike price
multiplied by the number of options exercised by employees).
Proceeds from Sale of Equity[vendor] (7.83)
= Proceeds from IPO[vendor] + Proceeds from VC financing[vendor] + Proceeds from
Shares Sold to Public[vendor] + Proceeds from Employee Options [vendor]
Proceeds from VC financing[vendor] = Funds Raised From VCs[vendor] (7.84)
Proceeds from IPO[vendor] = IPO Shares[vendor] * Stock Price[vendor] (7.85)
Proceeds from Shares Sold to Public[vendor] (7.86)
= New Shares Issued to Public[vendor] * Stock Price[vendor]
Proceeds from Employee Options[vendor] (7.87)
= SUM (Total Basis of Options Exercised[vendor,department!])
The financing the firm requires is (nonnegative part of) the amount needed to adjust the
cash balance to the target level less the firm's cash flow before financing. Note that I do
not model the possibility of share buybacks. Financing required is constrained to be
nonnegative. Expected cash flow before financing is the sum of revenue and any revenue
from assets sold less required expenditures.
Financing Required[vendor]= MAX (0, Adjustment to Financing for Cash[vendor] -
Cash Flow Before Financing [vendor]) (7.88)
Cash Flow Before Financing[vendor] (7.89)
= Receipt of Accounts Receivable[vendor] - Required Payments[vendor] + Cash Flow
from Investing[vendor]
The firm is assumed to adjust its cash balance to a target level that is sufficient to provide
certain coverage of its required expenditures.
Adjustment to Financing for Cash[vendor] (7.90)
= MAX(O, (Target Cash on Hand[vendor] - Working Capital[vendor]) / Time to Adjust
Cash)
Target Cash on Hand[vendor] (7.91)
= Desired Cash Coverage[vendor] * Required Payments[vendor]
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Figure 7.13 shows the balance sheet sector. It keeps track of assets (working capital and
account receivable) and liabilities (account payable, pay in capital and cumulated retained
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7.10 Prospect Chain
The market sector of the model follows Miller (2007) closely, with changes to the
formulations for how sales flow through from one chain to another. The prospect chain is
based on the Bass diffusion model (Bass, 1969). It has been extended to more closely
approximate the sales cycle of the clean energy technology companies based on
interviews and case studies done by Miller (2007). See Figure 7.14 for a depiction of the
stocks and flows of the prospect chain.
The stocks of prospects along the chain are based on the sales experiences of the
companies interviewed by Miller; the research indicated points at which prospects get
"stuck" and where prospects are lost. The units of the stocks, which are "prospects,"
represent commercial enterprises that are capable of purchasing and adopting the product
of the clean technology startup being modeled. The driver for prospects to move along
the prospect chain is the sales effort of the startup, which is made more or less productive
by the startup's product attractiveness in comparison with that of the competitors. The
model is capable of representing multiple startup competitors. However, for simplicity,
the analysis done in this thesis assumes that there is only one startup firm competing
against the incumbent, who offers the conventional way of operating energy use (such as
the traditional HVAC systems). The startup's product attractiveness is driven by
customer payback period, customer support, marketing effort and word of mouth.
The prospect chain includes the following stocks:
e Potential Customers: This is the group of firms that can possibly adopt the clean
energy product at some point in the future. This captures the concept of an
addressable market size, which is driven by the attractiveness of the startup's product
offering.
" Potential Prospects: These are firms that are capable of adopting the current version
of the product. The startup has identified these firms and chosen to apply sales effort
to persuade them to learn more about the product.
e Prospects: These are firms that are capable of adopting the product and have been
made aware of the product by the startup, and have not ruled out adopting it. The

startup has decided to apply sales effort to persuade these firms to trial the product or
otherwise to learn enough about it to be able to make the decision to adopt it or not.
" Hot Prospects: These are firms that have expressed interest in adopting the product
and are either actively trialing it or evaluating it in some other fashion.
e Adopters: These are firms that have purchased and are actively using the product.
Adopters can be poached by other firms after 10 years of adoption.
" Lost Prospects: These are firms that were prospects (anywhere from potential
prospects to hot prospects) that lost interest in considering the product or made the
decision not to adopt. They could become interested and reenter the potential
prospects stock after one year.
7.11 Product Development
The product development sector of the model is based on the inventory management
sector described in section 18.1 of Sterman (2000) and on Miller (2007). The firm
develops its product features through engineering effort. See Figure 7.15 for a diagram
of the product development sector. Full model documentation is listed in the appendix.
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7.12 Alpha Inc.'s Initial Conditions
To initialize the model, I did a field research at a startup company, Alpha Inc.
(pseudonym), that develops integrated energy efficiency systems for commercial and
industrial buildings. Its innovative technology aims to lower building operating costs for
electricity, heating and cooling by over 75% from traditional HVAC systems.
Table 7.1 is a list of parameter values used in the model based on Alpha Inc's current
condition. Given the inherent limitation of an early-stage startup, where there are no
later-stage time-series data, the company data was used to parameterize the initial
conditions of the model. I also interviewed the executives concerning their decision rules
regarding pricing, financing, human resource and compensation policies and their
projections of the business performance.
Table 7.1: Selected Parameter Values
VARIABLES INITIALVALUES
Market
Potential Market Size (people) 100,000
Sales Cycle Time (year) 1
Reference Sales Effort Productivity (prospect/person/hour) 0.1
Product Development
Initial Feature Relative to Incumbent (index) 4
Average Product Development Time (year) 1
Engineer Hours Required per Feature (person*hours/feature) 100
Product Useful Life (year) 20
Human Resources
Initial Sales Force (people) 0
Initial Engineers (people) S
Average Time to Fill Employee Vacancies (year) 0.167
Assimilation Time (year) 2
Industry Quit Fraction (1/year) 0.1
Reference Total Compensation ($/person/year) 100,000
Rookie Compensation Relative to Experienced Employee (dimensionless) 0.667
Workweek per Year (week/year) 50
Normal Workweek (hour/week) 40
Burnout Time (year) 0.25
Customer Support Needed per Customer ((Person* Hours/Year)/Prospect) 45
Price
Initial Incumbent Price ($/unit) 16,000
Initial Price ($/unit) 80,000
Initial Markup Ratio (dimensionless) 0.3
Annual Service Fee Relative to Product Price (1/year) 0.05
Cost
Initial Operating and Maintenance Costs ($/unit/year) 2400
Initial Energy Use (kWh/Year/Unit) 180,000
Initial Energy Price ($/kWh) (2/3 * 0.05/kWh (gas) + 1/3 * 0.15/kWh (electricity)) 0.083
Fractional Percentage Growth Rate of Energy Price (1/year) 5
C02 Emission per kWh (tons/kWh) 0.000606
Discount Rate for Energy Costs (1/year) 0.04
Finance
Initial Investment ($) 1,000,000
Fixed G&A Expense ($) 200,000
Unit G&A Expense ($/unit) 1,000
Desired Cash Coverage (year) 0.167
Venture Cipital
Time for VC Application (year) 1
Required Factor of Return for VC (dimensionless) 10
VC Financing Effort per Dollar (Person*Hours/Year/$) 0.001
Founders Shares Outstanding (shares) 1,000,000
Stock Options and Grants
Stock Options Vesting Period (year) 3
Desired Options Pool Fraction (dimensionless) 0.15
Average Life of Vested Options (year) 5
Stock Grants Vesting Period (year) 3
8. DATA AND REGRESSION ESTIMATION
This chapter presents the dataset that is used to estimate the non-linear functional forms
of various relationships in the model.
8.1 Data
To build a formal simulation model of the causal structure shown in Figure 6.4, it is
important to estimate the functional forms of each linkage, such as the effect of financial
compensation on job satisfaction. One way to quantitatively estimate the relationship is
to gather a random sample of employees with enough variation in the variables listed in
Figure 6.4, and run a regression to estimate the relationship, controlling for other
variables. For this purpose, I run regressions using the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER)'s Shared Capitalism dataset (Kruse, Freeman and Blasi 2010).2
8.1.1 NBER Shared Capitalism Dataset
The NBER Shared Capitalism dataset is a company survey that administered 80 to 100
questions to 41,206 employees in fourteen firms at 323 work sites who had some shared
capitalism modes of compensation. It is the single largest dataset conducted on workers
in shared capitalism firms. All of the firms interviewed exercise some sort of broad-
based employee ownership plan. The plan types vary: eight have standard Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), one has a 401(k) ESOP, four have Employee Stock
Purchase Plans (ESPPs), and three have 401(k)s with company stock. Eleven of the firms
have broad-based profit-sharing plans, while five have broad-based stock option plans.
The 80 to 100 survey questions cover most of the variables found in a typical HPWS with
shared capitalism modes of compensation, making this NBER dataset the best available
source I know for estimating this study's Employee Ownership model. The NBER's over
40,000 data entries allow me to segment the data and estimate the non-linear relationships
in the model.
2 I would like to thank Professors Joseph Blasi and Douglas Kruse of Rutgers University for their
generosity in sharing their valuable data and conducting regression analyses with me.
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8.1.2 Limitations of the Data
There are, however, two potential drawbacks to the data. First, the NBER firm survey is
a self-selected nonrandom sample of US establishments. To the extent that the survey
questions relate to issues facing all firms and reflecting human nature, there is good
reason to expect any findings to generalize to a broader population. The empirical study
of management and firm behavior and much of psychology is replete with in-depth and
useful analysis of nonrandom samples, often of just a single firm or person (Kruse,
Freeman and Blasi 2010). The NBER data set with over 40,000 respondents is a
significant improvement over the existing literature for estimating the relationships of
various employee ownership and human resource policies. Future data collection efforts
could focus on time series within one firm or panel data across firms in a randomized
sample.
Second, this is self-reported data as opposed to objective financial data. For example, the
question for the variable "Profit sharing as % of pay" is "what was the approximate total
dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent year of bonuses] divided
by basepay + overtime, otherwise 0". While the employees are asked to report objective
data, there may be some bias if certain types of employees are more likely to underreport,
overreport, or not report the values (e.g., if those with negative attitudes are more likely
to underreport profit sharing). Obtaining administrative data on these variables would be
theoretically preferable, but attempting to match such data to individual surveys would
violate the anonymity of the survey and lower response rates. The self-reported financial
data provide the best available data to date for estimating shared capitalism effects.
8.2 Overview of Regression Estimates
I used the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset to estimate the five table functions in Figure
8.1. Each thick line with a number indicates a table function estimated from the NBER
dataset. This section explains each function in detail.




Red: Human resource policies.
Green: Job satisfaction driers.
Blue: Employee behavior indicators.
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8.3 Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction
To estimate the effects of financial compensation, employee ownership stake and profit
sharing on job satisfaction (#1, 2 and 3 links in Figure 8.1), the regression equation 8.1
below is performed. Job satisfaction is regressed on compensation greater and less than
average, employee ownership stake as percent of pay, profit sharing as percent of pay,
number of stock options in last year, training hours, job security, supervision, and
employee participation. One potential missing variable is the length of work time for
capturing the burnout effect, indicating how people are less happy when they work too
long without rest. Another missing variable is the intrinsic motivation people derive from
the meaning of their work. Future research would benefit from adding these topics to the
survey.
Job Satisfaction = a + bi*Compensation Greater Than Average + b2*(Compensation
Greater Than Average) 2 + b3*Compensation Less Than Average + b4*(Compensation
Less Than Average)2 + b5*Employee Ownership Dummy + b6*Employee Ownership
Stake Over Pay + b7*(Employee Ownership Stake Over Pay)2 + bs*Profit Sharing
Dummy + b9*Profit Sharing Over Pay + bio*(Profit Sharing Over Pay)2 + b1 *Stock
Options Dummy + b12*Stock Options + bi 3*(Stock Options) 2 + b14*Training Dummy +
b15*Training Hours + b16*(Training Hours) 2 + b17*Job Security + bis*Supervision
+b19*Participation + Error (8.1)
The regression uses linear and squared terms of total compensation, employee ownership
stake over pay, profit sharing over pay, stock options, training hours to model non-
linearities, with separate linear and squared terms for total compensation less than
industry average and greater than industry average. Table 8.1 shows the regression results
for job satisfaction. All variables have the expected signs and the conventional
significance levels except the number of stock options, which is statistically insignificant.
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Table 8.1: Results of Regression Analysis for Job Satisfaction
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Constant 2.4048*** .1167 2.1759 2.6336
Compensation Greater Than Average .0063*** .0006 .0051 .0075
Compensation Greater Than Average Squared -.000065*** 9.6e-06 -.000084 -.000046
Compensation Less Than Average -.0158*** .0008 -.0175 -.0143
Compensation Less Than Average Squared .000167*** .00002 .000126 .000211
Employee Ownership Dummy .0117 .0107 -.0092 .0328
Employee Ownership Stake Over Pay .0217** .0095 .0031 .0405
Employee Ownership Stake Over Pay Squared -.0027 .0018 -.0063 .0007
Profit Sharing Dummy 
-.0052 .0113 -.0275 .0171
Profit Sharing Over Pay .2327*** .0682 .0990 .3665
Profit Sharing Over Pay Squared -.2180** .0751 -.3653 -.0707
Stock Options Dummy .0127 .0219 -.0301 .0557
Stock Options 1.1e-06 9.2e-07 6.1e-07 3.0e-06
Stock Options Squared 
-5.7e-12 3.8e-12 -1.3e-11 1.7e-12
Training Dummy .0964*** .0078 .0811 .1117
Training Hours .0011*** .0001 .0008 .0013
Training Hours Squared 
-8.8e-07*** 1.6e-07 -1.2e-06 -5.6e-07
Job Security .3871*** .0180 .3517 .4225
Supervision .0193* .0109 -.0021 .0407
Participation .3279*** .0174 .2937 .3620
R2 0.3784
Adj. R2  0.3748
N 20,206
*p <.10, two-tailed test
**p <.05, two-tailed test
***p <.01, two-tailed test
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Compensation Greater Than Average (CGTA) is compensation greater than industry
average, expressed as a percentage of industry average. Thus, CGTA = 5 means a 5%
increase in compensation relative to the industry average. Industry average is assumed to
be $100,000 a year in the model.
To predict the change in job satisfaction when compensation changes, the statistically
significant coefficients of CGTA and CGTA Squared are used.
Change in Job Satisfaction = 0.0063 * CGTA - 0.0000065 * CGTA2  (8.2)
Thus, a 5% compensation increase relative to the industry average leads to 0.0063 * 5 -
0.0000065 * 25 = 0.029 units increase in job satisfaction.
A similar procedure is performed for compensation that is less than the industry average.
Figure 8.2a shows the predicted regression result. On the horizontal axis, 50% means
total compensation worth 50% of industry average. The vertical axis shows the change in
job satisfaction index, with zero meaning there is no change in job satisfaction.
Figure 8.2a: Effect of Financial Compensation as % of Industry Average on Job Satisfaction (#1)
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At 100% of industry average, the change in job satisfaction is zero. At 150%, the job
satisfaction index is increased by 0.15 units on a scale of 1 to 4, and at 50%, job
satisfaction decreases by 0.37 units. What is interesting is the changing slope, where for
compensation larger than 100%, the effect on job satisfaction increases at a decreasing
rate, signifying that as people are paid with higher compensation, the incremental
increase in compensation makes people more satisfied by a lesser magnitude. On the
other hand, when people are paid less than average, a sharp drop in job satisfaction
occurs. The rate of reduction in job satisfaction decreases as one lowers the
compensation. The kink at 100% is similar to the well-documented prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Figure 8.2b shows the 95% confidence interval of the effect of financial compensation on
job satisfaction. It is predicted using the values from the upper and lower bounds of the
confidence interval in Table 8.1. The red line is the upper bound and the green is the
lower bound. As expected, the farther away from 100% of industry average, the wider the
confidence interval, signifying the greater the uncertainty. It is worth noting that the red
line curves up as compensation decreases to less than 65% of industry average. This is
due to the quadratic equation in the regression model. It means people with 50%
compensation see their job satisfaction decrease by a lesser amount than the ones with
65% compensation. This is not realistic. Alternatively, I assume that, for compensation
less than 65%, the change in job satisfaction stays constant at the value of 65%
compensation for the upper bound. A similar assumption is imposed for the green line
passing 130% compensation. For compensation greater than 130%, the increase in job
satisfaction is assumed to stay constant at the value of 130% compensation for the lower
bound. Figure 8.2c shows the revised confidence interval. A sensitivity analysis using the
95% confidence interval is presented in Chapter 12.
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Figure 8.2b: 95% Confidence Interval of the Effect of Financial Compensation as % of Industry Average on Job
Satisfaction
Figure 8.2c: 95% Confidence Interval of the Effect of Financial Compensation as % of Industry Average on Job
Satisfaction
Effect of Financial Compensation as % of Industry
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Effect of Financial Compensation as% of Industry
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8.4 Psychological Ownership
8.4.1 Effect of Employee Ownership on Job Satisfaction
Figure 8.3a shows the effect of employee ownership stake as a percentage of pay on job
satisfaction (#2 in Figure 8.1). This is based on the same specification in equation 8.1
that includes a dummy variable for any employee ownership stake along with linear and
squared terms for size of stake. Employee ownership stake is the value of stock held in
different plans by employees divided by base pay plus overtime. We see there is a jump
of job satisfaction at 1% and a steady increase at a diminishing rate until 200%, the
maximum in the available data. The jump can be interpreted as people gaining
psychological satisfaction and feeling like owners as long as some stock is granted. Once
an employee has stock, the higher the value of the average stock each employee owns,
the higher her job satisfaction is. For example, if the stock price increases and makes the
average stock owned by each employee worth 200% of her salary, this increases her job
satisfaction by 0.045 units more than if she has no stock at all.
Figure 8.3a: Effect of Employee Ownership Stake as % of Pay on Job Satisfaction (#2)
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One limitation of the NBER dataset is that the maximum data available on employee
ownership stake cuts off at 200% of pay. It is unrealistic to assume that any stake greater
than 200% has the same effect as that of 200%. Given that there is no data available
beyond 200%, the function is extrapolated to asymptotically reach 0.05 as employee
ownership stake reaches 300% and beyond (see the circled line in Figure 8.3b). That
means when the average stock owned by each employee is worth 3 times their salary,
their job satisfaction increases by 0.05 units. The asymptotic assumption is justified on
the ground that there must be a limit to the psychological effect of employee ownership
stake: people cannot be infinitely happier as the value of their stock increases indefinitely.
Even the founder who owns the whole stake at the beginning has a limit to satisfaction.
Figure 8.3b: Extrapolated Effect of Employee Ownership Stake as % of Pay on Job Satisfaction (#2)
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8.4.2 Effect of Profit Sharing on job Satisfaction
Figure 8.4 shows the effect of profit sharing as a percentage of pay on job satisfaction (#3
in Figure 8.1). As with the employee ownership stake, this is based on the same
specification in equation 8.1 that includes a dummy variable for any profit sharing along
with linear and squared terms for size of profit sharing. Profit sharing as percent of pay is
the total dollar value of the payment(s) one received as bonuses in the most recent year
divided by base pay plus overtime. As profit sharing % increases, job satisfaction
increases at a decreasing rate.
Figure 8.4: Effect of Profit Sharing as % of Pay on Job Satisfaction (#3)
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8.5 Job Satisfaction Effects
8.5.1 Effect of Job Satisfaction on Turnover Rate
One difficulty of using the NBER data and self-reported survey data in general is how to
translate the regression results into the table functions when some of the data series are
not the exact variables in the model but related to them. For example, the turnover rate in
the model is the actual turnover rate, the percentage of people leaving per year. The
closest measure from the NBER data is Turnover Intentions, reporting how likely people
are to look for a job with another organization within the next twelve months.
Translating turnover intentions into an actual turnover number is difficult to do; studies
have shown they are highly correlated, but there are no good representative studies that I
know of to make an exact translation. In the NBER data, "already looking" + "very
likely looking" is used as a measure of the turnover rate. This averages 12.4% across the
sample, which is similar to the average actual turnover rate reported by companies to the
Great Places to Work Institute. 3 This encourages confidence that the self-reported data is
a good proxy for actual turnover. Further studies could collect and use the actual
turnover rate to estimate the table function.
Figure 8.5 shows the effect of job satisfaction on turnover rate (#4 in Figure 8.1).
Ordered probit is used to predict the probability of "already looking" + "very likely
looking" for the turnover rate measure. The result shows that job satisfaction is a
powerful predictor of turnover rate - the lower the job satisfaction, the higher the
turnover rate. People vote with their feet: the less happy they are, the more likely they
are to choose to leave the company.
3 In a forthcoming study by Douglas Kruse and Joseph Blasi, the major regression results using the NBER
dataset were confirmed using a dataset comprising about 300,000 employee surveys and company data
from the 800 companies that applied for the 100 Best Companies to Work for in America designation of
Fortune magazine. In this study the outcomes such as turnover, employee ownership and profit sharing
were supplied by the companies and were not self-reported data.
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Figure 8.5: Effect of Job Satisfaction on Turnover Rate (#4)
8.5.2 Effect of Job Satisfaction on Willingness to Work Hard
Job satisfaction is another powerful predictor of willingness to work hard. The question
for willingness to work hard is "To what extent do you agree or disagree with this
statement? 'I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the company I
work for succeed' (1-5 scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). Ordered probit is
used to predict the probability of "strongly agree" or "agree" for the willingness to work
hard measure.
One way to translate the willingness to work hard measure into the actual work time is to
use the multiplicative function:
Workweek = Normal Workweek * Effect of Job Satisfaction on Workweek * Effect of Work
Pressure on Workweek
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Actual workweek is determined by the normal workweek times the effects from job
satisfaction and work pressure. Figure 8.6 shows the effect of job satisfaction on
willingness to work hard (#5 in Figure 8.1). It shows when job satisfaction is at its
normal scale 3, its effect on willingness to work hard equals 1, which means people work
at the normal workweek of 50 weeks per year (if effect of work pressure on workweek =
1). When job satisfaction decreases below 3, people are less willing to work hard and
thus reduce their workweek. When people are more satisfied than normal, they are
willing to work for a longer time, since they enjoy the work.
Figure 8.6: Effect of Job Satisfaction on Willingness to Work Hard (#5)
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8.5.3 Effect of Job Satisfaction on Employee Productivity
Figure 8.7 shows the effect of job satisfaction on employee productivity. The higher the
job satisfaction, the higher employee productivity is. The productivity effect is modeled
as a multiplicative function as shown in section 9.3. When job satisfaction is at the
reference level of 3 on a 1 to 4 scale, the employee productivity effect is neutral at 1.
I1
When job satisfaction is higher than the reference, the productivity effect increases, and
when job satisfaction is lower, the productivity effect decreases.
It is worth noting that aggregated employee evaluations of establishment productivity are
used for the productivity measure since they are highly correlated with actual
productivity measures in the NBER data. Figure 8.7 is based on a regression of
establishment-level productivity on average establishment-level job satisfaction and its
square and cube. The circles on two sides are based on judgment as there is no data
available in those ranges. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to analyze how sensitive the
assumption is in Chapter 11.
Figure 8.7: Effect of Job Satisfaction on Employee Productivity (#6)
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9. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
9.1 Causal Loop Diagram of Employee Participation
Employee participation is an important element of an HPWS and ownership culture
(Rosen, Case and Staubus 2005; Rosen and Rodgers 2007; Kruse, Freeman and Blasi
2010). How does participation influence employee behavior and firm performance?
Figure 9.1 shows a high-level causal structure of employee participation. There are two
effects of participation effort. First, it increases employee productivity as the firm
accumulates participation experience and builds up participation culture. Second,
participation effort increases the employee education and coaching effort, thereby
reducing the effective work effort available for real work. Under what condition does the
long-term productivity gain outweigh the short-term work effort loss? This question is
analyzed in Chapter 11. This chapter describes the model formulations of the employee
participation sector. The subscripts for the equations are ignored for simplicity.
Data for this sector is based on interviews with researchers and consultants in the
employee ownership field, and practitioners in employee-owned companies4 , as well as a
review of the employee ownership literature (e.g., Rosen, Case and Staubus 2005; Rosen
and Rodgers 2007; Kruse, Freeman and Blasi 2010). While the model attempts to capture
the essence of the participation structure, it is important to note that this section is meant
to be illustrative and not definitive. Unlike the employee ownership effects in Chapter 8,
the functional forms and parameters in the participation sector are not based on
quantitative regression analysis; they are based on qualitative interviews. Future work
could estimate the functional forms described below using survey data on employee
participation.
4 I would like to thank Corey Rosen and Loren Rodgers at the National Center for Employee Ownership,
Joseph Blasi and Douglas Kruse at Rutgers University, Mary Ann Beyster at the Foundation for Enterprise
Development, Chris Mackin at the Ownership Associates, Anthony Matthews at the Beyster Institute, J.
Robert Beyster and employees at Science Applications International Corporation, and participants at the
2009 and 2010 Beyster Fellowship Symposiums.
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Figure 9.1: Causal Loop Diagram of Employee Participation
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Participation time is the number of work hours per year allocated to participation effort;
this includes team work, problem solving groups and participation committees. As the
firm spends more time on participation, employees' participation experience builds up
over time and is modeled as a co-flow structure (Sterman 2000). Thus, participation
experience captures the time delay in building up a participation culture - it takes a
sustained participation effort over time to accumulate the experience needed to establish a
participation culture. Participation culture is modeled as an average participation
experience per employee over a reference level. Thus, as the average employee's
accumulated participation experience reaches the reference level of 100 hours of average
participation experience for each employee, the company participation culture index
equals to 1 and signals a mature participation culture. Participation culture is a
theoretical construct that captures the observation that it takes a certain sustained
participation effort throughout the whole company over time to build the culture. One
cannot build the culture with a one-time initiative. Participatory companies, such as W.
L. Gore and Southwest Airlines, spend sustained effort in participation are cases in point.
Participation Effort = Participation Time * Employees (9.1)
(person*hour/year) (hours/year) (person)
Participation Experience = INTEGRAL (Participation Effort - Participation Experience
Loss Rate from Quits - Participation Experience Loss Rate from Layoffs - Participation
Experience from Forgetting) (9.2)
Average Participation Experience = Participation Experience / Employees (9.3)
Participation Culture = Average Participation Experience / Reference Average
Participation Experience (9.4)
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9.3 Productivity Gain from Participation
The effect of participation culture on productivity is modeled as a nonlinear function, as
shown in Figure 9.2. Before employee culture reaches the threshold level of 0.3 units,
productivity effect is less than one, signaling the loss of productivity due to the learning
curve in participation effort: it takes time for employees to learn initiatives such as the
learning circle, problem solving group and open book management before they can
become effective. However, once enough experience is accumulated to the point where
participation culture passes 0.3 units, the productivity effect becomes greater than one -
employees become more productive than without participation, as more innovations are
generated through employee involvement.
Effect of Participation Culture on Productivity = Function for Effect of Participation
Culture on Productivity [Participation Culture] (9.5)
Productivity Effects = Effect of Participation Culture on Productivity * Effect of
Employee Experience on Productivity * Effect of Employee Quality on Productivity *
Effect of Job Satisfaction on Productivity (9.6)
Effective Work Effort = Employees * Work Time * Productivity Effects (9.7)
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Figure 9.2: Effect of Participation Culture on Productivity
9.4 Work Effort Loss from Participation
For each unit of participation effort, one needs to allocate additional employee education
and coaching effort to make it work. For example, one needs to provide employee
education teaching people how the ownership plan works. In addition, it is important to
train people in business literacy so they have the tools to think like entrepreneurs about
company performance. These efforts are usually conducted through internal coaching
from senior employees.
Employee education and coaching effort per unit of participation effort does not stay
fixed; it varies with the firm's participation culture. Figure 9.3 shows that as the firm
builds up its participation culture, the fraction of education and coaching effort needed
per participation effort decreases. There is less need to educate and coach as more
employees accumulate experience in participatory management. People become familiar
with the participatory culture and able to self-organize and manage the process.
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Employee Education and Coaching Effort = Participation Effort * Effect of Participation
Culture on Employee Education and Coaching Effort (9.8)
Effect of Participation Culture on Employee Education and Coaching Effort = Function
for Effect of Participation Culture on Employee Education and Coaching Effort
[Participation Culture] (9.9)
Net Effective Work Effort = Effective Work Effort - Employee Education and Coaching
Effort (9.10)
Work Pressure = Desired Work Effort / Net Effective Work Effort
Figure 9.3: Effect of Participation Culture on Employee Education and Coaching Effort
(9.11)
9.5 Participation Time
Managers decide how much time is allocated to participation. Participation time is
modeled as the normal participation time multiplied by the effect of work pressure on
participation time. Figure 9.4 shows that the higher the work pressure experienced by
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managers, the less time they allocated to participation. This captures the observation that
real work demand takes precedence over participation. When the work pressure is three
times higher than the actual work effort (work pressure = 3), managers cut participation
time to zero.
The variable sensitivity of participation time to work pressure captures the decision rule
managers use to determine participation time. When the sensitivity = 1, managers decide
according to the table function in Figure 9.4. When the sensitivity = 0, managers are not
affected by work pressure and allocate fixed normal participation time.
Participation Time = Normal Participation Time * Effect of Work Pressure on
Participation Time (9.12)
Effect of Work Pressure on Participation Time = 1 + Sensitivity of Participation Time to
Work Pressure * (Function of Effect of Work Pressure on Participation Time [Work
Pressure] - 1) (9.13)
Figure 9.4: Effect of Work Pressure on Participation Time
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PART IV: MODEL ANALYSIS
10. BASE CASE ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the business strategy, employee behavior and firm performance in
the base case scenario.
10.1 Business Strategy
At the time of my field research, Alpha Inc. had $1 million working capital including
founder capital and a government grant (Figure 10.1). Their technology was promising
but was still at the early development stage and appeared it would need about three to
four years to fully develop the product, with a payback period at around five years.
Alpha Inc.'s sales cycle was long (about 1 year), as the customers were not familiar with
this new technology. Significant direct sales effort was needed to move the potential
customers through the prospect chain. Thus, with an early product development stage
and long sales cycle, the firm planned to ask for venture capital (VC) financing to help it
get through the "valley of death" (Figure 10.2).
The managers projected that Alpha Inc. would be able to attract two rounds of VC
financing, first $4 million at year 1 to fund its product development and then $8 million
at year 3 to fund its go-to-market strategy Based on these initial conditions and
assumptions, the model shows that, after burning cash for seven years, its working capital
starts to go up (Figure 5a) because cash flow has turned positive (Figure 10.2). Years 0 to
7 in Figure 10.2 are the infamous "valley of death" where the firm needs sufficient
injection of financing to help it return to cash-positive. A boost in financing is possible,
thanks to an increasing sales volume starting from the first sale at year 5 and sufficient
sales at year 7 to generate positive net income (Figure 10.3). It takes such a long time to
turn cash-positive because Alpha is at an early product development stage and its product
development and sales cycles are long. Alpha's product starts out with 8 years of
customer payback period (Figure 10.4), i.e., it takes 8 years of accumulated energy
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savings from adopting Alpha's product to cover the costs of purchasing the product. A
payback period of 8 years is too long to be considered attractive for the customers.
Alpha's initial strategy is to focus on product development by hiring engineers (Figure
10.5) to develop product features that would increase the energy savings their product
offers and thereby shorten the payback period (Figure 10.4). Being mindful of the long
sales cycle and the need to generate revenue, the firm begins to hire sales people, though
fewer than engineers (Figure 10.5). Around year 5.5, the sales force surpasses the
engineers, i.e., the sales force as a fraction of total employees passes 0.5 (Figure 10.6).
This is because the firm has developed a good enough product, by switching from
product development to a sales focus strategy after year 5.5, that the firm is able to
generate an increasing amount of sales: enough to turn cash-positive by year 7.
At around year 8, Alpha begins to reduce its sales fraction gradually and shift towards
growing the engineering force (Figure 10.6). This is because each sale requires ongoing
customer service support performed by service engineers. To maintain high customer
service quality and keep earning service fees, the firm gradually shifts to a service-
focused strategy by increasing the fraction of service engineers.
Figure 10.1 Figure 10.2
Cash Quarterly Net Income
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The graphs above have a time horizon of 15 years, which is too short to saturate the
market. The addressable market is still much larger than the installed base by year 15
(Figure 10.7). The addressable market increases as the product becomes more attractive
over time due to shorter payback period. The drop from year 7.5 to 9 is caused by the
shortage of customer service as sales volume increases rapidly and it takes time to hire
and train service engineers (Figure 10.8). As customer support increases over time, the
addressable market expands again after year 9. Note that after year 8, all engineering
effort is allocated to customer support, with no product development. This is because in
this base case scenario, no new entrant to compete against the firm is assumed. The firm
has developed a good product that needs no further development, thus freeing up its
engineers to focus on customer support. The assumption of no entry of competitors is
unrealistic; hence a sensitivity analysis of competitive pressure from new entrants is
presented in Chapter 12.
While the model cannot perform a historical fit as there is no time-series data available
from Alpha Inc., the stylized pattern of behavior shown in the base case scenario is
consistent with the entrepreneurship literature: the valley of death dynamics; the need for
several rounds of VC financing in a long product development and sales cycle industry;
the product life cycle of going from infancy, growth, maturity to decline; and the strategic
shifting from product development at the early stage to a sales-focused strategy in the
growth stage and service model at the mature and decline stage (Roberts 1991; Gartner et
al. 2004; Kuratko and. Hodgetts 2006). Future work could calibrate the model to a clean
tech startup with a long enough time-series dataset.
10.2 Employee Behavior
The base case described here is the scenario where the salary is the same as the industry
average and there are no stock options, stock grants, profit sharing, or participation. This
is the scenario of a non-shared capitalism, non-employee-owned company. Given that
there is no extra compensation besides average salary, plus the average workweek is very
long due to high work pressure from working in a startup (Figure 10.9), job satisfaction is
consistently below the reference value of 3, as people are burned out (Figure 10.10). The
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reputation of there being low job satisfaction deters high-quality people from joining the
company and, as a result, average employee quality is below the reference value of 1
(Figure 10.11). Quarterly turnover hovers around 3% of total employees (Figure 10.12).
Rookie employees as a fraction of total employees increases when there are new hires
due to the injection of venture capital at years 1 and 3 (Figure 10.13). After year 8, the
company becomes cash-positive and starts hiring again. The higher the rookie fraction,
the lower the average employee experience, as there are more inexperienced rookies in
the workforce mix (Figure 10.14). As shown in Figure 6.4, employee productivity is
driven by job satisfaction, employee quality and employee experience. Productivity
increases slightly over time as employee experience accumulates, despite the negative
effects from job satisfaction and employee quality (Figure 10.15). If the firm adopts
other shared capitalism policies, one can expect its job satisfaction and productivity to go
up significantly in comparison to this base case scenario.
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10.3 Financial Performance
The model also has a detailed financial sector that illustrates various financial
performance indicators. Figure 10.16 shows that the cumulative profit goes from
negative to zero at year 12.5, and thereafter increases exponentially. Market
capitalization starts to jump up after year 7 when the firm starts to make a profit, and is
calculated as expected present value of net income (Figure 10.17). Shares outstanding
increases at years 1 and 3 as new shares are issued to the venture capitalists for their
investments (Figure 10.18). Stock price equals the market capitalization divided by the
total shares outstanding (Figure 10.19). The founder's ownership stake shrinks from
100% to 41% at year 1 and 18% at year 3, while the total VC ownership increases from
0% to 59% to 82% (Figure 10.20). There is no employee ownership or IPO in this
scenario. Founder's net worth equals her number of shares times stock price. It reaches
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$40 million by year 15 whereas the total VC net worth reaches $186 million (Figure
10.21).




















































To see the main causal structure described above, Figure 10.22 shows the causal linkages
of the key variables. It presents the base case scenario with salary at 100% industry
compensation and no shared capitalism policy. Figure 10.23 shows the same causal loop
diagram of salary effect in words, without the behavior-over-time graphs.
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The base case described above is the non-shared-capitalism company where there are
neither stock options, stock grants, profit sharing, nor participation. In this chapter, I will
analyze the dynamic effects of different levels of salary, stock grants, profit sharing and
participation on employee behavior and firm performance.
11.1 Stock Grants
11.1.1 Low to Medium Levels of Stock Grants
To test the effect of employee ownership through stock grants, I create a variable called
Annual Stock Grants Value as Percentage of Industry Compensation (ASGV). ASGV
captures the policy of compensating employees by giving them an ownership stake in the
company. The value of stock granted to each employee annually is modeled as a
percentage of industry average compensation. For example, suppose the industry
compensation is $100,000 per person per year. If one would like to give stock grants
worth 10% of the industry compensation ($10,000 per person per year), and the internal
stock price is $10 per share at the time stocks are granted, each employee would receive
1000 shares per year.
Stock grants help conserve cash, recruit employees, reduce turnover, and motivate people
to work harder. One might compensate for salaries lower than the industry norm by
giving each employee an ownership stake in the firm through stock grants. However,
granting stock to employees dilutes everyone's (including the founder's) ownership.
How should one decide whether or not to grant stock to employees? How much value
motivates employees without too much dilution? When is the right time to award the
stock and for what purpose? These are interesting theoretical questions for researchers
and crucial practical questions for entrepreneurs.
Figure 11.1 shows three policy runs: average stock grants value as 0% (blue), 10% (red)
and 20% (green) of industry compensation, holding salary constant at 100% industry
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compensation. As ASGV increases from 0% to 10% and 20%, we see employee
ownership percentage increasing from 0% to 14% and 24% by year 15. Despite the
increase in employee ownership, the founder's net worth actually increases from $45M to
$88M and $90M, respectively, at year 14 (two graphs on the left). That is, the more
wealth is shared with employees, the more wealth is created for the founder.
Why is that? The underlying causal loop diagram is shown in Figure 11.2. Figure 11.1
shows the selected variables from the causal loop diagram. The eight graphs in the
middle form the R2 loop, with the two graphs on the right forming the RI loop. The key
insight is that granting employees shares closes the employee ownership loop R2. When
there are no stock grants (blue), there is no feedback from how the company is
performing (stock price) to the employee behavior, since they are paid a fixed salary
without an ownership stake. As a result, the employee's job satisfaction stays relatively
flat, despite the company starting to generate positive net income and the stock price
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However, when ASGV is 10%, the employee ownership loop R2 is closed and job
satisfaction jumps up along with the stock price (Figure 11.1). Employees are now part
owners and firm performance feeds back to their behavior. Productivity and effective
work effort go up, which increases quarterly sales, net income and working capital. The
improved financial performance allows the firm to expand its employee workforce and
further increase effective work effort, sales, net income and so forth. Stock grants close
the R2 loop and trigger the RI loop in a virtuous cycle, which in turn propels the R2 loop
further in a virtuous direction. This interaction of two reinforcing loops causes the firm
performance to increase exponentially over time, as seen in the widening wedge between
the red and blue lines.
Proposition I (Productivity Gain of Employee Ownership): Employee ownership closes
the reinforcing feedback loop from firm performance to employee behavior and generates
additional productivity gain. Given appropriate conditions, higher stock price increases
employees'stock value, driving up job satisfaction, attracting better employee quality and
reducing turnover These, in turn, create additional productivity gain, which increases
net income and stock price further At the same time, higher net income enables hiring
more workforce, which increases work effort, revenue and net income further Thus, more
wealth is shared through broad-based employee ownership; and more wealth is created,
given the appropriate conditions.
Notice that, as ASGV increases from 10% (red) to 20% (green), stock price (and thus
founder's net worth) increases as well, though at a lower magnitude than when ASGV
goes from 0% to 10% (Figure 11.1). This is caused by a diminishing returns of employee
ownership effect. As employee ownership stake increases, the marginal increase in job
satisfaction and productivity decreases over time. This is caused by the effect of financial
compensation on job satisfaction, which increases at a decreasing rate for compensation
greater than the industry compensation (Figure 8.2a). Consequently, productivity also
increases at a diminishing rate until it reaches its maximum. Financial performance still
increases as employee ownership stake increases, though at a diminishing rate.
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Proposition 2 (Diminishing Returns of Employee Ownership): There is a diminishing
returns of employee ownership effect. The effect of additional employee ownership stake
increases job satisfaction, employee productivity, and firm performance at a diminishing
rate.
11.1.2 Very High Levels of Stock Grants
Given that an additional employee ownership stake motivates employees and increases
firm performance, is greater employee ownership better? Should the founder give
employees as much ownership as possible? The answer depends on one's measure of
performance. Figure 11.3 shows policy runs with ASGV as 0% (blue), 50% (red) and
100% (green) of industry compensation. For sales, net income and market capitalization,
the higher the stock grants, the higher their performance - though it increases at a
diminishing rate, as explained earlier.
If one looks at stock price and founder's net worth, their values actually decrease as
ASGV increases from 50% (red) to 100% (green). This is due to the dilution effect of
employee ownership. As more shares are issued to employees through stock grants, stock
price decreases as total shares outstanding increase. Even though the market
capitalization keeps increasing due to productivity gains from employee ownership, the
magnitude of increase is outweighed by the dilution of additional shares. As a result,
stock price can decrease when the dilution effect outweighs the productivity gain.
This can be explained through the causal loop diagram in Figure 11.2. Granting
employees shares has two effects on stock price: productivity gain and dilution effects.
Employee shares, firstly, create additional productivity gain and increase stock price by
closing the employee ownership R2 loop (blue) and, secondly, dilute ownership by
increasing total shares, which lowers stock price and the founder's net worth (purple).
The two combined effects determine the change in stock price.
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Proposition 3 (Dilution Effect of Employee Ownership): Employee ownership has two
effects on stock price: productivity gain and dilution effects. First, it creates additional
productivity gain and increases stock price by closing the employee ownership loop.
Second, it dilutes ownership by increasing total shares, which lowers stock price and
founder's net worth. The two combined effects determine the change in stock price. When
too much ownership is granted (past a certain threshold), the dilution effect can outweigh




















11.1.3 Zero to High Levels of Stock Grants
When salary is fixed at the market average, how do different levels of stock grants
influence firm performance? Figure 11.4 shows the market capitalization at year 15 under
different constant levels of ASGV and 100% salary. When ASGV is zero, market
capitalization at year 15 is $300 million. As the level of ASGV increases, market
capitalization at year 15 increases. With 150% ASGV, market capitalization reaches $900
million by year 15. This is due to the productivity gain effect stated in Proposition 1.
The higher the level of ASGV, the less the incremental increase in market capitalization
for every additional increase in ASGV. This demonstrates the diminishing return effect
stated in Proposition 2. The productivity gain of employee ownership diminishes as the
stock grants level increases. Thus, as more wealth is shared, more wealth is created, but at
a diminishing rate.
Figure 11.4: Market Capitalization at Year 15 under Different Stock Grant Levels
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How about founder's net worth? Figure 11.5 shows founder's net worth at year 15 under
various levels of ASGV. The base founder's net worth when there is no stock grant is $55
million at year 15. As the level of ASGV increases, founder's net worth increases and
reaches its peak when ASGV is 20% of industry compensation. It decreases steadily as
ASGV passes 20%. This is due to the dilution effect stated in Proposition 3. Figure 11.6
shows the ownership percentages of founder, VC and employees at year 15 under
different levels of ASGV. As the level of ASGV increases, more dilution occurs in
founder's (blue) and VC's (green) ownership. This is caused by the increase in employee
ownership (red).
It is worth noting that although founder's net worth starts to decrease passing 20% ASGV,
it still outperforms the base case of $55 million when there is zero stock grant. Only
when ASGV is greater than 90% do we see founder's net worth underperform the base
case. This is because the dilution effect dominates the productivity gain, such that even
though the total pie (market capitalization) increases with higher ASGV, the diminishing
incremental increase in market capitalization is not enough to offset the loss in ownership
share due to dilution. When too much ownership is granted (past a certain threshold), the
dilution effect can outweigh the productivity gain, thereby lowering the founder's net
worth.
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Figure 11.5: Founder's Net Worth at Year 15 under Different Stock Grant Levels
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Figure 11.6: Ownership Percentage at Year 15 under Different Stock Grant Levels
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11.1.4 Timing Effect: Pre-growth vs. Growth Period Grants
The timing of stock grants is another critical decision. When should one give out stock?
Should one grant stock at the early cash-negative pre-growth stage or at the later cash-
positive growth period? What is the dynamic tradeoff between productivity gains and
dilution effects at different periods? Figure 11.7 shows three policy runs of awarding
ASGV at 20% of industry compensation at three different periods: zero period (blue),
cash-negative pre-growth period year 0-7 (red), and cash-positive growth period year 8-
15 (green). First of all, no matter what the timing is, granting stocks generates higher net
income and stock price than granting no stock at all. Granting no stock (blue) is the
worst performing in all graphs.
Second, the cash-negative pre-growth period (red) produces higher market capitalization
than the cash-positive growth period (green). This is because granting stock at the early
stage allows the firm to capitalize the productivity gain effect early on and amplify it at
the growth stage. This is demonstrated in the job satisfaction and productivity graphs
where the red line is higher than the blue line, both from years 1 to 7 when the stock is
granted and from years 7-15 when no stock is granted. The reason productivity increases
despite no new stock being granted is because the value of the stock of previously
awarded shares increases as stock price increases in the growth period. Employees are
able to share part of the wealth created from the early stage, which boosts their job
satisfaction and productivity in the later period. The R2 loop is closed early on and
allows the RI and R2 loops to mutually reinforce and amplify each other over time.
Despite no new stock being granted in the growth period (a flow concept), the stock
granted in the pre-growth stage has closed the R2 loop earlier and will continue to do so
for employees who own the stock (a stock concept). The early capitalization and later
amplification effects explain why market capitalization is much higher for the pre-growth
period grants (red) than the growth period grants (green).
Note that there is a subtle caveat to this analysis. The current model does not keep track
of who owns stock or not: it calculates the average share outstanding for all employees,
and assumes the averaged impact applies to all employees. Future work could distinguish
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the ones with stock versus the ones without, and the new versus old employees, to study
the differential impact on employee behavior and firm performance.
What about stock price and the founder's net worth? Do pre-growth-period grants always
yield higher values than the growth-period grants? It depends on the dynamic tradeoff
between productivity gains and the extent of dilution. To grant stock worth 20% of
industry compensation at the early stage when the stock price is very low, the firm needs
to issue many more shares to the employees than in the growth stage, when the stock
price is high. This can be seen in the employee ownership graph where the pre-growth-
period grants result in 22% at year 15 as opposed to the merely 2% from the growth-
period grants. 5 The higher volume of newly issued employee shares increases the total
shares outstanding, thus lowering the stock price6 . Given that the founder has the same 1
million shares, the founder's ownership becomes diluted and her net worth follows the
same trajectory as the stock price. Since the dilution rate under ASGV at 20% of industry
compensation is not very strong, the founder's net worth is still higher than with growth-
period grants and is surpassed only at year 14.
Figure 11.8 shows similar runs with ASGV at 50% of industry compensation as opposed
to 20% for the three different periods. Because of the much higher volume of stock
grants, the employee ownership share reaches 41% at year 15 for the pre-growth period
grants and 5% for the growth-period grants. The dilution effect is so strong that
founder's net worth from the pre-growth-period grants (red) is only slightly higher than
with the growth-period grants (green) before it is surpassed at year 11.5 - a much earlier
date than year 14.
Proposition 4 (Timing Effect of Employee Ownership): Stock granted at the cash-
negative pre-growth period closes the employee ownership loop early on and enables the
firm to capitalize on productivity gains in the early stage and to amplify them in the later
period, thereby producing higher net income and market capitalization than the stock
' The reason the red line in employee ownership graph gradually reaches to 23% is due to the 3 year vesting
period of stock grants assumed in the model. Thus, after stopping the granting of stocks at year 7, all the
non-vested grants from the past gradually become fully vested later on.
6 Stock price ($/share) = Market capitalization ($) / Shares outstanding (shares)
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granted at the cash-positive growth period. However higher dilution occurs with the
pre-growth-period grants, as more shares need to be issued, given the low firm valuation
at the pre-growth stage, which depresses stock price at the later period. The extent of
pre-growth versus growth-period grants'impact on stock price and the founder 's net








































Stock options differ from stock grants in that stock grants give shares outright to
employees, whereas stock options give the employees the right to purchase stocks at a
predetermined strike price. Options may be exercised when the stock price is greater
than the strike price. The employees profit from the difference, which motivates them to
improve stock price through their work effort. How do stock options influence employee
behavior and firm performance? To analyze the dynamic effect of stock options, I .
created a variable called Annual Stock Options per Employee as a Basis Point of Total
Shares (ASO). ASO captures the policy of compensating employees by offering them
annual stock options. The number of stock options is modeled as the basis point of the
total shares outstanding. Thus, a policy of 5 basis points of ASO means granting each
employee a number of options worth 0.0005 of total shares. For instance, if the firm
starts with one million shares, each employee will receive 500 options per year. The
model assumes a vesting period of 3 years.
Figure 11.9 shows four policy runs where ASO equals 0 basis points (blue), 5 basis points
(red), 10 basis points (green) and 15 basis points (grey). Notice that the higher the ASO,
the higher the job satisfaction, net income, stock price and founder's net worth. This is
because stock options, like stock grants, also close the employee ownership loop R2 in
Figure 11.2. The difference, however, is that employee job satisfaction increases only
after options are "in the money" (stock price exceeds the strike price), starting in year 7.
The employee ownership loop starts to kick in when options are in the money and are
exercised after the three-year vesting period.
Notice that in the employee ownership percentage graph, employee ownership gradually
reaches 15% under all three ASO policies. This is because there is an assumption of 15%
option pool in the model (commonly observed in startups). As a result, the amount of
ASO the firm is able to award decreases when the total option pool reaches 15%.
Employee ownership increases faster with 15 basis points ASO (grey) than 10 (green) or
5 basis points (red), as more options are issued to employees earlier. The higher ASO
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strengthens the employee ownership loop and leads to higher firm performance, though at
a diminishing rate.
Proposition 5 (Dynamic Effect of Stock Options): The dynamic effect of stock options is
similar to that of stock grants, though with some subtle differences. Like stock grants,
stock options close the employee ownership loop by creating a feedback linkage from
firm performance to employee behavior However the virtuous reinforcing effect kicks in
only when stock prices exceed strike prices. The more options that are granted, the
stronger the employee ownership loop gain, which leads to higher firm performance,






























Profit sharing is another commonly practiced form of shared capitalism modes of
compensation. How much should one share profits with employees? The higher the
profit sharing (assuming profitability), the more motivated are the employees, but the
lower the returns to shareholders. Yet how do different magnitudes of profit sharing
influence employee behavior and firm performance?
Figure 11.10 shows four policy runs of profit sharing as different percentages of net
income: 0% (blue), 5% (red) and 10% (green). First of all, it is obvious that profit
sharing only begins to have an impact when net income turns positive after year 8. Profit
sharing is a useful motivational tool only when the company escapes the valley of death
and enters the growth stage.
Second, as profit sharing percentage increases from 0 to 5% to 10%, job satisfaction,
productivity, net income, market capitalization, stock price and founder's net worth all
increase, though at a diminishing rate. These variables increase because profit sharing
closes the feedback loop R3, which connects net income to financial compensation
through profit sharing (Figure 11.11). Therefore, how the firm performs matters directly
to employees, since part of their compensation depends on it. This scenario creates
additional incentive for employees to work harder and increase their productivity, and
leads to higher net income, average profit sharing, market capitalization and stock price.
All stakeholders (employees, founders and shareholders) are better off as a result. When
done in this range, profit sharing is another tool to create wealth by sharing wealth.
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Does this mean the higher the profit sharing the better, and that one should share as much
profit as possible? Figure 11.12 shows three policy runs with 0% (blue), 50% (red), and
70% (green) profit sharing. With 70% profit sharing (green), average profit sharing is
around $150,000 per person per year at year 8, this increases job satisfaction and
productivity by large amounts. 7 However, effective work effort actually falls below the
zero profit sharing case (blue). This is due to the lower number of employees hired
7 The reason productivity rises sharply is due to multiple effects -job satisfaction, employee quality and
employee experience - working concurrently. High profit sharing drives up job satisfaction, attracts high-
quality employees and lowers turnover, which conserves employee work experience. As a result,
productivity increases sharply over time in a high profit sharing setting.
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because working capital and net income decrease after profit sharing. After expensing
profit sharing, net income falls far below the 0% case. This creates an additional
balancing loop B 1, as lower net income constrains the firm's hiring budget and reduces
its workforce more than otherwise, which decreases sales and net income further than the
0% case.
At 50% profit sharing (red), the increase in productivity almost exactly offsets the loss in
workforce, which makes the effective work effort the same as the base 0% case (blue).
For profit sharing greater than 50%, the balancing loop B 1 dominates the reinforcing loop
R3, and the system tips over to lower financial performance, as described earlier. Notice
that market capitalization and stock price lines shift downward as the profit sharing
percentage passes the threshold. There appears to be a tipping threshold where profit
sharing's impact on work effort and firm performance turns from positive to negative.
Proposition 6 (Benefits of Profit Sharing): An increase in profit sharing as a percentage
of net income before a certain tipping threshold increases job satisfaction, productivity,
net income, market capitalization, stock price and founder's net worth at a diminishing
rate. Profit sharing causes productivity to increase through higher job satisfaction,
better employee quality, and longer work experience from lower turnover
Proposition 7 (Tipping Threshold of Profit Sharing): Once the profit sharing percentage
surpasses the tipping threshold, the reduction in net income after expensing profit sharing
limits the resources available to expand the workforce. The workforce reduction
outweighs the productivity gain from profit sharing, and profit sharing's influence on
work effort andfirm performance turns from positive to negative.
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11.4 Participation
All the analyses above assume there is no employee participation. Studies show that
employee participation is an important element of a HPWS and ownership culture
(Rosen, Case and Staubus 2005; Rosen and Rodgers 2007; Kruse, Freeman and Blasi
2010). Formulation of the participation structure was described in Chapter 9. Figure 9.1
is reprinted below to show the causal loop diagram of employee participation.
Figure 9.1: Causal Loop Diagram of Employee Participation (Reprinted)
Work Effort Loss
from Participation
Functon for Eect of
Partcipaton Culture Reference Average
on Parldcpalon ParicipadonManagement Effort Experience
artclpation '* r articlp~aon
Partcipalon Culture Average
ment Effort Parcipaton
Funcion for Efect of Experience
Elect of Paricipaion on









Hinng + Revenue Work
Met Effiectve +















There are two main effects of participation effort. First, it increases employee
productivity as the firm accumulates participation experience and builds up participation
culture. Second, participation effort increases the employee education and coaching
effort, thus reducing the effective work effort available for real work. Under what
condition does the long-term productivity gain outweigh the short-term work effort loss?
This section analyzes the dynamic effects of participation and its interactions with other
shared capitalism practices.
11.4.1 Low Participation Effort
As mentioned in section 9.5, the variable sensitivity of participation time to work
pressure captures the decision rule managers use to determine participation time. When
the sensitivity = 1, managers decide according to the table function in Figure 9.4. When
the sensitivity = 0, managers are not affected by work pressure and allocate a fixed
normal participation time. Figure 11.13 shows two policy runs with no participation
(blue) and low participation (red). No participation is the case when participation time
equals zero hours per year. Low participation is the case when managers' participation
policy is highly sensitive (0.9) to work pressure. Given that the startup company
experiences high work pressure, a high sensitivity of 0.9 units means a low level of
participation time of 10 hours per year.
The consistently low participation time causes the firm's financial performance (net
income, stock price and working capital) to fall below that of zero participation. This is
because the low participation time is insufficient to build up enough participation culture
(graph in the middle) to trigger productivity gain. As shown in Figure 9.2, before
participation culture reaches a tipping threshold of 0.3 units, there is productivity loss due
to effects of the learning curve in participation effort - it takes time for employees to
learn initiatives such as the learning circle, problem solving group and open book
management before they become effective. Thus the productivity gain loop R2 in Figure
9.1 has not kicked in to outweigh the work effort loss from employee education and
coaching effort, loop B 1. As a result, low participation actually makes the firm
performance worse than with no participation.
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It is worth noting that the number 0.3 as the tipping threshold is a theoretical construct.
The actual number is an empirical question and needs further research to develop exact
measurements of participation culture. Whatever the exact number is, the concept of a
tipping threshold of participation culture where productivity gain starts to kick in is
consistent with practitioners' experience. This analysis shows the dynamic effects of
participation culture on employee productivity and firm performance.
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11.4.2 Medium and High Participation Effort
Figure 11.14 shows three policy runs: no participation (blue), medium participation (red)
and high participation (green). Medium participation is the case when sensitivity = 0.7,
which results in 30 hours per year of participation time. High participation is when
sensitivity is set to zero - managers adopt a fixed participation policy of 100 hours per
year, regardless of the work pressure. The persistence of high participation effort (green)
pays off in the long run as the firm builds up a strong participation culture that causes
productivity to increase beyond the zero participation case (blue). As a result, the firm's
performance is higher when managers adopt a sustained participation effort independent
of the work pressure.
When managers become sensitive to work pressure and adopt medium participation effort
(red), the impact on firm performance is minimal, as productivity gain is washed out by
work effort loss. It takes time to build up participation culture. Medium participation
effort builds up participation culture more slowly than high participation. The drop in
participation culture starting in year 8 is caused by the increased hiring. New hires lower
average participation experience as rookies need to undergo participation education and
coaching from senior people. The surge in hiring during the growth phase from year 9 to
14 dilutes participation culture to below 0.5 units, since medium participation time is not
sufficient to keep pace with the workforce expansion. The dilution of participation
culture loop B2 in Figure 9.1 dominates the productivity gain loop R2. As a result, the
intended productivity gain from participation is canceled out. A firm can either choose to
expand its workforce at a slower pace to ensure a sustained high participation culture (a
practice some companies, such as W. L. Gore, adopt) or it can increase participation
effort so rookies can catch up faster. The key insight for managers is to consciously
choose a participation policy that sustains a high participation culture that passes the
tipping threshold, so that the productivity gain loop R2 dominates the work effort loss
loop BI and dilution of participation culture loop B2, which leads to higher firm
performance.
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Proposition 8 (Tipping Threshold of Participation Culture): Participation culture (a
stock concept) is accumulatedfrom the past participation effort (a flow concept) and can
be diluted with increased workforce.
There is a tipping threshold of participation culture where, before crossing it, productivity
decreases due to the learning curve in participation effort. After participation culture
passes the threshold, productivity gain from participation outweighs work effort loss from
employee education and coaching effort. As a result, firm performance increases.
Low participation effort can make firm performance worse than no participation if there
is insufficient participation culture to trigger the productivity gain from participation.
Medium participation effort can have minimal impact on firm performance when
productivity gain is washed out by work effort loss. Increased hiring during the growth
phase can dilute the participation culture if participation effort does not keep pace with
the workforce expansion.
High participation effort can increase firm performance once the firm builds up strong
participation culture that causes productivity gain to outweigh work effort loss from
employee education and coaching effort.
For participation to work, managers should aim to sustain a high participation culture
that passes the tipping threshold, such that the productivity gain loop R2 dominates the
work effort loss loop B] and dilution ofparticipation culture loop B2 in Figure 9.1.
Adopting a sustained participation effort independent of work pressure is one way to

































11.5.1 Participation with Employee Ownership
Policy experiments above show the effect of participation effort alone without any shared
capitalism mode of compensation. What is the combination effect of participation and
stock grants? Figure 11.15 shows three policy runs. The blue line is the base case
without participation or stock grants. The red line is high participation without stock
grants. This is the case where productivity increases when participation culture crosses a
tipping threshold. The green line is the combination of high participation with annual
stock grants worth 10% of industry compensation. Notice that indicators of firm
performance (net income, working capital and stock price) are all much higher with the
combination of participation and stock grants than with participation alone. This is
because stock grants mediate and close the employee ownership loop, R2, which enables
the direct effect of participation on productivity to be amplified through the closed
reinforcing loop. This can be seen in the green line in the job satisfaction graph, where
higher stock price leads to higher job satisfaction and increases productivity even more
than participation alone.
The key insight is that participation alone only taps into its direct effect on productivity
(Figure 11.16). Participation in combination with employee ownership enables the
productivity gain from participation to be reinforced and amplified through the employee
ownership loop (Figure 11.17). Participation with employee ownership works better than
participation or employee ownership alone. It is important to combine both the "soft"
participation management with the "hard" employee ownership financial incentives to
make shared capitalism work. Having participation alone only give employees "a sense
of lunch," whereas employee ownership gives people "the actual lunch" (Rosen and
Rodgers 2007). This insight has implications for the organizational development field,
which focuses primarily on the soft HR practices without taking into consideration the
importance of the hard financial incentives. Shared capitalism modes of compensation
are effective tools to reinforce and amplify the organizational development change
efforts.
161
Proposition 9 (Combination Effect of Participation and Employee Ownership):
Participation with employee ownership improvesjob satisfaction andfirm performance
more than participation or employee ownership alone. This is because participation
alone only taps into its direct effect on productivity. Employee ownership closes the
employee ownership loop by mediating the financial performance-employee behavior
link. As a result, participation in combination with employee ownership enables the
productivity gain from participation to be reinforced and amplified through the employee
ownership loop.
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11.5.2 Participation with Profit Sharing
What about other combination effects among employee ownership, profit sharing and
participation? Figure 11.18 shows the base case without profit sharing or participation
(blue), profit sharing as 10% of net income only (red), and profit sharing as 10% of net
income with participation (green). Similarly to the findings in the previous section, the
combination of profit sharing with participation outperforms profit sharing and
participation alone. This is because profit sharing mediates the firm performance-
employee behavior link and closes the profit sharing loop R3. The direct effect of
participation on productivity is amplified and reinforced through the profit sharing loop.
It is worth noting that the reinforcing effect is triggered only when the firm has positive
net income, whereas in the employee ownership case, the reinforcing effect is triggered
regardless of the profit level.
Proposition 10 (Combination Effect of Participation and Profit Sharing): Profit
sharing with participation improves job satisfaction and firm performance more than
profit sharing or participation alone. This is because participation alone only taps into
its direct effect on productivity. Profit sharing closes the profit sharing loop by mediating
the financial performance-employee behavior link. As a result, profit sharing in
combination with participation enables the productivity gainfrom participation to be
reinforced and amplified through the profit sharing loop.
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Figure 11.18: Profit Sharing vs. Participation Com
bination Effect: No Profit Sharing 
and No Participation
(Blue), 10%
 Profit Sharing (Red), and 10%
 Profit Sharing w
ith Participation (Green)
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11.5.3 Participation with Profit Sharing, Stock Options and Stock Grants
Figure 11.19 shows five policy runs: 1) the base case without participation, profit sharing,
stock options or stock grants (blue); 2) participation only (red); 3) participation with
profit sharing as 10% of net income (green); 4) participation with profit sharing as 10%
of net income plus 10 basis points of stock options (grey); and 5) participation with
profit sharing as 10% of net income plus 10 basis points of stock options and annual
stock grants worth 10% of industry compensation (black). The more shared capitalism
practices are combined, the higher the job satisfaction, productivity and firm
performance. The productivity graph distinguishes the effects from each additional
practice. Productivity increases as more practices are combined. This is because the
direct effect of participation on productivity gets amplified and reinforced through two
closed profit sharing loops and the employee ownership loop. The two closed loops
strengthen the feedback from firm performance to employee behavior and make the loop
gain higher than that of individual loops alone. Higher loop gain amplifies any direct
effects (such as participation) more than the direct effects alone. Seeing how shared
capitalism practices close the firm performance-employee behavior loops helps to explain
why combined practices outperform individual ones. Figure 11.20 illustrates the holistic
feedback system of shared capitalism practices.
Proposition 11 (Combination Effect of Shared Capitalism Practices). Combinations of
shared capitalism practices outperform individual ones alone. The more shared
capitalism practices (such as participation, profit sharing and employee ownership) that
are combined, the higher the job satisfaction, productivity andfirm performance. This is
due to the "hard"financial incentives (such as stock options, stock grants and profit
sharing) closing the feedback loops fromfirm performance to employee behavior thus
enabling the "soft" human resource practices (such as participation and training) to
amplify their direct effects onfirm performance.
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11.6 Salary vs. Stock Grants
The analysis above assumed a fixed salary level while varying the level of stock grants.
In practice, the entrepreneur could lower the salary and replace it with stock grants to
conserve cash. What combinations of salary and stock grant levels outperform the base
100% salary case with no employee ownership? To answer this question, I ran 1,600
simulations of various combinations. Figure 11.21 on the left shows the market
capitalization at year 15 under various combinations of salary and stock grant levels. The
horizontal axis shows different levels of salary between 50% and 150% of industry
compensation that a manager could adopt. 91.25% means that the firm adopts a policy of
paying its employees a below-the-market salary worth a constant 91.25% of industry
average. The depth axis shows various levels of stock grant value between 0% and 200%
of industry compensation. These two axes denote the various combinations of salary and
stock grants a manager could choose as a combined compensation policy. The vertical
axis shows the value of market capitalization at year 15 when the manager adopts a
certain constant combination of salary and stock grant levels throughout the model run.
The line between the red and blue areas is the $300 million base case line. Any point on
that line denotes a certain combination of salary and stock grants that renders the same
market capitalization as the base case. The area above the base line is the result of
policies that outperform the base case.
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Figure 11.21: Market Capitalization at Year 15 under Various Salary and Stock Grant Levels
Market Capitalization at Year 15 Market Capitalization at Year 15
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Figure 11.21 on the right presents a two-dimensional contour diagram of the 3D graph
from a bird's-eye view. The purple area denotes the best-performing market
capitalization. The blue area is the market capitalization that underperforms the base case,
under the policies of very low salary with little to no stock grants on the left side, or high
salary with or without stock grants on the right. The base line is the curve between the red
and blue area Every point on the base line is a combination of salary and stock grants that
generates the base market capitalization at year 15.
To understand the dynamics that generate Figure 11.21, it is helpful to explain the base
line curve. First, Figure 11.22 shows that, as salary decreases, one needs to increase stock
grants to maintain the base performance. This is because a low salary lowers financial
compensation, job satisfaction, employee productivity and effective work effort (1. lower
productivity). The side benefit of low salary is that it enables the firm to hire more people
for a given headcount budget driven by the working capital (2. more hiring). However,
the increase in hiring is not enough to offset the productivity decrease - effective work
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effort is still lower than the base case. To maintain the base case effective work effort, the
firm needs to award stock grants that close the employee ownership loop - because the
increase in stock grants value increases financial compensation, job satisfaction and
productivity to the point that effective work effort restores to the base case value, which
generates the base case values of sales, net income and market capitalization (3. EO
loop). This demonstrates the scenario where employee ownership can be used as a
compensation tool in combination with lower salary in order to conserve cash and expand
the workforce.
Figure 11.22: Causal Loop Diagram of Low-Salary, Low-Stock-Grant Strategy
Market Capitalization at Year 15


















Second, Figure 11.23 shows that, when salary is increased, one needs to combine that
with high stock grants in order to maintain the base case market capitalization. This is
counter-intuitive - why does one need to award employees high stock grants on top of
high salary? The causal diagram explains it. A high salary increases financial
compensation, job satisfaction and employee productivity. However, the productivity is
increased at a diminishing rate due to the functional form of the effect of financial
compensation on job satisfaction (1. limited productivity increase). The unintended
consequence of a high salary strategy is that it burns cash faster, thus lowering the
number of people hired (2. fewer people). The limited productivity increase is not enough
to offset the loss in headcount, and hence the effective work effort is lower than the base
case value. To restore effective work effort to the base case value, the firm can increase
productivity further by awarding stock grants. However, due to the diminishing return in
job satisfaction and productivity, one needs to award a large amount of stock grants to
raise productivity enough to restore effective work effort (3. EO Loop).
In short, the intended productivity gain of a high salary strategy can be offset by the
diminishing returns in productivity gain and the limited workforce due to expensive
headcounts. High salary alone with no employee ownership performs worse than the
market average salary alone. It is worth noting that high salary here means a policy of
high salary for all employees (e.g., everyone's salary increases by 30%). The model does
not address differential pay raises to a workforce differentiated by functions or
performance (Becker, Huselid and Beatty 2009). Further work could disaggregate
employees into different performance levels to study the effect of a differentiated salary
strategy.
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Figure 11.23: Causal Loop Diagram of High-Salary, High-Stock-Grant Strategy
Market Capitalization at Year 15
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What combinations of salary and stock grants produce a founder's net worth that
outperforms the base case value? Figure 11.24 show the comparable 3D and contour
graphs for founder's net worth. The base line curve of $50 million is the line between the
yellow and red areas. The area inside the base line curve is combinations that outperform
the base case. The purple area with low stock grants and around market salary produces
the best founder's net worth. The underperforming red and blue areas on the top are
caused by the dominance of the dilution effect due to high stock grants.
Figure 11.24: Founder's Net Worth at Year 15 under Various Salary and Stock Grant Levels
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Figure 11.25 presents four types of strategy that can generate the base case value. First,
the lower-left quadrant is the "cheap labor" strategy with low salary and low stock grants.
A low salary with low stock grants leads to low productivity but more employees. Low
stock grants also lead to low founder's dilution. The founder attains her net worth
through a large share of a small pie of market capitalization. Second, the upper-left
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quadrant is the "cheap labor with ownership" strategy with a low salary and high stock
grants. Low productivity caused by low salary is offset by productivity increase from
high stock grants. However, it is done at the cost of high dilution. In this quadrant, the
total pie is large but the founder's share is small. Third, the lower-right quadrant is the
"expensive labor" strategy with a high salary and low stock grants. This leads to merely
medium productivity due to the diminishing returns in productivity gain. It also leads to
fewer people due to expensive headcount. As a result, market capitalization is smaller.
The low stock grant also leads to low dilution. The founder attains her net worth through
a large share of a smaller pie. Fourth, the upper-right quadrant is the "expensive labor
with ownership" strategy with a high salary and high stock grants. This leads to a high
productivity gain, but at the cost of fewer people and a higher dilution. This is the case of
a smaller share of a larger pie.
Figure 11.25: Four Quadrants of Founder Net Worth
Founder Net Worth at Year 15
































Figure 11.26 show the 3D and contour graphs for employee net worth. The base case of
no employee ownership produces $0 employee net worth. The base line is the horizontal
axis when stock grant is zero. As stock grant increases, employee ownership increases,
which leads to higher employee net worth. Yellow is the maximum employee net worth,
driven by low salary (to conserve cash and expand workforce) along with high stock
grants (to increase productivity and employee share of the wealth).
Figure 11.26: Employee Net Worth at Year 15 under Various Salary and Stock Grant Levels
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Figure 11.27 presents the contour diagrams for market capitalization, founder's net worth,
employee net worth, employee productivity effect and headcount, all at year 15. It shows
the two main reinforcing loops, RI hiring and R2 employee ownership, that explain the
contour results.
Market capitalization is split into founder, employee and venture capital net worth (not
shown). The employee productivity effect shows productivity increases from the least (in
the red lower left-hand corner) to the highest (at the top). The small arrow in each
diagram points to the base case line. The low productivity is caused by low salary and
low stock grants. As salary and stock grants increase, productivity increases. The highest
productivity, at the top, is driven by the best employee net worth. High productivity leads
to high market capitalization and employee net worth, which increases productivity even
more (R2 Employee Ownership Loop).
The headcount diagram on the right shows the number of employees. The blue is the least
headcount area, driven by high salary cost. The purple is the highest headcount, caused
by low salary and high stock grants. Higher productivity and headcount lead to higher
effective work effort, which drives up net income and market capitalization. High net
income and working capital lead to expansion of workforce (RI Hiring Loop). The hiring
loop and the employee ownership loop are the two main loops that generate the dynamic
behavior shown in the contour diagrams.
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Figure 11.27: Contour Diagrams of Market Capitalization, Founder Net Worth, Employee Net Worth, Employee
Productivity and Headcount at Year 15
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Figure 11.28 shows four types of firm objectives and the corresponding HR strategies.
1. Best Market Capitalization: Area 1 shows the maximum market capitalization and
employee net worth with the worse founder net worth than the base case. To achieve the
objective of maximizing market capitalization, low salary with high stock grants is the
strategy. Low salary conserves cash and enables workforce expansion. High stock grants
close the employee ownership loop and generate high employee net worth, which leads to
high productivity. High productivity along with workforce expansion leads to maximum
market capitalization. The hiring loop and the employee ownership loop reinforce each
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other into a virtuous cycle and generate the highest market capitalization. However, the
founder net worth is worse than in the base case due to excessive dilution.
2. Best Founder Net Worth: Area 2 shows the maximum founder net worth, but
mediocre market capitalization in comparison with the base case. To achieve the
objective of maximizing founder net worth, market salary with low stock grants is the
strategy. Low stock grants weaken the employee ownership loop and result in a mediocre
market capitalization that is only slightly better than the base case. Low stock grants also
reduce dilution, which enables the founder to capture the wealth. This is the case of a
small pie (market capitalization) with a large share (founder ownership). This is optimal
for the founder but the total market capitalization is suboptimal. There is a an unrealized
potential wealth that is missing due to a weak employee ownership loop.
3. Mutual Gain: Area 3 shows the scenario where both founder and employee net worth
outperform the base case. To achieve the objective of mutual gain, market salary with
medium stock grants is the strategy. Medium stock grants strengthen the employee
ownership loop without overly diluting the ownership. The productivity gain from
employee ownership outweighs the dilution effect. Making stock grants increases both
founder and employee net worth, as long as it is within the tipping threshold.
4. Lose-Lose: Area 4 shows the worst-performing market capitalization and founder net
worth. To prevent lose-lose for the company and founder, very low or high salary with no
stock grants is the strategy to avoid. With no stock grants, there is no employee
ownership loop and the potential productivity gain is untapped. Varying salary too much
without stock grants underperforms because its intended effect can be washed out by
unintended consequences. For example, low salary enables hiring more employees.
However, too low salary lowers productivity and net income, which shrinks the
headcount budget, which results in fewer employees. Fewer employees lead to low work
effort and net income. The hiring loop turns into a vicious cycle. On the other hand, very
high salary increases productivity by only a limited amount, due to diminishing returns. It
also reduces the headcount as employees become more expensive. In sum, too low or too
high salary without stock grants underperforms.
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Figure 11.28: Firm Objective and HR Strategy
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11.7 Main Insights
The main insights of the policy analysis are:
1. Employee ownership creates, and mediates the strength of, the reinforcing feedback
loops from firm performance to employee behavior.
2. Salary has a direct effect on productivity and hiring but does not close the firm
performance to employee behavior feedback loop.
3. Stock grants have productivity gain, diminishing returns and dilution effects.
4. The impact of salary and stock grants on firm performance is sensitive to the non-
linear effect of total compensation on job satisfaction.
5. The impact of shared capitalism policy on firm performance depends on the dynamic
tradeoffs among the four effects: hiring, productivity gain, diminishing returns and
dilution.
6. The more wealth is shared through broad-based employee ownership, the more
wealth is created, given the appropriate conditions.
7. To attain mutual gains for founder and employees, a policy of market average salary,
plus sufficient stock grants to strengthen the employee ownership loop without overly
diluting the ownership, is recommended.
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12. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
This chapter shows two sets of sensitivity analysis. Section 12.1 shows a sensitivity
analysis of the effect of financial compensation on job satisfaction. Section 12.2 presents
a sensitivity analysis of a sudden decrease in sales productivity.
12.1 Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction
The impact of shared capitalism policy depends on the strength of the employee
ownership loop. The strength of that loop in turn depends on the functional form of the
effect of financial compensation on job satisfaction. To test how sensitive the analysis is
to the functional form, I ran the same 1,600 simulations using the function forms at the
lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval (reprinted below).
Figure 8.2c: 95% Confidence Interval of the Effect of Financial Compensation as /0 of Industry Average on Job
Satisfaction
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Figure 12.1 shows the sensitivity analysis of the effect of financial compensation on job
satisfaction. It presents market capitalization at year 15 when the financial compensation
effect is at the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval. In the lower
bound scenario, the base case line between red and blue areas is shifted to the left. This is
because the maximum financial compensation effect on job satisfaction is capped at
130%. When the combined value of salary and stock grants passes 130% of the industry
compensation, job satisfaction reaches its peak and, as a result, there is no additional
productivity gain. Increasing stock grants beyond the 130% mark does not increase firm
performance. The productivity gain from the employee ownership loop is weakened. The
blue area is larger than the center bound case - more combinations of salary and stock
grants underperform the base case. In fact, the likelihood of bankruptcy increases - the
area to the right and below the black line signifies zero market capitalization at year 15.
The 3D graph on the left in Figure 12.2 shows this clearly.
The upper bound scenario shows the opposite result. There are more combinations of
salary and stock grants that outperform the base case, and the outperformance is at higher
magnitudes. Shared capitalism policy creates higher market capitalization because the
productivity gain in the employee ownership loop is strengthened in the upper bound
scenario. This is due to the upward-shifting red line in Figure 8.2c, which increases the
effect of additional salary and stock grants on job satisfaction and productivity.
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Figure 12.1: Sensitivity Analysis of the Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction (Market
Capitalization in Contour Diagram).
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Figure 12.2: Sensitivity Analysis of the Effect of Financial Compensation on Job Satisfaction (Market


































The sensitivity results for founder net worth show a similar pattern (Figure 12.3). The
number of outperforming combinations of salary and stock grants (yellow area) shrinks in
the lower bound scenario due to the weakened employee ownership loop. It expands in
the upper bound case as the loop strengthens. This sensitivity analysis shows that
although the magnitude of the shared capitalism policy effect could be weakened or
strengthened, its directional effect within the 95% confidence interval stays the same. The
main policy insights stated in Section 11.7 remain intact.
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12.2 Decrease in Sales Productivity
The analysis so far assumes there is one startup firm and one incumbent with no new
entrants into the market. To test the sensitivity of the model results under competitive
pressure, I ran simulations with a step decrease of sales productivity at year 6 onwards till
year 15. Since new entrants offering competing products are likely to lower the firm's
sales productivity, this shock signifies the uncertainty in market competition.
Figure 12.4 shows the sensitivity results. The horizontal axis denotes the size of shock
from 0 to 50% of sales productivity decrease from year 6 onwards. The vertical axis is the
market capitalization at year 15. Two HR policies are compared. The blue is the case of
100% salary with no stock grants. The red is 80% salary plus 14% stock grants. Both
policies give the same base case market capitalization when there is no shock - this gives
us the equal starting point for comparison.
As expected, the larger the shock (signifying higher competition), the lower is the market
capitalization. There is a tipping point where the shock is too large (around 30%), so that
the firm goes bankrupt, as there is not enough sales generated to sustain the firm. The
firm is outcompeted and has ceased to exist by year 15.
The red line declines more steeply than the blue one for a given shock, i.e., the same
shock reduces market capitalization more for the lower salary with stock grant policy
than for the market salary case. This is due to the positive feedback loop of employee
ownership working in the vicious direction. A shock of low sales productivity leads to
lower sales and net income, which leads to lower stock price and stock grants value. This
in turn reduces job satisfaction and employee productivity more than in the 100% salary
case. Thus, employee ownership creates the reinforcing loop connecting firm
performance and employee behavior. However, the virtuous or vicious direction of the
loop depends on other factors, such as competitive pressure. Being an employee
ownership company does not guarantee success; sound business strategy is needed to
fend off competitors. This sensitivity analysis shows that, in a downturn, the employee
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ownership loop could work in a vicious direction and cause the firm to underperform the
100% salary case.
Figure 12.4: Sensitivity Analysis of Decreases in Sales Productivity
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13. CLEAN TECHNOLOGY STARTUP MANAGEMENT FLIGHT
SIMULATOR
This chapter describes the Clean Technology Startup Management Flight Simulator, a
computer simulation game developed for teaching the dynamic strategies of running a
clean technology startup company. It is based on the model presented in this thesis and
aims to make the insights from this research experiential through an interactive learning
environment. The game interface is developed using Venapp software where students can
play the game with a user friendly dashboard and timely reports. A teaching assignment
is developed to enhance the real time learning experience.
13.1 Learning Objectives
The intended audiences for the simulator are students in human resource management,
employee ownership, entrepreneurship, sustainability and strategic management. There
are four learning objectives:
1. Systems approach: learning to see employee ownership management as an
important part of the larger corporate system where it is interconnected with
human resource management, product development, sales and financing
strategies.
2. Dynamic effects: learning about the dynamic effects of employee ownership
management overtime through broad-based stock grants, stock options and profit
sharing schemes.
3. Experiential learning: through a real-time simulation game, students learn under
what conditions various employee ownership management strategies improve
employee well-being and firm performance overtime.
4. Clean technology startup: the simulation game is based on the scenario of a
clean technology startup company. Students learn about the business and human
resource strategies of growing and managing a clean technology company.
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13.2 Simulator Overview
Below is the cover screen of the simulator.
Industry Evolution
Management Flight Simulator
(Clean Technology Startup Version)
by
Joe Hash, David Miller, John Sterman
System Dynarnics Group




This isa pr-release beta version, for use only by stenroled at the MIT Sloan School of ManagewW in the Spring
semnester 2010- May not be distributed or modified in anyf formr Copyrigt 2005-20 10 W-l AN rights reseived.
Financial support for the development of the Clean Technology Startup Simulator provided by the
Foundation for Enterprise Development.









By clicking "Simulator Overview," the simulator provides the following introduction.
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Your Challenge
Your startup firm and product
You are the founder, president and CEO of a clean technology startup company. For
concreteness, imagine that your firm has developed a set of technologies to improve
energy efficiency for your customers (for example, the owners and operators of
commercial and industrial buildings), cutting their energy costs while lowering their
carbon footprint. You've developed a set of sensors, controls, and software that work
seamlessly to optimize the efficiency of the HVAC, lighting and other systems in
commercial and industrial facilities. As the simulation starts, your product offers what
you consider to be a highly attractive value proposition for building owners - your target
customers. You estimate that the average customer can reduce their current energy
use by 30% if they buy your system. The unit cost of your product is initially $100,000. If
you charge $120,000 (a 20% margin to cover your indirect costs and provide an
acceptable return on capital), with an annual service fee of 10% of the product price,
you estimate that the simple payback period for your customers is two years, even at
current energy prices. That is, your product pays for itself in just two years.
Market
Based on these savings and the prospect for further improvements as you develop your
technology, you foresee a substantial potential market for your product. However, given
that this is a new product unfamiliar to many customers, it takes roughly one year for a
customer to go from learning about the product to the decision to purchase the
product. The size of the potential market and the likelihood of closing a sale depends on
how attractive your product is, as perceived by the potential customers. The
attractiveness of your product depends of course on the financial benefits it offers the
customer (measured by the payback time or NPV of the savings you offer them), but
also depends on your ability to provide high quality service and support. As with any
new product and new company, potential customers feel more comfortable and are
more likely to adopt if other firms have also done so, so word of mouth from other
adopters is important in the decision of potential customers to consider and ultimately
adopt your product (entrepreneurs know that one of the first questions they will hear
from potential customers early on is "Who else is using your product?"). Because your
product is expensive and requires significant changes in the way your customers
operate their buildings, sales do not occur on the basis of word of mouth or advertising
alone, but require sustained direct sales effort. The more time your sales team can
devote to that process, and the more skilled and motivated they are, the more
customers you move through the sales cycle.
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Figure 1. Sales chain: from potential customer to customer
Sales Effort
Prospect Hot Prospect 4
Generation Generation + Sales
Rate Rate Rate
Potential Hot
Customers & Prospects Prospects p Customers
Potential Prospect Hot Prospect Poaching
Customers Loss Rate Loss Rate Rate
Loss Rate
Product Development
While you believe your initial product offers a good value proposition for potential
customers, it can be improved as technology develops and as you learn from the
experience and suggestions of your customers. And you need to improve at as your
competitors (such as the incumbent utilities that that currently provide energy to
buildings). Your engineering team develops and improves the product. However, your
engineers are also needed to provide support and service to existing customers. The
larger the installed base of your product, the more customer service effort is needed,
drawing time away from product development. The larger your engineering team, and
the more skilled and motivated they are, the better the quality of service they can
provide to existing customers and the faster then can improve the product.
Figure 2. Product Development
Engineering
Effort
S1Product Features + Product Features
Feature Under Development Feature Feature
Start Rate Completion Rate Obsolesce nse Rate
Revenue and Costs
Your revenue comes from sales of your product and the annual customer service fee for
system maintenance and upgrades. Your main costs are the expenses associated with
your employees (sales people and engineers), primarily salary but also the cost of
providing the space, equipment, etc. they need to be effective, and the cost of goods
sold.
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You begin with initial cash on hand of $1 million representing capital you raised from
angels during the initial development phase. Your job is to grow the company, survive
the 'valley of death' without running out of cash, and maximize the firm valuation, your
net worth and cumulative profit over a period of ten years (you decide whether you
want to focus on your net worth, on building the best company you can, and whether
these goals are aligned or not). You do so by making four sets of decisions each quarter.
Those decisions involve pricing, headcount, financing and compensation.
You will receive quarterly reports including information on sales, the income statement,
cash flow, shares outstanding, product attractiveness, and human resources in the
report panel. You should select your strategies based on those reports, your
understanding of the underlying industry structure, and your best judgment about how
your employees and customers may respond.
Will you crash and burn or become the next millionaire while saving the planet?
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13.3 Scenario Settings
Below is the scenario settings screen where the students can change various conditions in
product development, market, finance and energy and carbon price. This allows the
students to test different strategies under various industry conditions. Average Feature
Development Time captures the length of product development cycle from short (such as
a software company) to long period (such as clean technology or biotechnology). Initial
Feature Relative to Incumbent sets how competitive the startup's product offering is at
the beginning. Sales Cycle Time sets the time it takes to move a typical potential
customer through the prospect chain to become an adopter. Potential Market Size allows
one to test strategies under different market sizes. VC Investment Climate determines
how easy or difficult it is to attract VC financing, given the same product attractiveness.
It simulates the macroeconomic environment. Energy and Carbon Price allows one to test
different scenarios of energy policy.
Scenario Settings
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Avg Feature Development Tine (Year)
Initial Feature Relative to Intanbent
ENERGY AND CARBON PRICE
Energy Price Growth Rate (%IYear)
Carbon Price Start Date (Year)
Carbon Price Phase In Period (Years)








Sales Cycle Thug (Year)
Potential Market Sime (Units)
Government Subsidy to Consumer
(% of Sales Price)
FINANCE
I-al Cash on Hand (S)
VC investment Climate Index
(0: Poor, 1: Neutral, 2: Great)
Maximum Options Pool






Below is the model dashboard where the game decisions are entered on the left hand
column. Students can input their decisions on pricing, headcount growth rate, engineer
proportion, VC financing amount, IPO date, salary, stock options, stock grants and profit
sharing percentage every quarter. Each decision variable is described in Section 13.6.
An overview of the key variables in the model is exhibited on the right. There are also a
set of detailed reports in the bottom-right hand corner.
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13.5 Reports
There are eight detail reports where the students can study in depth to sense-make the
underlying causal mechanism that generates the patterns of behavior shown in the




Below shows the total addressable market size (which increases as the product becomes
























Below shows the drivers of product attractiveness such as the customer payback period,
customer service quality, price and energy cost savings. The lower the price and the
higher the energy cost savings, the lower the customer payback period.
Product Attractiveness [jt
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Below presents key cash flow indicators: cash, runway, cash flow from operations and
cash flow from financing. For example, there are two injections of venture capital
financing at year 1 and 3. The runway becomes zero when there is positive cash flow
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13.5.5 Shares Outstanding and Ownership Structure
Below shows firm valuation, stock price and strike price. It also shows the shares
outstanding, ownership percentage and net worth for founders, venture capitalists,
employees and public (if there is an IPO). This allows students to analyze how much total
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Below presents key human resource indicators such as job satisfaction, turnover, number
of sales versus engineers, employee quality, average workweek and employee experience.

































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Tane (Yea)
Sales Ene -


















Below records a set of decisions students make in the game. It gives an overview of the
employed strategy for later reflection.
Managerial Decisions
Year: 7
Price and Unit Cost
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One could run the game multiple times and save each game under different run number.
The compare runs function enables students to compare multiple runs at once. One can
select many key variables shown on the right below and analyze what causes the
difference in performance. A comparison of net income from two runs is shown below.
Startup 1: Quarterly Net Income ($/Quarter) -I





The Clean Technology Startup Simulator has been used in the Sustainability Lab at MIT
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Assignment Questions
You will make four sets of decisions (pricing, headcount, financing and compensation) in
the simulation. To facilitate learning in a complex environment, we will start with a small
set of decisions and understand their effects before expanding to others. Please follow
the sequence to maximize your learning.
Stage I: Pricing and Headcount
This stage focuses on your pricing, HR growth and product development vs. sales
strategies. You are to made three decisions only:
Pricing ($/unit): What price would you set for your product? The initial unit cost is
$100,000. Higher price provides a higher margin and more resources you can invest in
building your sales and engineering capabilities, but also lengthens the payback period
for customers, lowering the attractiveness of your product for customers. Lower price
may increase sales effectiveness but at a lower profit margin. Pricing lower than unit
cost incurs profit losses. Unit cost goes down over time due to learning from
experience, from customers, and from engineering effort to improve the product. You
believe unit costs might fall about 2.5% every time your cumulative experience
(aggregating learning by doing and engineering effort) doubles.
Headcount Growth Rate (%/Quarter): How fast do you want to grow the total number
of employees? 100% means you target a doubling of your workforce in a quarter, -50%
means trimming your staff by half. What is your headcount growth strategy to generate
revenue growth while not running out of cash?
Engineer Proportion (%): What proportion of your total headcount growth is allocated
to engineers as opposed to sales people? Engineers perform customer service and
product development, while sales people bring in customers and revenue. You need not
only a good product but also customers who know your product and are willing to buy
it. What is your product development and sales strategy?
What you should do:
Stage I: Growth and Pricing
1. Before playing each game, note down your strategy and briefly explain your
reasoning. A strategy is a decision rule, not a set of decisions. For example, "grow the
engineering staff quickly to improve product functionality, then begin to hire sales
people once our offer is sufficiently attractive so that sales effort will be successful" is a
strategy; "grow the staff at 40%/year with 70% engineers for the first year, then 70%
sales people for year 2" is not a strategy but a set of decisions.
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2. Now play the game working only with the three decisions above (pricing,
headcount growth, allocation between engineering and sales). Are you able to escape
the valley of death? Note down what happens and why when you go bankrupt (if you
do).
3. Briefly describe the best strategy you found. What is your pricing, HR growth and
product development vs. sales strategy? How is it different from your initial strategy?
You can copy and paste your decisions into your writeup by clicking "Decisions" in the
dashboard and then copying. To compare runs, you can save runs as Run 1 to 5 in the
dashboard, and compare them by pressing "Compare Run."
4. Why did your best strategy work or not work? What, if any, insights into the
dynamics of clean technology startups did you gain from this stage of the game?
Stage II: Financing
In addition to the three decisions in Stage 1, you are to make two additional decisions
regarding your external financing strategy.
VC Financing ($): You can raise external capital in the venture capital market. How
much VC financing do you want, and how much equity will it cost you? The lower the
value of the firm, the higher the ownership stake the VCs will require to provide a given
amount of financing. And, if the VC's due diligence suggests that your firm is not viable
or too risky, they will not provide the financing you need. To win VC funding, select the
amount you want and run the model for a quarter. If the VCs find your firm attractive
(based on the attractiveness of your product, their estimate of the size of your market,
etc., you may receive all or part of the funding you sought. The fraction of ownership
you had to pay the VCs will be displayed. You may choose to apply for multiple rounds
of VC funding. Doing so however may significantly dilute your ownership.
IPO Date: You may also consider trying an IPO. Select the year that you would like to
take your company public. If successful, you can use the funds from the IPO to expand
your company, and you (and/or your employees and VC partners) may become
millionaires. The extent of your ownership dilution depends on the firm valuation at the
time of the IPO.
5. Before playing the game, note down your financing strategy and briefly explain
your reasoning.
How many times should you play? That is up to you. You should not need to spend more than a
few hours on the assignment. To maximize your leaming, you should follow the principles of scientific
method: formulate (and write down) your hypothesis (strategy) before each game you play; evaluate your
strategy and hypotheses about the causal structures driving the dynamics after each game, and test them
through controlled experimentation (vary decisions one at a time until you understand each one). You will
also learn more playing a lot of games relatively quickly than one game very slowly.
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6. Play the game, experimenting with VC financing and, if you believe you can
succeed, with an IPO. How does the timing and amount of VC funding influence
the firm valuation, your net worth and cumulative profit? You can paste a copy
of the financing results by clicking "Shares Outstanding" in the dashboard.
Stage III: Compensation
Adding to the right pricing, headcount and financing strategies, startup founders must
also design an organization and compensation system that attracts, motivates and
retains high quality employees. In this stage, you make four additional decisions
regarding employee compensation and the ownership structure for your firm.
Salary as % of Industry Compensation: What salary do you offer relative to the industry
average for people with the skills you need? Offering salaries above the industry norm
will help attract better quality applicants, shorten the time required to fill vacancies,
lower turnover, and motivate people to work harder, but it burns cash faster.
Options Granted per Employee: You can also attract talent by offering stock options to
employees. How many options do you give to each employee per year? The decision
here is measured in basis points of total shares outstanding per employee per year.
There are initially 1 million shares outstanding in total, so if you give options equal to 1
basis point of total shares per person that means you give options for 100 shares. When
the company is doing well and the options are in the money, options help attract better
quality applicants for your positions, shorten the time required to fill vacancies, reduce
employee turnover, and motivate people to work harder, all while conserving cash
resources. However, options don't vest immediately, and may have no value if the
company does not do well and the options are underwater.
Stock Grants as % of Industry Compensation: You can also compensate people by giving
them an ownership stake in your company. You set the amount to grant each employee
per year as a percentage of industry average compensation. For example, the industry
compensation is $75,000 per person per year. If you would like to give stock grants
worth of 10% of industry compensation ($7,500 per person per year), and the stock
price is $10 per share, each employee would receive 750 shares per year. Stock grants
help conserve cash, make it easier to recruit employees, reduce turnover, and motivate
people to work harder. You might compensate for salaries lower than the industry
norm by giving each employee an ownership stake in the firm through stock grants.
However, granting stock to employees dilutes your ownership.
Profit Sharing as % of Net Income: What percentage of net income do you want to
share with the employees as additional compensation? The higher the profit sharing
(assuming you are profitable), the more motivated the employees, but the lower the
returns to shareholders.
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7. Before playing the game, note down your strategy to utilize the four
compensation options and briefly explain your reasoning.
8. Can you improve on your best strategy to date through the use of different
compensation structures? Briefly describe the best strategy you found. How do
salary, stock ownership, options and profit sharing influence firm success,
valuation, your net worth, and the net worth of your employees?
9. What have you learned, if any, about the chances for success for your firm, for
you, for your shareholders, and for your employees from the use of internal
financing in compared to the external financing options you explored earlier?
10. What strange behavior or unrealistic assumptions or behavior did you discover in
the game? What suggestions for improvements or enhancements do you have?
Since this is a beta-version, please report any bugs and suggestions for
improvement. For software glitches, please specify the type of machine you
used and the version of the Windows you have.
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PART V: CONCLUSION
14. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
This chapter presents a summary of research, a list of propositions and main insights.
14.1 Research Question
Shared capitalism is a diverse set of compensation practices through which worker pay,
or wealth, depends on the performance of the firm or work group; compensation practices
include employee ownership, stock options, and profit sharing. Empirical studies on
whether employee ownership improves firm performance offer mixed results.
Kaarsemaker (2006), in a 30-year review of the literature, documented that "two-thirds of
129 studies on employee ownership and its consequences found favorable effects relating
to employee ownership, while one-tenth found negative effects. However, favorable
effects do not appear to come about automatically, and the specific conditions under
which they do are largely unknown."
This dissertation attempts to address the question: under what conditions do shared
capitalism policies improve firm performance? A system dynamics model of high
performance work systems estimated using the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset and
calibrated to a clean technology startup company is presented. The model provides an
explicit causal mechanism of how various shared capitalism policies and HR practices
influence employee behaviors which drive business processes, and how those business
processes interact with market conditions to generate firm performance in a dynamic
feedback system.
14.2 Literature Gap
After conducting a thorough literature review in the field of employee ownership and
SHRM/HPWS, four main literature gaps and potential contributions were identified.
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14.2.1 Contingency Theory
The specific conditions under which employee ownership yields favorable effects are
largely unknown. A contingency theory, as opposed to a universal approach, is needed to
answer under what conditions employee ownership improves firm performance.
14.2.2 Causal Mechanisms
The theory of the underlying causal mechanisms of employee ownership effects is
underdeveloped. One needs to build a model that captures the causal mechanisms
between HRM practices and firm performance.
14.2.3 Systems Approach
The relationships of employee ownership with other HRM practices and several
contingencies are too "complex and intertwined" (Poole and Jenkins 1990) to assume a
simple isolated relationship with participation in decision-making or some other single
factor or number of factors. One needs an integrated systems approach that connects the
isolated linkages as a whole.
14.2.4 Dynamic Analysis
Most of the empirical studies on employee ownership effects are static in the sense that
they do not take timing into consideration. The field of employee ownership would
benefit from a dynamic analysis of how different timing (span across the industry
lifecycle) of employee ownership policies affects employee behavior and firm
performance over time.
14.3 Method
While most of the empirical studies focus on estimating the relationship between some
forms of shared capitalism and firm performance through survey data and regression
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analysis, I take a system dynamics simulation approach that is quite different from those
present in the existing literature. By explicitly modeling the causal paths from HR
practices to performance through various mediating and moderating variables, and
simulating the dynamic behavior of performance under various HPWS scenarios, one is
able to generate and test a set of causal theories explaining the impact of HPWS on
performance.
My approach involves three main steps, using mixed survey data, case study and
simulation methods.
1. Model Building: I build a system dynamics model of HPWS estimated using the
NBER Shared Capitalism dataset and calibrated to a clean technology startup company.
The model provides an explicit causal mechanism to show how various shared capitalism
policies and HR practices influence employee behaviors that drive business processes,
and how those business processes interact with market conditions to generate firm
performance in a dynamic feedback system. This model is built on Miller's (2007) model
of clean technology startup companies. My contribution is to add a detailed HPWS with
various shared capitalism policies such as salary, stock grants, stock options, profit
sharing and employee participation. To build the HPWS structure, I performed a
thorough literature review on the existing theoretical and empirical findings of employee
ownership and Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM), and formally modeled
them in a system dynamics framework.
2. Model Estimation and Calibration: Since employee ownership effects are the main
focus of this study, I have estimated the non-linear functional forms of various employee
ownership effects by regression analysis using the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset
(Kruse, Freeman and Blasi 2010). To calibrate this model, I conducted interviews and
collected archival data of an early-stage clean technology startup company. Given the
inherent limitation of an early-stage startup when there are no later-stage time-series data,
company data was used to parameterize the initial conditions of the model. I interviewed
the executives to identify their decision-making rules for pricing, financing, human
resource and compensation policies and their projections for business performance. The
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base run of the model represents closely the executives' expectations and confirms the
general patterns of typical startup companies.
There are three reasons why I focus on a startup company. First, shared capitalism
policies such as stock options, stock grants and profit sharing are important motivational
tools in addition to salary in cash-constrained startup companies (Blasi, Kruse and
Bernstein 2003). Second, I am interested in studying the long-term dynamic effects of
shared capitalism policies across the firm life cycle, starting from the founding stage.
Third, research has shown that founders have long-term imprinting effects on
organizational design and policies (Burton 2001, Burton and Beckman 2007, Beckman
and Burton 2008). Understanding the impact of various shared capitalism policies since
the founding phase is highly relevant to the practice of entrepreneurship.
3. Policy Analysis: I conduct simulation analyses to study how various combinations of
salary, stock options, stock grants, profit sharing schemes and employee participation
efforts influence employee behavior and firm performance over time. The simulation
results offer insights into the dynamic effects of shared capitalism policies. Eleven
propositions on the conditions under which shared capitalism policies improve firm
performance are presented. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to ensure the robustness of
the analyses and guide future research.
14.4 List of Propositions
Below is a list of propositions from the policy analysis in Chapter 11. A key causal loop
diagram of shared capitalism policies where these propositions are based on is reprinted
below (Figure 11.20).
14.4.1 Stock Grants
Proposition 1 (Productivity Gain of Employee Ownership): Employee ownership closes
the reinforcing feedback loop fromfirm performance to employee behavior and generates
additional productivity gain. Given appropriate conditions, higher stock price increases
employees'stock value, driving up job satisfaction, attracting better employee quality and
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reducing turnover These, in turn, create additional productivity gain, which increases
net income and stock pricefurther At the same time, higher net income enables hiring
more workforce, which increases work effort, revenue and net income further Thus, more
wealth is shared through broad-based employee ownership; and more wealth is created,
given the appropriate conditions.
Proposition 2 (Diminishing Returns of Employee Ownership): There is a diminishing
returns of employee ownership effect. The effect of additional employee ownership stake
increases job satisfaction, employee productivity, andfirm performance at a diminishing
rate.
Proposition 3 (Dilution Effect of Employee Ownership): Employee ownership has two
effects on stock price: productivity gain and dilution effects. First, it creates additional
productivity gain and increases stock price by closing the employee ownership loop.
Second, it dilutes ownership by increasing total shares, which lowers stock price and
founder's net worth. The two combined effects determine the change in stock price. When
too much ownership is granted (past a certain threshold), the dilution effect can outweigh
the productivity gain, thereby lowering the stock price and the founder's net worth.
14.4.2 Stock Options
Proposition 4 (Timing Effect of Employee Ownership): Stock granted at the cash-
negative pre-growth period closes the employee ownership loop early on and enables the
firm to capitalize on productivity gains in the early stage and to amplify them in the later
period, thereby producing higher net income and market capitalization than the stock
granted at the cash-positive growth period. However higher dilution occurs with the
pre-growth-period grants, as more shares need to be issued, given the low firm valuation
at the pre-growth stage, which depresses stock price at the later period. The extent of
pre-growth versus growth-period grants'impact on stock price and thefounder's net
worth depends on the dynamic tradeoff between productivity gains and the extent of
dilution overtime.
14.4.3 Profit Sharing
Proposition 6 (Benefits of Profit Sharing): An increase in profit sharing as a percentage
of net income before a certain tipping threshold increases job satisfaction, productivity,
net income, market capitalization, stock price andfounder's net worth at a diminishing
rate. Profit sharing causes productivity to increase through higher job satisfaction,
better employee quality, and longer work experience from lower turnover
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Proposition 7 (Tipping Threshold of Profit Sharing): Once the profit sharing percentage
surpasses the tipping threshold, the reduction in net income after expensing profit sharing
limits the resources available to expand the workforce. The workforce reduction
outweighs the productivity gain from profit sharing, and profit sharing's influence on
work effort and firm performance turns from positive to negative.
14.4.4 Participation
Proposition 8 (Tipping Threshold of Participation Culture): Participation culture (a
stock concept) is accumulatedfrom the past participation effort (a flow concept) and can
be diluted with increased workforce.
There is a tipping threshold of participation culture where, before crossing it, productivity
decreases due to the learning curve in participation effort. After participation culture
passes the threshold, productivity gainfrom participation outweighs work effort loss from
employee education and coaching effort. As a result, firm performance increases.
Low participation effort can make firm performance worse than no participation if there
is insufficient participation culture to trigger the productivity gain from participation.
Medium participation effort can have minimal impact on firm performance when
productivity gain is washed out by work effort loss. Increased hiring during the growth
phase can dilute the participation culture ifparticipation effort does not keep pace with
the workforce expansion.
High participation effort can increase firm performance once the firm builds up strong
participation culture that causes productivity gain to outweigh work effort loss from
employee education and coaching effort.
For participation to work, managers should aim to sustain a high participation culture
that passes the tipping threshold, such that the productivity gain loop R2 dominates the
work effort loss loop B] and dilution ofparticipation culture loop B2 in Figure 9.1.
Adopting a sustained participation effort independent of work pressure is one way to
achieve a high participation culture.
14.4.5 Combination Effects
Proposition 9 (Combination Effect of Participation and Employee Ownership):
Participation with employee ownership improves job satisfaction andfirm performance
more than participation or employee ownership alone. This is because participation
alone only taps into its direct effect on productivity. Employee ownership closes the
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employee ownership loop by mediating the financial performance-employee behavior
link. As a result, participation in combination with employee ownership enables the
productivity gain from participation to be reinforced and amplified through the employee
ownership loop.
Proposition 10 (Combination Effect of Participation and Profit Sharing): Profit
sharing with participation improves job satisfaction andfirm performance more than
profit sharing or participation alone. This is because participation alone only taps into
its direct effect on productivity. Profit sharing closes the profit sharing loop by mediating
the financial performance-employee behavior link. As a result, profit sharing in
combination with participation enables the productivity gain from participation to be
reinforced and amplified through the profit sharing loop.
Proposition 11 (Combination Effect of Shared Capitalism Practices): Combinations of
shared capitalism practices outperform individual ones alone. The more shared
capitalism practices (such as participation, profit sharing and employee ownership) that
are combined, the higher the job satisfaction, productivity andfirm performance. This is
due to the "hard"financial incentives (such as stock options, stock grants and profit
sharing) closing the feedback loops from firm performance to employee behavior; thus
enabling the "soft" human resource practices (such as participation and training) to
amplify their direct effects onfirm performance.
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Figure 11.20: Causal loop Diagram of Shared Capitalism Policies (Salary, Employee Ownership,
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The main insights of the policy analysis are:
1. Employee ownership creates, and mediates the strength of, the reinforcing feedback
loops from firm performance to employee behavior.
2. Salary has a direct effect on productivity and hiring but does not close the firm
performance to employee behavior feedback loop.
3. Stock grants have productivity gain, diminishing returns and dilution effects.
4. The impact of salary and stock grants on firm performance is sensitive to the non-
linear effect of total compensation on job satisfaction.
5. The impact of shared capitalism policy on firm performance depends on the dynamic
tradeoffs among the four effects: hiring, productivity gain, diminishing returns and
dilution.
6. The more wealth is shared through broad-based employee ownership, the more
wealth is created, given the appropriate conditions.
7. To attain mutual gains for founder and employees, a policy of market average salary,
plus sufficient stock grants to strengthen the employee ownership loop without overly
diluting the ownership, is recommended.
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15. CONTRIBUTIONS
This chapter presents four types of contributions from this dissertation: theoretical,
empirical, methodological and teaching contributions.
15.1 Theoretical Contribution
There are four main points under theoretical contribution.
15.1.1 Systems Approach
This dissertation offers a systems approach to the study of HPWS, employee behavior
and firm performance. First, a generic process theory of the firm and the role of
managers is presented in Figure 3.1. The four internal processes are employee behaviors,
business processes, market conditions and financial performance. The contribution of
this framework is its transformation of the traditional balanced scorecard into a dynamic
feedback framework with explicit causal linkages connecting across the four quadrants.
It can be used to provide a high-level systems view of the firm structure and guide
strategic planning for a startup company.
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Figure 3.1: Overall Model Framework (Reprinted)
Second, I offer an integrated and comprehensive model of HPWS that incorporates both
"hard" financial compensation policies, "soft" HR practices, and their inter-linkages with
the whole corporate system. It enables one to view employee ownership management as
an important part of the larger corporate system where it is interconnected with human
resource management, product development, sales and financing strategies.
15.1.2 Causal Mechanisms
This dissertation helps open the "black box" of SHRM/HPWS by providing explicit
causal mechanisms for how various shared capitalism policies and HR practices influence
employee behaviors which drive business processes, and how those business processes
interact with market conditions to generate firm performance in a dynamic feedback
system. A causal loop diagram of HPWS is reprinted below. By making the causal paths
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of HR policies explicit, one is able to trace and analyze the cause and effect of each
policy and identify high leverage points for managers to intervene.
Figure 6.4: Causal Loop Diagram of High Performance Work System (Reprinted)
and Options Emlye N
EmpNeo +
Red: Human resource policies.
Green: Job satisfaction drivers.
Blue: Employee behaAor indicators.
15.1.3 Direct vs. Mediating Effects
One critical insight is that employee ownership and profit sharing are mediating effects
that close the reinforcing feedback loops from firm performance to employee behavior.
Salary and participation are direct effects that influence job satisfaction and productivity
but do not close the firm performance-employee behavior loop. Employee ownership
221
along with participation effort improves firm performance significantly because closing
the firm performance-employee behavior loop amplifies the direct effects of salary and
participation. Thus, the more wealth is shared through broad-based employee ownership,
the more wealth is created, given the appropriate conditions.
15.1.4 Dynamic Theory
This dissertation offers a dynamic theory of how shared capitalism modes of
compensation influence employee behavior and firm performance. In particular, the
concepts of tipping thresholds for salary, employee ownership, profit sharing and
participation culture are proposed in propositions 3, 7 and 8.
15.2 Empirical Contributions
In addition to theoretical contributions, this dissertation also offers some empirical
contributions. The six table functions estimated using the large NBER Shared Capitalism
dataset provide rigorous empirical estimations of the so-called "soft" variables on
employee behavior such as effect of employee ownership on job satisfaction, effect of
profit sharing on job satisfaction, effect of financial compensation on job satisfaction,
effect of job satisfaction on turnover, effect ofjob satisfaction on workweek, and effect of
job satisfaction on productivity. Regressions are performed to estimate the non-linear
relationships as opposed to a linear model specification.
15.3 Methodological Contributions
This dissertation demonstrates how the system dynamics simulation method can be used
for theory building and for guiding empirical testing in SHRM/HPWS through four
iterative steps shown in Figure 4.1 reprinted below.
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Figure 4.1: Steps of System Dynamics Method (Reprinted)
1. System Dynamics
Model Building
Qualitative Field Regression Existing 2. Simulation
Research Anal sis Theory Analysis
3. Dynamic
Theory Building
1. System Dynamics Model Building: to open the black box generating the correlation
observations, system dynamics is used to build a causal process model of how HR
practices, through various causal paths, lead to firm performance. The model is
constructed based on existing theoretical and empirical findings in the literature. This
process allows one to clarify and test the causal logic of existing theories by turning
verbal theories into formal mathematical models. If we find incompleteness or
inconsistency, it allows us to identify the gap and to propose new theories. Sastry's
(1997) formal model of punctuated equilibrium helps identify gaps in the original
theory and provides a refined theory. Similar approaches could be applied to
SHRM/HPWS.
When there are gaps in the causal mechanisms found in the existing literature, one
can conduct qualitative field research to map out the actual causal process. This
engages the grounded theory building approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) to generate
new theory when the existing theory is unclear. Such mixed methods among
quantitative regression analysis, qualitative field research and simulation methods
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allow the model to draw on the strength of each method to improve our understanding
of the underlying causal mechanisms.
2. Simulation Analysis: Once a causal model is built with a set of differential equations
characterizing the causal relationships among variables, one can conduct simulation
analysis by changing the independent variable that we care about, such as the profit
sharing percentage. One can test how different levels of profit sharing in turn
influence firm performance over time. Simulation data is generated to show the
relationship between profit sharing and performance.
3. Dynamic Theory Building: If the simulated data confirms the previous empirical
findings, one gains confidence that the model may have captured the underlying
causal mechanism between profit sharing and firm performance. The model
contributes to the field by providing a dynamic theory of how profit sharing leads to
higher (or lower) performance.
4. Regression Analysis: If the simulated data does not confirm the empirical finding,
this informs us that either something is missing in the model or the previous
regression model was mis-specified. If one is reasonably confident about the model,
one can specify the regression equation on the real data based on the causal model
and collect additional data if needed. The new regression analysis can test the
dynamic hypothesis from step 3 and provide further empirical evidence.
It may well be that the system dynamics model is mis-specified. Perhaps a function is
not correctly estimated, or a feedback loop is missing from the model. One can
conduct further field research and data collection to revise the system dynamics
model and propose a new dynamic theory.
This process not only allows us to identify gaps in the existing theory, but also
enables the generation of new theories that can then be tested empirically using
regression analysis. The iterative process goes on (as illustrated by the circular loop
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above) between empirical testing and theory building. As a result, our understanding
of the underlying causal mechanisms improves over time.
15.4 Teaching Contribution
I hope the dissertation can inform practitioners such as entrepreneurs, managers,
employees and investors regarding the dynamic effects of HPWS and shared capitalism
practices and help them become aware of the various conditions under which shared
capitalism improves employee well-being and firm performance. To aid teaching, a
computer simulation game called "Clean Technology Startup Management Flight
Simulator" is developed for teaching students and training practitioners the dynamic
strategies of employee ownership management in a clean technology startup company. In
a safe and rapid feedback simulation environment, people can test their assumptions,
examine their mental models and gain new insights that could help them design an
effective HPWS.
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16. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
16.1 Further Analysis of Model
e Managerial Objectives: there are different objectives managers could define as
success: quarterly net income, cumulative profit, market capitalization, stock
price, founder's net worth, employee net worth, employee job satisfaction and
customer satisfaction. Future work could analyze the optimal strategic choices
under various objectives. How to design HR practices and shared capitalism
policies for a founder who wants to maximize her net worth versus creating the
highest firm valuation? What about maximizing short-term quarterly net income
versus long-term cumulative profit? Focusing on shareholder value, customer
satisfaction or employee well-being has different strategic implications. Further
analysis of the model could shed light on the organizational design for different
objectives. It could guide inquiry into the purpose of business organizations -
how to balance various objectives and in what sequence? For example, SAIC
believes in putting employee well-being first, and that shareholder value will
follow (Beyster and Economy 2007). This model could enable would-be
entrepreneurs to test strategies under various organizational purposes.
* Dynamic Optimization: while the current analysis shows that under various
conditions employee ownership improves firm performance, it does not analyze
the optimal strategy in each condition. Further analysis could include dynamic
optimization of the various HR practices by taking the optimal decisions at time T
and feeding them into the next period to calculate the next set of optimal decisions
iteratively. This could provide a trajectory of how optimal decisions change over
time and potentially offer a set of optimized dynamic decision rules under various
conditions.
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16.2 Further Empirical Studies of the Model
e Detailed Calibration with Time-Series Data: as mentioned earlier, the current
model is calibrated to the initial parameters of a startup company, Alpha Inc.
Given that Alpha Inc. is at the early stage, there is no meaningful time-series data
available for model calibration. Future work could collect time-series data from a
mature company since its startup phase and calibrate to build further confidence
in the model.
" Empirical Testing of the Propositions: this thesis serves as a theory-building study
and offers eleven propositions from the simulation analysis. Some propositions
confirm previous empirical findings. Others offer insights that are new. The next
stage of research is to conduct empirical studies of the propositions. This can be
done through regression analysis based on large-scale survey and financial data to
test some of the relationships stipulated in this thesis.
" Case Studies of the Propositions: in addition to survey data, the field of
SHRM/HPWS could also benefit from case studies of companies adopting various
forms of high performance work practices and shared capitalism policies. One
could use the propositions as a guide and research case studies that either confirm
or disconfirm the propositions. This will provide further empirical evidence to
guide the next iteration of model development and analysis.
16.3 Further Development of Model
e Disaggregation of Employee Ownership Recipients: the current model assumes
equal distribution of stock options and stock grants when they are awarded; there
is no distinction of which employees own the stocks. Further work could
disaggregate the employees into the ones who are awarded stocks versus the ones
who are not. This can illuminate the inter-organizational dynamics of employee
ownership policy such as the issues of fairness between the haves and have-nots,
the new versus old employees, etc. Without proper and fair distribution, awarding
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employees stock could cause adverse effects to job satisfaction and productivity.
While this study focuses on the aggregated effect of employee ownership at the
firm level, future study could focus on the inter-organizational dynamics of
employee ownership policy at the group level.
* Decision Rules of Employee Compensation: the decision rules for setting salary,
stock options, stock grants and profit sharing are exogenously determined in the
current model. Further model development could endogenize HR managers'
decision rules based on various employee behavior and firm performance
indicators. Should one compensate employees based on the overall financial
performance or their individual impact on the financial bottom line? With a
disaggregated workforce, one could study individual versus team-based
performance evaluation and test some of the hypotheses proposed in the
differentiated workforce literature (Becker, Huselid and Beatty 2009).
* Effect of Going Public: the current model does not distinguish between a private
and a public company. Future work could model the pressure of meeting
quarterly earnings targets on managerial decisions, such as employee
compensation, employee ownership and participation efforts.
* Disaggregation of Competition: the current model assumes one competitor, the
traditional HVAC systems with no energy efficiency savings. In reality, many
startups are competing in the energy efficiency market. While the current model
does have the indexed firm structure that allows the modeling of multiple firms,
this thesis focuses on the dynamics between a single startup and the incumbent.
Future work could analyze the competitive dynamics between multiple startups
with different product development, human resource policies, financing and
market strategies. One could also study how competitive pressure influences
human resource decisions.
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* Disaggregation of Participation Process: the current model aggregates the
participation process into a stock called Participation Experience. In reality, the
process to build a participatory culture is much more complex. According to
Rosen and Rodgers (2007) mentioned in Section 2.1, to build participatory
culture, besides awarding stocks, one needs ownership education teaching people
how the ownership plan works, training people in business literacy, sharing
performance data about how the company is doing overall and how each work
group contributes to that, and building employee involvement not just by allowing
employees to contribute ideas and information but by making that part of their
everyday work through teams, feedback opportunities, devolution of authority,
and other structures. Further work could model various participation processes to
study the conditions for building a successful participation culture.
e Employee Ownership Program: the current model models the generic stock
options and stock grants without distinguishing different types of employee
ownership programs. Further work could model different program designs such
as ESOP, ESPP and their tax implications to analyze the differences among
various employee ownership programs.
* Union and Labor Market: the current model does not consider the effect of labor
unions nor the wider labor market conditions on the adoption of shared capitalism
policies. These can be explored by further work.
* Intrinsic Job Satisfaction: the current model assumes job satisfaction is driven by
financial compensation, psychological ownership, participation, burnout and job
security effects. Further work could model the intrinsic drivers of job satisfaction
such as the meaning of the work, purpose of the organization, organizational
citizenship behavior, personal growth and development.
* Debt Financing: the current model's financing sources include the founder's
initial investment, venture capital, government grants, employee ownership
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financing and initial public offering. There is no debt financing in the model.
Further work could include debt financing structures and study the tradeoff
between equity versus debt financing.
* Generic Model: the current model offers a detailed structure for a clean
technology firm. To make the model analysis and application go beyond the
clean technology sector, one could create a generic version of a startup company
by distilling the core structure from the current model. One could set key
parameters, such as product development time and sales cycle, to represent
various industry conditions. For example, a software company has a shorter
product development time and sales cycle than a bio-tech company. A generic
model could study various HR practices under different industry settings.
16.4 Final Words
How to create a high performance work system that improves employee well-being and
firm performance? This dissertation sheds light on the importance of combining "soft"
HR practices, such as employee participation, along with the "hard" compensation
policies, such as employee ownership and profit sharing. Being aware of the conditions
under which shared capitalism works could ease fears such as the fear of equity dilution
and enable organizations to create wealth by sharing it. By expanding the pool of
capitalists and empowering employees to share the wealth they contribute to creating,
shared capitalism may be able to become a sustainable and predominant form of
capitalism.
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Employees' average accumulated participation experience in hours.
Average Participation Experience Needed for Participation Culture=100
Hours
Maximum average participation hours needed for the whole company
to reach a complete participatory culture. This is a theoretical construct.
100 hours means employees need to constantly accumulated 100 hours
of participation experience (given there is participation loss rate) in order
to achieve a complete participatory culture.
Average Rookie Participation[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ(Rookie Employees Participation
Experience[vendor,department], Rookie Employees[vendordepartment])
Hours
Average rookies' participation experience (in hours).
Average Senior Participation[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ ( Experienced Employees Participation
Experience[vendor,department], Experienced Employees[vendordepartment])
Hours
Average experienced employees' participation experience (in hours).
Effect of Work Pressure on Participation Time per Employee[vendor, department]=l+Sensitivity of Work Pressure on
Participation Time*(Function of Work Pressure on Participation Time per Employee(Work
Pressure[vendor,departmentl)-1)
Dimensionless
Experienced Employees Participation Experience(vendor,department]= INTEG (Senior Participation
Effort[vendordepartment]+Participation Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment) - Loss of Participation from
Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment] - Loss of Participation from Senior Layoff[vendordepartmentl - Senior
Participation Experience Loss Rate[vendordepartment],0)
Person*Hours
The cumulative total experience of all senior employees, in person-hours.
Increased as rookies become experienced (senior) employees and as the
senior employees continue to learn from their experience. Decreased when
senior employees quit or are laid off.
Function of Work Pressure on Participation Time per Employee([(1,0)-
(3,1)],(1,1),(1.25,0.94),(1.5,0.83),(1.75,0.67),(2,0.5),(2.25,0.32),(2.5,0.17),(2.75,0.06),(3,0))
Dimensionless
As work pressure > 1 (desired work effort greater than available work
effort), people start to cut down the participation time as "real work"
takes priority.
Loss of Participation from Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment]=Average Senior
Participation[vendor,department] * Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment]
Person* Hours/Year




Loss of Participation from Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment]=Average Rookie Participation[vendordepartment] *
Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartmentl
Person* Hours/Year
Loss of Participation from Senior Layoff[vendordepartment]=Average Senior Participation[vendordepartment] *
Experienced Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]
Person* Hours/Year
Normal Participation Time per Employee=O
Hours/Year [0,100,10]
Normal participation time is assumed to be 2 hour per week.
Participation Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment]=Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment]* Average Rookie
Participation[vendordepartment]
Persons*Hours/Year
Rookie Experience lost when rookies becomes experienced.
Participation Culture[startupl]=MIN(1, SUM(Participation Culture by Department[startupl,department!]*Total
Employees per Department[startupl,department!])/SUM(Total Employees per Department[startupl,department!]))
Dimensionless
Participation Experience Loss Time=3
Year
Participation Time[vendor]=SUM(Participatory Time per Employee[vendordepartment!]*Total Employees per
Department[vendor,department!])/SUM(Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment!])
Hours/Year
Rookie Employees Participation Experience[vendordepartment]= INTEG (Rookie Participation
Effort[vendor,department] - Participation Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment] - Loss of Participation from Rookie
Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] - Loss of Participation from Rookie Quit Rate[vendor,department]-Rookie
Participation Experience Loss Rate[vendor,department],0)
Person*Hours
Cumulative participation effort of rookie employees, in person-hours.
Increased as senior employees spend time on participation effort per
rookie, e.g. committee, open door policy, evaluate and implement ideas.
Decreased as rookies become experienced (senior) employees and when
rookies quit or are laid off.
Rookie Participation Experience Loss Rate[vendor, department]=Rookie Employees Participation
Experience[vendor,department]/Participation Experience Loss Time
Person*Hour/Year
Senior Participation Experience Loss Rate[vendor, department]=Experienced Employees Participation
Experience[vendor,department]/Participation Experience Loss Time
Person*Hour/Year
Sensitivity of Work Pressure on Participation Time=0
Dimensionless [0,1,0.1]
.Employee Hiring and Experience
* * *** * *** ** ** * *** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * *********************** *.
Average Years of Total Employee Experience[vendor]=ZIDZ(SUM(Rookie Employees
Experience[vendordepartment!]+Experienced Employees Experience[vendordepartment!]),Total





Initial Rookie Experience in Yea rs[vendordepa rtment]=0.5
Year
Layoff as Percentage of Total Employees[vendor]=Quarterly Total Layoff[vendor]/Total Employees[vendor]*100
Dimensionless
Quit Fraction[vendordepartment]=lndustry Quit Fraction*Effect of Job Attractiveness on Quit
Rate[vendor,department]
1/Year
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on Quits=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.11
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on Time to Fill Vacancies=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Turnover as Percentage of Total Employees[vendor]=ZIDZ(SUM(Quarterly Quits[vendordepartment!]),Total
Employees[vendor])* 100
Dimensionless
Total number of turnover as a percentage of total employees.
Assimilation Time = 2
Year
Average Employee Experience[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ ( Rookie Employees Experience[vendordepartment] +
Experienced Employees Experience[vendordepartment] , Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment])
Hours
Average experience of all rookie and experienced employees by department.
Average Layoff Time = 0.166
Year
The average time required to lay off an employee.
Avg Time to Fill Employee Vacancies[department]=0.167
Year
The average time required to fill vacancies and hire new people.
Bankruptcy Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] = Bankruptcy Switch[vendor] * ( ( Rookie Employees[vendordepartment]
/ TIME STEP ) - Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment] -Assimilation Rate[vendordepartmentl)
People/Year
Layoff rate when firm bankrupts, which equals all existing rookies minus
those that quit and assimilate.
Desired Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] = Switch for Layoffs * MAX ( 0, - Indicated Employee Hiring
Rate[vendor,department] )
Persons/Year
If hiring rate is negative, means we want to get rid of sales people as
long as we're willing to make lay offs
Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Employee Vacancy Creation Rate[vendor,department] - Employee
Vacancy Closure Rate[vendordepartment] - Employee Vacancy Cancellation Rate[vendordepartment] , Desired
Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment]
People
The number of open sales positions the firm seeks to fill.
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Experience Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment]=Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment]* Average Rookie
Experience[vendor,department]
Persons*Hours/Year
Rookie Experience lost when rookies becomes experienced.
Experienced Employees Experience[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Experience Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment] +
Increase in on the Job Experience from Experienced[vendordepartment] - Loss of Experience from Experienced Quit
Rate[vendor,department] - Loss of Experience from Layoff [vendordepartment] , Initial Experience of Senior
Employees[vendor,department] * Initial Experienced Employees[vendordepartment]
Person*Hours
The cumulative total experience of all senior employees, in person-hours.
Increased as rookies become experienced (senior) employees and as the
senior employees continue to learn from their experience. Decreased when
senior employees quit or are laid off.
Increase in Experience From Hiring[vendordepartment] = Rookie Hire Rate[vendordepartment] * Average Experience
Of New Hires[vendordepartment]
Persons* Hours/Year
Experience gain from hiring
Increase in on the Job Experience from Experienced[vendordepartment] = Experienced
Employees[vendor,department] * Working Hours per Year[vendordepartment]
Person*Hours/Year
Employees gain one hour of experience per hour worked.
Increase In on the job Experience from Rookie[vendordepartment] = Rookie Employees[vendordepartment] *
Learning per Hour for Rookies[vendordepartment] * Working Hours per Year[vendordepartment]
Persons* Hours/Year
Rookie employees do not receive the full range of experiences as senior
employees so the effective experience they gain per hour worked is less
than one hour.
Indicated Employee Hiring Rate[vendor,department] = Adjustment for Labor Force[vendordepartment] + Total Quit
Rate[vendor,department]
People/Year
Hire enough people to replace expected attrition and adjust the number of
employees to the desired level.
Loss of Experience from Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment] = Average Senior Experience[vendordepartment]
* Experienced Quit Rate[vendor,department]
Person* Hours/Year
Loss of Experience from Layoff[vendordepartment] = Average Senior Experience[vendordepartment] * Experienced
Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]
Person* Hours/Year
Loss of Experience from Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]=Average Rookie Experience[vendordepartment] *
Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]
Person *Hours/Year
Loss of Experience from Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment]=Average Rookie Experience[vendordepartment] *
Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartmentl
Person* Hours/Year
Maximum Experienced Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] = Experienced Employees[vendor,department] / Average
Layoff Time
People/Year
Maximum Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] = Rookie Employees[vendordepartmentl / Average Layoff Time
People/Year
Maximum rookie layoff rate is determined by the number of rookie employee
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and the layoff time.
Rookie Employees Experience[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Increase in Experience From Hiring[vendordepartment] +
Increase In on the job Experience from Rookie[vendordepartmentl - Experience Assimilation
Rate[vendor,department] - Loss of Experience from Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] -Loss of Experience from
Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment], Initial Rookie Employees[vendor,department] * Average Experience Of New
Hires[vendor,department] )
Person*Hours
Cumulative experience of rookie employees, in person-hours. Increased as
as the rookies employees continue to learn from their job experience.
Decreased as rookies become experienced (senior) employees and when
rookies quit or are laid off.
Rookie Fraction[vendor]=ZDZ(SUM ( Rookie Employees[vendordepartment!] ) , Total Employees[vendor])
Dimensionless
Total rookies as a fraction of total employees.
Rookie Fraction by Department[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ(Rookie Employees[vendordepartmentl,( Rookie
Employees[vendor,department] + Experienced Employees[vendordepartment]))
Dimensionless
Rookie as a fraction of total employees in each department.
Switch for Layoffs = 1
Dmnl [0,1,11
Whether or not to allow layoffs to occur (O=no, 1=yes)
Average Years of Employee Experience[vendor, department]=ZDZ((Rookie Employees
Experience[vendor,department]+Experienced Employees Experience[vendordepartment]), (Rookie
Employees[vendor,department]+Experienced Employees[vendordepartment]))/Normal Work Hours per Year
Year
Average years of employee experience by department.
Average Years of Rookie Experience[vendor, department]=Average Rookie Experience[vendordepartment]/Normal
Work Hours per Year
Year
Average Years of Senior Experience[vendor, department]=Average Senior Experience[vendordepartment]/Normal
Work Hours per Year
Year
Average Experience Of New Hires[vendordepartmentl=lnitial Rookie Experience in Years[vendor,
department] *Normal Work Hours per Year
Hours
Average relevant experience of new sales hires
Initial Engineers[vendor]=5
People [0,10,1]
Initial Experience of Senior Employees[vendor,department]=(lnitial Rookie Experience in
Years[vendor,department]+Assimilation Time)*Normal Work Hours per Year
Hours
The initial experience level of senior (experienced) employees, in hours.
Initial Sales Force[vendor]=0
People [0,10,1]
Effect of Job Attractiveness on Quit Rate[vendor,department]=Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on Quits*Function for
Effect of Job Attractiveness on Quits(Job Attractiveness for Existing Employees[vendordepartment])
Dimensionless
The effect of job attractiveness on the actual quit rate per year.
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Effect of Job Attractiveness on Time to Fill Vacancies[vendor, department]=1+Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on Time
to Fill Vacancies*(Function for Effect of Job Attractiveness on Time to Fill Vacancies(Job Attractiveness for New
Hires[vendor,departmentl)-1)
Dimensionless
Effect of financial rewards on time to hire people.




The higher the job attractiveness, the lower the actual quit rate.
Estimated using NBER Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples.




Higher the job attractiveness, shorter the hiring time, cap at minimum
hiring time equals to 30% of reference time. When job attractiveness is
below 1, the firm cannot find anyone to work for it.
Time to Fill Employee Vacancies[vendor, department]=Avg Time to Fill Employee Vacancies[department]*Effect of Job
Attractiveness on Time to Fill Vacancies [vendor,department]
Year
Actual time to hire people is the average time multiple by the effect of
financial rewards on hiring time.
************************** ************* *****************
.Employee Quality
* * ** * **** ** ** * ** ******************** ********** * *** * * * ** *~
Quality of Total New Hires[vendor]=SUM(Quality Of New Hires[vendordepartment!])/2
quality
Quality of new hires from all departments.
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on Quality of New Hires=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment] = Rookie Employees[vendordepartment] * Company in Operation
Switch[vendor] / Assimilation Time
Persons/Year
Average Quality Of New Hires[vendordepartment]=1
quality
Average quality of new hires, this is the quality of people prior coming
to the firm, including innate ability, education etc.
Effect of Job Attractiveness on Quality of New Hires[vendor, department]=1+Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on
Quality of New Hires*(Function for Effect of Job Attractiveness on Quality of New Hires(Job Attractiveness for New
Hires[vendordepartment])-1)
Dimensionless
Effect of financial reward on quality of people attracted. Higher the
compensation, higher the quality of new hires I
Experienced Employees Quality[vendordepartment]= INTEG (Quality Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment] - Loss of
Quality from Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment] - Loss of Quality from Layoff[vendor,department],Initial
Experienced Employees[vendordepartment*Average Quality Of New Hires[vendordepartment])
Person*quality
The cumulative total experience of all senior employees, in person-hours.
Increased as rookies become experienced (senior) employees and as the
senior employees continue to learn from their experience. Decreased when
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senior employees quit or are laid off.
Experienced Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] = MIN ( Maximum Experienced Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] , MAX
0, Desired Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] - Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]))
People/Year
Layoffs, if necessary, occur in reverse seniority order. Hence layoffs are
the smaller of the maximum rate at which experienced people can be laid
off (based on the time required to carry out a force reduction) or the
difference between the desired total rate of layoffs and the rate of
rookie layoffs. This difference will be zero if all needed layoffs are
accommodated by firing rookies, and will be positive if the rate of rookie
layoff is not sufficient. It cannot be negative since rookie layoffs will
be at most the total desired layoff rate.
Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment]=Experienced Employees[vendordepartment] *Quit
Fraction[vendo r,depa rtment]
People/Year
Function for Effect of Job Attractiveness on Quality of New Hires([(2,0)-
(4,2)],(2,0.6),(2.2,0.61),(2.4,0.63),(2.6,0.7),(2.8,0.83),(3,1),(3.2,1.17),(3.4,1.35),(3.6,1.45),(3.8,1.49),(4,1.5))
Dimensionless
Higher the compensation, higher the quality of new hires.
Increase in Quality From Hiring[vendordepartment]=Rookie Hire Rate[vendor,department] * Quality Of New
Hires[vendor,department]
quality*Person/Year
Quality gain from hiring
Initial Experienced Employees[vendorsales] = Initial Sales Force[vendor]




Number of sales people company initially has
Loss of Quality from Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment]=Average Senior Quality by
Department[vendor,departmentl * Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment]
Person*quality/Year
Loss of Quality from Layoff[vendordepartment]=Average Senior Quality by Department[vendordepartmentl *
Experienced Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]
Person*quality/Year
Loss of Quality from Rookie Layoff Rate[vendor,department]=Average Rookie Quality by
Department[vendor,department] * Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]
Person*quality/Year
Loss of quality when rookies are layoff.
Loss of Quality from Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment] = Average Rookie Quality by
Department[vendor,department] * Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment]
Person*quality/Year
Loss of quality when rookies quit.
Quality Assimilation Rate[vendor,department]=Assimilation Rate[vendor,department]* Average Rookie Quality by
Department[vendor,departmentl
Persons*quality/Year
Quality lost when rookies becomes experienced.
Quality Of New Hires[vendordepartment]=Average Quality Of New Hires[vendordepartment]*Effect of Job
Attractiveness on Quality of New Hires[vendor, department]
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quality
Actually quality of new hires is the average quality times the effect of
financial rewards on quality. The higher the financial rewards, the better
quality people is attracted.
Rookie Employees Quality[vendordepartment]= INTEG ( Increase in Quality From Hiring[vendordepartment] - Quality
Assimilation Rate[vendor,department] - Loss of Quality from Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] - Loss of Quality
from Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment], Initial Rookie Employees[vendordepartment] * Average Quality Of New
Hires[vendor,department])
Person*quality
Cumulative quality of rookie employees. Decreased as rookies become
experienced (senior) employees and when rookies quit or are laid off.
Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment] = MAX ( Bankruptcy Layoff Rate[vendordepartmentl , MIN ( Desired Layoff
Rate[vendordepartment] , Maximum Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]))
People/Year
Rookie Quit Rate[vendordepartment]=Quit Fraction[vendordepartment]* Rookie Employees[vendordepartment]
Persons/Year
Rate at which sales people leave (quit)
Average Employee Quality[vendor]=ZIDZ(SUM(Rookie Employees Quality[vendordepartment!]+Experienced
Employees Quality[vendordepartment!]), Total Employees[vendor])
quality
Average quality of all employees.
Average Rookie Quality[vendor]=ZDZ(SUM(Rookie Employees Quality[vendordepartment!]), SUM(Rookie
Employees[vendor,department!]))
quality
Average quality of rookies from all departments.
Average Senior Quality[vendor]=ZIDZ(SUM(Experienced Employees Quality[vendordepartment!]), SUM(Experienced
Employees[vendor,department!]))
quality
Average quality from experienced employees of all departments.
**** *********************** ****************** ***********
.Employee Vacancies
Aggressiveness of Hiring Policy=1
Dimensionless [0,1]
Change in Desired Employees[vendor]=Desired Employees from Policy[vendor] *(Desired Employee Growth
Percentage Policy/100)
People/Year
Desired Employee Growth Percentage Policy=0
1/Year [0,100,11
Desired Employee Proportion[vendor, sales]=ZIDZ(Desired Sales Force[vendor], Desired Total Employees[vendor]) ~~ I
Desired Employee Proportion[vendor, engineer]=ZIDZ(Desired Engineers[vendor], Desired Total Employees[vendor])
Dimensionless
Desired Employee Proportion from Game[vendorengineer]= GAME (Desired Employee
Proportion[vendor,engineer] * 100)
Desired Employee Proportion from Game[vendor, sales]=100-Desired Employee Proportion from Game[vendor,
engineer]
Dimensionless [0,100,5]
Desired Employees from Policy[vendor]= INTEG (Change in Desired Employees[vendor],Total Employees[vendor])
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People
Desired Total Employees[vendor]=Desired Engineers[vendor]+Desired Sales Force[vendor]
People
Desired Total Employees from Game[vendor]=Starting Total Employees[vendor]*(1+Percentage of Desired Total
Employee Growth from Game/Percentage Point)
People
Feasible Headcount[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ(Headcount Budget[vendor, department], Average Salary by
Department[vendor, department])
People
Feasible total headcount equals the headcount budget divided by average salary.
Headcount Budget[vendor, department]=Total Headcount Budget[vendor]* Desired Employee Proportion from
Game[vendor,department]/100
$/Year
Headcount Budget Adjustment Time=1
Year
Headcount Budget as Fraction of Working Capital=0.8
Dimensionless
Indicated Desired Total Employees[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Game=1, Desired Total Employees from
Game[vendor], IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Hiring Policy=1, Desired Employees from Policy[vendor], Desired Total
Employees[vendor]))
People
Min Runway for Paying Employee[vendor]=2
Year
Percentage of Desired Total Employee Growth from Game = GAME( 0)
Dimensionless [-50,100,1]
Fractional quarterly growth rate of desired total employees, determined by the game player.
Percentage Point=100
Dimensionless
Starting Total Employees[vendor]=SAMPLE IF TRUE(MODULO(Time, 0.25) < TIME STEP, Total Employees[vendor],Total
Employees[vendor])
People
Use SAMPLE IF TRUE to capture and fix the number of employees at the start
of each game input, so it can be used to calculate the desired employees
given the desired employee growth rate from game input.
Switch for Hiring Policy=IF THEN ELSE(Desired Employee Growth Percentage Policy=0, 0, 1)
Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Total Headcount Budget[vendor]=SMOOTH(ZIDZ(Headcount Budget as Fraction of Working Capital*Working
Capital[vendor],Min Runway for Paying Employee[vendor]), Headcount Budget Adjustment Time)
$/Year
The headcount budget is determined by the total available cash time the
fraction allocated to headcount divided by the minimum runway needed for
paying employee.
Adjustment for Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment] = ( Desired Employee Vacancies[vendordepartmentl -
Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment] ) / Employee Vacancy Adjustment Time[vendor]
Persons/Year
Adjusts sales vacancy creation to have the desired number of vacancies.
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Adjustment for Labor Force[vendordepartment] = ( Authorized Headcount[vendordepartment] - Total Employees per
Department[vendor,departmentl ) / Labor Force Adjustment Time[vendor]
Persons/Year
Adjustment for sales and engineers from their current numbers to the
authorized headcount numbers.
Authorized Headcount[vendordepartment]=MIN(Indicated Desired Employee[vendordepartment], Feasible
Headcount[vendor,department])* Effect of Liquidity on Headcount[vendor]*Aggressiveness of Hiring Policy
People
Desired Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment] = MAX ( 0, Avg Time to Fill Employee Vacancies[department] *
Indicated Employee Hiring Rate[vendordepartment])
People
Desired Employee Vacancy Cancellation Rate[vendordepartment] = MAX ( 0, - Desired Employee Vacancy Creation
Rate[vendor,department] )
Persons/Year
The desired rate of sales vacancy cancellation, given by the desired
vacancy creation rate whenever that rate is negative.
Desired Employee Vacancy Creation Rate[vendor,department] = Indicated Employee Hiring Rate[vendordepartmentl +
Adjustment for Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment]
Persons/Year
Create enough sales vacancies to result in the desired hiring rate,
adjusted to bring the stock of vacancies in line with the desired level.
Effect of Liquidity on Headcount[vendor] = Function for Effect of Liquidity on Headcount ( Perceived Liquidity[vendor])
Dimensionless
Employee Vacancy Adjustment Time[vendor) = 0.167
Year
The average time over which to adjust the actual number of sales vacancies
to the desired level.
Employee Vacancy Cancellation Rate[vendor,department] = MIN ( Desired Employee Vacancy Cancellation
Rate[vendor,department] , Max Employee Vacancy Cancellation Rate[vendordepartment])
Persons/Year
The rate at which to cancel existing sales vacancies prior to filling them.
Employee Vacancy Cancellation Time[vendor] = 0.167
Year
The average time required to cancel an employee vacancy.
Employee Vacancy Closure Rate[vendordepartment] = Rookie Hire Rate[vendordepartment]
Persons/Year
Vacancies are closed when the employee is hired
Employee Vacancy Creation Rate[vendordepartmentl = MAX ( 0, Desired Employee Vacancy Creation
Rate[vendor,department] )
Persons/Year
The rate at which to create new sales positions and begins to recruit for
them.
Function for Effect of Liquidity on Headcount([(0,O)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.2,0.5),(0.4,0.8),(0.6,0.9),(0.8,0.98),(1,1),(1000,1))
Dimensionless
Low liquidity forces the firm to cut the fraction of revenue it plans to spend on headcount.
Indicated Desired Employee[vendordepartment]=lndicated Desired Total Employees[vendor]*Desired Employee
Proportion from Game[vendordepartmentl/100
People
Desired employees depending on whether the game is on or not, if not, take
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inputs from endogenously driven values.
Max Employee Vacancy Cancellation Rate[vendordepartment] = Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment] / Employee
Vacancy Cancellation Time[vendor]
Persons/Year
The maximum sales vacancy cancellation rate is determined by the number of
vacancies outstanding and the minimum cancellation time.
Labor Force Adjustment Time[vendor] = 0.25
Year [0,90,1]




Customer Support as Fraction of Total Engineering Effort[vendor]=ZIDZ(Customer Support Effort[vendor], Effective
Engineering Effort[vendor])
Dimensionless
Effective Engineering Effort[vendor]=Rookie Effective Work Effort[vendor,engineer]+Experienced Work Effort for Non
Administrative Work[vendorengineer]
Persons*Hours/Year
How many total hours engineers work per year net of coaching and financing efforts.
Customer Support Effort for Game[vendor]=Effective Engineering Effort[vendor] *(Customer Support Proportion for
Game[vendor]/100)
Hours* Person/Year
Customer Support Proportion for Game[vendor]= GAME (0)
Dimensionless [0,1001
Desired Customer Support as Fraction of Engineering Effort[vendor]=MAX(Min Customer Support Fraction[vendor],
ZIDZ(Desired Customer Support[vendor], (Desired Customer Support[vendor]+Desired Product Development
Effort[vendor])))
Dimensionless
desired customer support as fraction of total engineer efforts that
include product development and customer support, constrained by the min
customer support fraction.
Min Customer Support Fraction[vendor]=1
Dimensionless [0,1]
1 means customer support is a priority to product development.
Switch for Customer Support Game Input[vendor]=0
Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Desired Product Development Effort[vendor] = SUM ( Desired Feature Development Rate[vendorfeaturetype!] *
Engineer Hours Required per Feature[featuretype!]
Persons*Hours/Year
How many person hours are needed to develop the features we desire
Appropriable Development Fraction = 1 - Nonappropriable Development Fraction
Dimensionless
Customer Support Effort[vendor]=(1-Switch for Customer Support Game Input[vendorl)*MIN ( Desired Customer
Support[vendorl , Feasible Customer Support[vendor] ) + Switch for Customer Support Game Input[vendorl*Customer
Support Effort for Game[vendor]
Persons*Hours/Year
After allocating the min percentage of engineering effort to development,
then use engineering effort to satisfy customer support (current engineering) needs
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Customer Support Needed per Adopter=45
((Person*Hours)/Year)/Prospect
Person-Hours needed per year needed to support each adopter. 0.02 ppl*year x 2000 hour/year
Desired Customer Support[customer]=Adopters[customer] * Customer Support Needed per Adopter*Switch for
Customer Support
Persons*Hours/Year
Total cust support needed for customers who have purchased and adopted the
product (includes time needed to deliver the product)
Effective Engineering Effort Net of Customer Support[vendor]=Effective Engineering Effort[vendor] - Customer Support
Effort[vendor]
Person* Hours/Year
Feasible Customer Support[vendor]=Effective Engineering Effort[vendor]*Desired Customer Support as Fraction of
Engineering Effort[vendor]
Person* Hours/Year
Remaining engineering effort after allocating to the min effort for development.
Customer Support Shortage Fraction[vendor] = ZIDZ ( ( Desired Customer Support[vendor] - Customer Support
Effort[vendor]), Desired Customer Support[vendor])
Dimensionless
The shortage of available engineering effort from the customer support
needed as a ratio of the customer support needed.
Nonappropriable Development Fraction=0.909
Dimensionless
Fraction of development effort applied to non-appropriable features (as
opposed to appropriable features). 10 out of 11 is allocated to
non-appropriable feature because it is worth 10 times more than
appropriable features (nonappropriable feature multiple =10).
Product Development Effort[vendorappropriable]=Appropriable Development Fraction * Effective Engineering Effort
Net of Customer Support[vendor]
Product Development Effort[vendornonappropriable] = Nonappropriable Development Fraction * Effective
Engineering Effort Net of Customer Support[vendor]
Persons*Hours/Year
After satisfying min product development and customer support, engineering
effort is allocated to additional development, differentiated between
appropriate and non-appropritate features.
Switch for Customer Support=1
Dimensionless [0,1,1]
0 = there is no customer support business, thus no customer support effort
and revenue. 1 = there is customer support business.
Customer Service Quality[vendorj = xIDZ ( Customer Support Effort[vendor] , Desired Customer Support[vendor], 1)
Dmnl
Fraction of max cust support effectiveness (If we don't need any cust
support, then we're supplying all that is needed). Also amount of cust
support determines how soon product is "delivered".
Adopters[customer] = INTEG( Adopter Generation Rate[customer] - Poaches[customer] , Initial Adopters)
Adopters[none] = 0
Prospects
Prospects who are now using the product
************************************************ ********
.Productivity and Work Effort
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Actual Work Effort[vendor,department]=Rookie Work Effort[vendordepartment]+Experienced Work
Effort[vendor,department]
Person*Hour/Year
Total actual person*hour of work effort per year from all employees, as
distinguished from the effective work effort due to productivity effects.
Effect of Job Attractiveness on Productivity[vendor, department]=1+Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on
Productivity*(Function for Job Attractiveness on Productivity(Job Attractiveness for Existing
Employees[vendor,department])-1)
Dimensionless
Effect of Participation Culture on Effort Needed for Managing Participation[vendor, departmentl=1+Sensitivity of
Participation Managing Effort*(Function of Participation Culture on Effort Needed for Managing
Participation(Participation Culture by Department[vendordepartment])-1)
Dimensionless
Effect of Participation on Productivity[vendor, department]=IF THEN ELSE(Participatory Time per
Employee[vendor,departmentl > 0, 1+Sensitivity of Participation on Productivity*(Function for Participation on
Productivity(Pa rticipation Culture by Department[vendordepartment])-1), 1)
Dimensionless
Effective Total Work Effort[vendor]=SUM(Effective Work Effort[vendordepartment!])
Person* Hour/Year
Employee Productivity[vendor]=ZIDZ(SUM(Effective Work Effort[vendordepartment!]), SUM(Actual Work
Effort[vendor,department!]))
Dimensionless
Employee productivity calculated as the total effective work effort divided
by actual work effort.
Experienced Work Effort Net of Grantseeking VC Financing and Coaching[vendor, department]=Experienced Work
Effort Net of Grantseeking and VC Financing(vendordepartment]-Net Required Coaching Effort[vendordepartmentl
Person*Hour/Year
Function for Effect of Employee Quality on Productivity([(O,0)-
(2,2)],(0,0),(0.25,0.1),(0.5,0.33),(0.7,0.72),(0.8,0.85),(0.9,0.93),(1,1),(1.1,1.05),(1.2,1.08),(1.3,1.1),(2,1.15))
Dimensionless
Higher the employee quality, higher the productivity.




Higher the job attractiveness, higher the productivity. It is estimated
based on the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset.




after certain threshold of participation culture, higher participation, higher productivity.
Function of Participation Culture on Effort Needed for Managing Participation([(0,0.2)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.125,0.95),(0.25,0.86),(0.375,0.75),(0.5,0.6),(0.615,0.47),(0.75,0.34),(0.875,0.25),(1,0.2))
Dimensionless
When participation culture is low (start introducing participation), it
takes more effort from senior managers to manage participation efforts. As
the firm accumulates participatory capacity, it takes less supervising efforts.
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Participation Managing Effort[vendor, department]=Total Participation Effort[vendordepartment] *Effect of
Participation Culture on Effort Needed for Managing Participation[vendordepartment]
Person*Hour/Year
Participatory Time per Employee[vendordepartment]=Normal Participation Time per Employee*Effect of Work
Pressure on Participation Time per Employee[vendordepartment]
Hours/Year [0,1000,10]
Number of work hours per year allocated to participation effort, e.g. team
work, problem solving group, participation committee.
Reference Quality=1
quality
Rookie Participation Effort[vendordepartment]=Rookie Employees[vendordepartment] * Participatory Time per
Employee[vendor,department]
Persons*Hours/Year
Rookie employees do not receive the full range of experiences as senior
employees so the effective experience they gain per hour worked is less
than one hour.
Rookie Work Effort[vendor, department] =Rookie Employees[vendordepartment]*Working Hours per
Year[vendordepartment]
Person*Hour/Year
The actual person*hour of work effort from rookie employees per year
equals the total rookie employees times the working hours per year.
Senior Participation Effort[vendor, department]=Experienced Employees[vendordepartment]*Participatory Time per
Employee[vendor,department]
Person*Hour/Year
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on Productivity=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Sensitivity of Participation Managing Effort=1
Dimensionless [0,1,0.1]
Sensitivity of Participation on Productivity=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Total Experienced Productivity Effect[vendor, department]=Effect of Experienced Employee Quality on
Productivity[vendor,department] *Effect of Senior Employee Experience on Productivity[vendordepa rtment] *Effect of
Job Attractiveness on Productivity[vendor,department*Effect of Participation on Productivity[vendordepartment]
Dimensionless
Total senior productivity effects from senior employee equality, experience, and job attractiveness.
Total Participation Effort[vendor, department] =Senior Participation Effort[vendordepartment]+Rookie Participation
Effort[vendor,department]
Person*Hour/Year
Total Rookie Productivity Effect[vendordepartment]=Effect of Rookie Employee Quality on
Productivity[vendor,department]*Effect of Rookie Employee Experience on Productivity[vendordepartment] *Effect of
Job Attractiveness on Productivity[vendordepartment*Effect of Participation on Productivity[vendordepartment]
Dimensionless
Total rookie productivity effects from rookie employee equality,
experience, and job attractiveness.
Average Senior Experience[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ ( Experienced Employees Experience[vendordepartment] ,
Experienced Employees[vendordepartment]
Hours
Average experienced employees' work experience (in hours).
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Effect of Rookie Employee Experience on Productivity[vendor,department] = MIN ( ( Relative Rookie
Experience[vendor,department] ) A Employee Experience Curve Strength[vendordepartment] , Max Employee
Productivity from Experience)
Dmnl
Learning curve for productivity from experience (from Sterman pg 507, from
Zangwill and Kantor (1998)). Productivity will never rise above some
maximum no matter how high relative experience rises.
Employee Experience Curve Strength[vendordepartment] = LN ( 1 + Employee Productivity Change Per Doubling of
Experience[vendor,department] ) / LN ( 2)
Dimensionless
The exponent in the learning curve is determined by the improvement in
sales productivity per doubling of experience.
Employee Experience Reference[vendordepartment]=2000
Hours
Amount of sales experience which will produce normal productivity
Employee Productivity Change Per Doubling of Experience[vendor,department]=0.1
Dmnl
Fractional change in productivity of people per doubling of their effective experience
Max Employee Productivity from Experience=2
Dmni
Max amount of productivity multiple that experience can bring
Relative Rookie Experience[vendordepartment]=Average Rookie Experience[vendordepartment] / Employee
Experience Reference[vendordepartment]
Dimensionless
The ratio of the average experience of rookie employees to the reference
level used in the learning curve.
Relative Senior Experience[vendor,department]=Average Senior Experience[vendor,department] / Employee
Experience Reference[vendordepartment]
Dimensionless
The ratio of the average experience of senior employees to the reference
level used in the learning curve.
Average Rookie Quality by Department[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ ( Rookie Employees Quality[vendordepa rtment],
Rookie Employees[vendordepartmentl)
quality
Avg quality of rookies
Average Senior Quality by Department[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ ( Experienced Employees
Quality[vendordepartment] , Experienced Employees[vendordepartmentl
quality
Average quality of experienced people.
Experienced Employees[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Assimilation Rate[vendordepartmentl - Experienced Layoff
Rate[vendordepartment] - Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment] , initial Experienced
Employees[vendor,departmentl)
People
Number of experienced employees equals assimilation rate minus experienced
layoff rate and experienced quit rate.
Rookie Employees[vendordepartmentl = INTEG( Rookie Hire Rate[vendordepartment] - Rookie Quit
Rate[vendor,department] - Rookie Layoff Rate(vendordepartmentl - Assimilation Rate[vendordepartment] , Initial
Rookie Employees[vendordepartment]
Persons
Number of rookie employees equals rookie hire rate minus rookie quit rate,
rookie layoff rate and assimilation rate to become experienced employees.
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Experienced Effective Work Effort[vendordepartment]=Experienced Work Effort[vendordepartment] *Total
Experienced Productivity Effect[vendordepartment]
Person* Hours/Year
Total effective person hours of effort available from experienced
employees equals the actual work effort net of administrative work
multiplied by the total productivity effect.
Effect of Senior Employee Experience on Productivity[vendor,department] = MIN ( ( Relative Senior
Experience[vendor,department] A Employee Experience Curve Strength[vendordepartment] , Max Employee
Productivity from Experience)
Dimensionless
Learning curve for productivity from experience (from Sterman pg 507, from
Zangwill and Kantor (1998)). Productivity will never rise above some
maximum no matter how high relative experience rises.
Average Rookie Experience[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ(Rookie Employees Experience[vendor,department], Rookie
Employees[vendor,department])
Hours
Average rookies' work experience (in hours).
Effect of Experienced Employee Quality on Productivity[vendor, department]=1+Sensitivity of Employee Quality
Effect*(Function for Effect of Employee Quality on Productivity(Average Senior Quality by
Department[vendor,department]/Reference Quality)-1)
Dimensionless
Effect of experienced people's quality on productivity.
Effect of Rookie Employee Quality on Productivity[vendor, department=1+Sensitivity of Employee Quality
Effect*(Function for Effect of Employee Quality on Productivity(Average Rookie Quality by
Department[vendor,department]/Reference Quality)-1)
Dimensionless
Effect of rookie quality on productivity.
Sensitivity of Employee Quality Effect=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Used to convert quality unit into dimensionless unit of productivity effect.
Experienced Work Effort for Non Administrative Work[vendordepartment]=MAX(0, Experienced Work Effort Net of
Grantseeking VC Financing and Coaching[vendor,department] -Participation Managing Effort[vendordepartment] -
Senior Participation Effort[vendordepartment])
Hours*Person/Year
Experienced work effort for non administrative work (sales and product
development) after subtracting participation efforts and coaching effort
for participation.
Experienced Work Effort Net of Grantseeking and VC Financing(vendordepartment] = Experienced Work Effort Net of
Grantseeking[vendor,department] - VC Financing Effort by Department[vendordepartment]
Person*Hours/Year
Experienced work effort available for product development and sales after
efforts for coaching, grantseeking, and VC financing.
Net Required Coaching Effort[vendordepartment] = Net Time Spent Coaching * Experienced Employee Time Spent
Coaching Rookies[vendordepartment]
Hours*Person/Year
The net required coaching effort is total coaching effort reduced by the
extent to which productive work can be accomplished while coaching or
being coached.
Rookie Effective Work Effort[vendordepartment]=(Rookie Work Effort[vendordepartment]-Rookie Participation
Effort[vendor,department])*Total Rookie Productivity Effect[vendordepartment]
Person* Hours/Year
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Total effective person hours of effort available from rookie employees
equals the actual work effort net of participation effort multiplied by
the total productivity effect.
.Customer Payback Period
********* ********* ******** ********** ******* ****** *******~
Carbon Tax Phase In End Time=Carbon Tax Start Time+Carbon Tax Phase In Time
Year
CT1=Carbon Tax Increase Rate/Discount Rate for Energy Costs*( exp( -Discount Rate for Energy Costs*(Carbon Tax
Start Time-Time) )-exp( -Discount Rate for Energy Costs*(Carbon Tax Phase In End Time-Time) ) )/Discount Rate for
Energy Costs
$*Year/kWh
CT2=Carbon Tax Increase Rate/Discount Rate for Energy Costs*( -Carbon Tax Start Time+Time-( exp(-Discount Rate for
Energy Costs*(Carbon Tax Phase In End Time-Time))/Discount Rate for Energy Costs )+(1/Discount Rate for Energy
Costs) )
$*Year/kWh
CT3=Final Carbon Tax per kWh/Discount Rate for Energy Costs
$*Year/kWh
Discount Rate for Energy Costs=0.04
1/Year [0,?]
Energy Cost Savings[vendor]=Energy Costs[incumbent]-Energy Costs[vendor]
$/Year/Unit









NPV of Carbon Tax[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE(Time<Carbon Tax Start Time, CT1, IF THEN ELSE(Time>Carbon Tax Phase In
End Time, CT3, CT2)) * Energy Use[vendor]*(Energy Cost Savings as Percentage of Incumbent[vendor]/100)
$/Unit
NPV of carbon tax differs depending on what carbon tax is at the current
time, categorized into three parts: before carbon tax start date, during
and after phase in period.
NPV of Energy Savings[vendor]=NPV of Energy Savings without Carbon Tax[vendor]+NPV of Carbon Tax[vendor]
$/Unit
NPV of Energy Savings without Carbon Tax[vendor]=Energy Use[vendor]*(Energy Cost Savings as Percentage of
lncumbent[vendor]/100) * (Energy Price/(Discount Rate for Energy Costs-Fractional Percentage Growth Rate of Energy
Price))
$/Unit
NPV of Maintenance Costs[vendor]=Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendorl/Discount Rate for Energy Costs
$/Unit
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NPV of Net Energy Savings[vendor]=NPV of Energy Savings[vendor]-NPV of Maintenance Costs[vendor]
$/Unit
NPV of Product for Customer[vendor]=NPV of Net Energy Savings[vendor]-Consumer Price After Subsidy[vendor]
$/Unit
Switch for Carbon Tax=1
Dimensionless [0,1,11
Carbon Tax Start Time=21
Year [0,?]
Time at which carbon policy starts having an effect
Energy Price=lnitial Energy Price*exp(Fractional Percentage Growth Rate of Energy Price/100*Time)+Carbon Tax
$/kWh
Energy price grows at the fractional growth rate, plus the carbon tax.




Choice (1) $170,000 comes from $16,000 traditional HVAC energy cost per
year / $0.83 energy price (combination of electricity and gas). Choice
(2) $700,000 = 50,000 sq foot * 14 kw/sq foot. Calibrated based on
7Solar's target market segment data.
.Balance Sheet
Bankrupt Time=SAMPLE IF TRUE(:NOT: Bankrupt Time :AND: Bankruptcy Switch[startupl] = 1, Time, 0)
Year





Assuming firm starts with $1m including angel investing.
Average Financing Period for New Sales = 4
years
Average years of financing for paying new sales.
Balance Sheet Error[vendor] = ZIDZ ((Total Assets[vendor) -Total Liabilities and Equity[vendor]) , Total Assets[vendor]
Dimensionless
This is a control variable that tests the basic accounting rule that Total
assets must equal total liabilities plus equity. Returns the error as a
fraction of total assets. Zero if assets are zero.
Balance Sheet percent error[vendor] = 100 * ZIDZ ( Balance Sheet Error[vendor] , Total Assets[vendor]
Dimensionless/$
Balance sheet error as percentage of total assets.
Bankruptcy Threshold[vendor]=0
The tolerable amount of arrears before company forced into bankruptcy.
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Billing for Downpayment[vendor] = Downpayment Fraction[vendor] * Revenue from New Sales[vendor]
$/Year
Billings of downpayment from new sales.
Cash Coverage[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Working Capital[vendor] , Cash Out[vendor]
Year
Cash ln[vendorl = Receipt of Accounts Receivable[vendor] + Proceeds from Sale of Equity[vendor] + Proceeds from
Sale of Assets[vendor]
$/Year
Total cash received is the sum of sales revenue and the proceeds from the
sale of shares to the public.
Cash Out[vendor]=Required Payments[vendor]
$/Year
The firm makes payments at the required rate or the maximum rate it can
based on its cash balance, whichever is less.
Current Liabilities[vendor] = Accounts Payable[vendor]
The current liabilities are equal to the account payable as the model does
not include long term debt.
Customer Billings[vendor] = Billing for Downpayment[vendor] + Time Payments Due for New Sales[vendor] + Revenue
from Service[vendor]
Dollars/Year
Customer billings as the sum of billing for downpayment, time payment due
for new sales and revenue from service fee.
Default Rate[vendor] = Normal Default Fraction[vendor] * Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn
(Customer Service Quality[vendorl)
1/years
Rate at which customers are defaulting based on our cust support and their
financial condition
Downpayment Fraction[vendor] = 1
Dimensionless
The fraction of revenue from new sales as downpayment. 1 means full
payment at the point of purchase.
Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn ( [(0,0)-
(5,20)1,(0,1000),(0.05,20),(0.1,5),(0.2,3.25),(0.5,2),(0.7,1.3),(1,1),(5,0.5),(100,0.25))
Dimensionless
With no customer support at all, all customers default, with norm cust
support, defaults are normal, and with maximum cust support, curve is
asymptotic to one quarter the default rate
Follow on Funding[vendor]=Payments Received from Grants[vendorl
$/Year
Increase in Accounts Payable[vendor]=Billing for COGS[vendor] + Operating Expenses[vendor] + Required Tax
Payment[vendor] + Depreciation[vendor] + Extraordinary Charges[vendor] + Profit Sharing Amount[vendor]
$/Year
All expenses accumulate in accounts payable until they are paid.
Increase in Receivables for New Sales[vendor] = ( 1 - Downpayment Fraction[vendor] ) * Revenue from New
Sales[vendor]
$/Year
Revenue from new sales not yet receivable after downpayment.
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Increase in Retained Earnings[vendor] = Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor] + Proceeds from Sale of
Assets[vendor] + Depreciation[vendor]
$/Year
This formula calculated the Retain Earnings coming from both operations and fundraising.
Initial Funding[vendor] = PULSE ( Startup Date[vendor] , 0) * Non Startup1 Initial Investment[vendor] /TIME STEP
$/Year
The initial funding represents the amount of cash made available to the
company at its start date. It is modeled as an explicit inflow instead of
an initial value of the cash stock in order to allow different startup
date.
Maximum Payments from Cash on Hand[vendor] = Working Capital[vendor] / Minimum Cash Disbursement Time
$/Year
The maximum rate at which the firm will make payments, based on the cash
balance and the fastest time period over which the firm can make payments.
Minimum Cash Disbursement Time = TIME STEP
Year
The firm can pay out all its remaining cash in one time step (that is, the
actual disbursement time is very small relative to the time step).
Net Change in Accounts Payable[vendor] = Increase in Accounts Payable[vendor] - Payment of Accounts
Payable[vendor]
$/Year
This variable measures the net change in Accounts payable by comparing the
inflow and the outflow.
Normal Default Fraction[vendor] = 0
1/Year
The 'normal' fraction of customers that default on what they owe per year.
Normal Payment Time=0.125
years
This parameter measures the normal time until accounts payable are settled.
Payment of Accounts Payable[vendor] = Cash Out[vendor]
$/Year
Accounts payable fall with the actual payments made by the firm.
Payment Shortage[vendor] = Required Payments[vendor] - Payments for Operating Expense[vendor]
$/Year
Receivables for New Sales[vendor] = INTEG( Increase in Receivables for New Sales[vendor] -Time Payments Due for
New Sales[vendor] , 0)
Revenue from new sales charged but not yet received.
Sale of Equity[vendor] = Initial Funding[vendor] + Follow on Funding[vendor] + Proceeds from Sale of Equity[vendor]
$/Year
The Inflow to the Sale of equity is determined by the initial funding and other money raised.
Simulation Time Horizon=15
years
The normal length of the simulation
Switch for Bankruptcy[startupl] = 1
Switch for Bankruptcy[startup2] = 0
Switch for Bankruptcy[incumbent] = 0
Dimensionless [0,1,1]
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Time Payments Due for New Sales[vendor] = Receivables for New Sales[vendor] / Average Financing Period for New
Sales
$/Year
Time payments due for new sales after downpayment.
Accounts Payable[vendor] = INTEG( Increase in Accounts Payable[vendor] - Payment of Accounts Payable[vendor] , 0)
This stock keeps track of accounts payable. In this model, accounts
payable are paid consistently based on the normal payment time. There is
no liquidity management.
Cumulative Retained Earnings[vendor] = INTEG( Increase in Retained Earnings[vendor], 0)
Cumulative retained earnings increases with current retained earnings,
which are determined by net income and various other charges and sources of funds.
Equity[vendor] = Cumulative Retained Earnings[vendor] + Paid in Capital[vendor]
This variable tracks total equity as part of the simulated balance sheet.
Paid in Capital[vendor]= INTEG (Sale of Equity[vendor],initial Investment[vendor])
This variable tracks paid in capital raised through sale of equity.
Total Assets[vendor] = Total Current Assets[vendorl + Accounts Receivable[vendor]
This accounting formula measures Total assets.
Total Current Assets[vendorl = Working Capital[vendorl
Total current assets are cash and value of the inventory (Note that there
are no accounts receivable as all receivables are assumed to be received instantly).
Total Liabilities and Equity[vendor] = Equity[vendor] + Total Liabilities[vendor]
This measures total liabilities plus equity.
Avg Receivable Delay = 0.125
Year [0.1,12,0.1]
How long it takes on average to get paid
Bankruptcy Switch[vendor]=Switch for Bankruptcy[vendor] * IF THEN ELSE ( Working Capital[vendor] < Bankruptcy
Threshold[vendorl , 1, 0)
Dimensionless [0,1,11
Bankruptcy switch is on when payment shortage exceeds the tolerable threshold.
Incumbent Startup Date=1000
Year [0,21,1]
Non Startup1 Initial Investment[startup1]=0
Non Startup1 Initial Investment[nonstartupl=3e+006
$ [0,le+007,le+0061
The amount of cash available for the company at its simulated start date.
Startup2 Start Date=1000
Year [0,21,1]
Accounts Receivable[vendor] = INTEG( Customer Billings[vendor] - Receipt of Accounts Receivable[vendor] - Defaults
on AR[vendor] , 0)
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Revenue waiting to be received in cash
**** *****************************
.Cash Flow
Adjustment to Financing for Cash[vendor]=MAX(0, (Target Cash on Hand[vendor] - Working Capital[vendor]) / Time to
Adjust Cash)
$/Year
The firm seeks to adjust its cash balance to the target level of the Time to Adjust Cash.
Cash Flow[vendor] = Cash Flow from Operations[vendor] + Cash Flow from Investing[vendor] + Cash Flow from
Financing[vendor]
$/Year
Cash flow equals to the sum of cash flows from operations, investing and financing.
Cash Flow from Investing[vendor] = Proceeds from Sale of Assets[vendor] - Proceeds from Acquisition of Assets
$/Year
Desired Cash Coverage [vendor] = 0.167
Year [0,3,0.11
The fraction of a year of expected expenditures the firm desires to have in cash.
Payments for Operating Expense[vendor]=MIN ( Maximum Payments from Cash on Hand[vendor] , Required
Payments[vendor] )
$/Year
Actual payment made for operating expense is the lesser of the maximum
payments from cash on hand and the required payments at normal payment time.
Proceeds from Acquisition of Assets = 0
$/Year
Proceeds from Acquisition of Equity[vendor] = 0
$/Year
Proceeds from Employee Options[vendor] = SUM ( Total Basis of Options Exercised[vendordepartment!]
$/Year
The cash proceeds received by the firm from employees exercising their
options is the total, across all departments, of the amount paid in by
employees for the strike price of the options they exercise.
Proceeds from IPO[vendor] = IPO Shares[vendor] * Stock Price[vendor]
$/Year
Total funds raised by the IPO depends on the number of shares sold in the
initial offering and the stock price at issue.
Proceeds from Sale of Assets[vendor] = 0
$/Year
Proceeds from Shares Sold to Public[vendor] = New Shares Issued to Public[vendor] * Stock Price[vendor]
$/Year
Total funds raised by secondary stock sales to the public depend on the
number of shares issued and the stock price at issue.
Proceeds from VC financing[vendor]=Funds Raised From VCs[vendor]
$/Year
Required Payments[vendor] = Accounts Payable[vendor] / Normal Payment Time
$/Year
The firm seeks to pay accounts payable in the normal payment time.
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Target Cash on Hand[vendor] = Desired Cash Coverage[vendor] * Required Payments[vendor]
The firm seeks to maintain cash sufficient to provide a certain coverage
of its required expenditures.
Time to Adjust Cash = 0.125
years
The time over which the firm seeks to bring its cash balance in line with the target level.
Proceeds from Sale of Equity[vendor] = Proceeds from IPO[vendor] + Proceeds from VC financing[vendor] + Proceeds
from Shares Sold to Public[vendor] + Proceeds from Employee Options[vendor]
$/Year
The rate at which money is raised by sale of equity depends on the value
of shares sold in the IPO, to VCs, plus the value of any shares sold in
secondary offerings, and the funds received from the proceeds from options
exercised by employees (the strike price multiplied by the number of
options exercised by employees).
Receipt of Accounts Receivable[vendorl = Accounts Receivable[vendor] / Avg Receivable Delay
Dollars/Year
Amount of cash coming in from customers
Years of Runway[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Working Capital[vendorl , Burn Rate[vendor]
Year
If we're burning cash, then years of cash we have left. If positive cash
flow, burn rate is zero, then runway is zero.
****************** ******,,*******************************
.Desired Engineers
Desired Engineers[vendor]= GAME ( Desired Engineering Effort[vendor] /Normal Work Hours per Year)
People
How many Engineers we need to make up the feature shortfall, based on
their productivity and how many hours are needed for cust support (current
engineering) (but can't be negative if too many features)
Desired Feature Development Rate[vendorfeaturetype] = MAX ( 0, Desired Feature Completion
Rate[vendor,featuretype] + Adjustment for Feature Under Development[vendor,featuretype])
Features/Year
At what rate do we want to be starting feature development, taking into
account the features already under development.
Engineer Hours Required per Feature[featuretype]=100, 1000
Person*Hours/Feature
How many hours it would take one engineer to develop a feature
********* **** ***** *** ************* ******* ** **** *********
.Desired Sales Force
Effect of Customer Service Shortage on Desired Sales Force[vendor]=1+Sensitivity of Customer Service
Priority*(Function for Effect of Customer Service Shortage on Desired Sales Force(Customer Support Shortage
Fraction[vendor])-1)
Dimensionless
Effect of Payback Period on Desired Sales Force [vendor]=Function for Effect of Payback Period on Desired Sales
Force(Payback Period[vendor]/Maximum Payback Period for Customer Consideration)
Dimensionless
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Function for Effect of Customer Service Shortage on Desired Sales Force([(O,O)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.15,0.6),(0.35,0.3),(0.65,0.08),(1,0))
Dimensionless
Higher customer service shortage fraction, less desired sales force since
customer service has priority over new customers.
Function for Effect of Payback Period on Desired Sales Force([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.5,1),(0.6,0.8),(0.7,0.5),(0.8,0.2),(0.9,0.05),(1,0))
Dimensionless
Before the payback period reaches 7 years, the firm focuses on product
development not sales, thus the desired sales force is constrained the
longer the payback period.
Sensitivity of Customer Service Priority=0.5
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Desired Sales Effort for Hot Prospects[vendor]=ZIDZ ( Weighted total prospects[vendor]*Fractional Sales Effort for Hot
Prospects[vendor] , Sales Productivity[vendor])
Person*Hours/Year
Desired sales effort for prospects is the normal prospect generation rate
of divided by the sales productivity for that prospects.
Desired Sales Effort for Poaching[vendor]=ZIDZ ( Weighted total prospects[vendorl*Fractional Sales Effort for
Poaching[vendor], Sales Productivity[vendor])
Person*Hours/Year
Desired sales effort for prospects is the normal prospect generation rate
of divided by the sales productivity for that prospects.
Desired Sales Effort for Potential Customers[vendor]=ZIDZ ( Weighted total prospects[vendor]*Fractional Sales Effort
for Potential Customers[vendor] , Sales Productivity[vendor]
Person*Hours/Year
Desired sales effort for prospects is the normal prospect generation rate
of divided by the sales productivity for that prospects.
Desired Sales Effort for Potential Prospects[vendor]=ZDZ ( Weighted total prospects[vendor]* Fractional Sales Effort
for Potential Prospects[vendor] , Sales Productivity[vendor])
Person*Hours/Year
Desired sales effort for prospects is the normal prospect generation rate
of divided by the sales productivity for that prospects.
Desired Sales Effort for Prospects[vendor]=ZDZ ( Weighted total prospects[vendor]*Fractional Sales Effort for
Prospects[vendor], Sales Productivity[vendor])
Person*Hours/Year
Desired sales effort for prospects is the normal prospect generation rate
of divided by the sales productivity for that prospects.
Desired Sales Force[vendor]= GAME (Desired Sales Effort[vendorl / Normal Work Hours per Year*Effect of Payback
Period on Desired Sales Force[vendor]*Effect of Customer Service Shortage on Desired Sales Force[vendor])
People
The number of sales people needed given the total person-hours of effort
needed and the number of hours worked per year.
Normal Adopter Generation Rate[Firm]=MAX(0, Hot Prospects[Firm])/ Normal Adopter Generation Time
Prospects/Year
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Normal Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] = Prospects[Firm] / Normal Hot Prospect Generation Time
Prospects/Year
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Normal Poaching Rate[customer] = Adopters[customer] / Normal Poach Time
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Prospects/Year
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Normal Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] = Potential Prospects[Firml / Normal Prospect Generation Time
Prospects/Year
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Normal Potential Prospect Generation Rate = Potential Customers / Normal Potential Prospect Generation Time
Prospects/Year
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Potential Customers Emphasis Multiplier[Firm]=0.05
Dimensionless
Since the number of total potential customers is huge, firm allocates
little weight to them as opposed to other prospects in the chain.
Hot Prospect Emphasis Multiplier[Firm]=0.3
Dmnl
Emphasis sales force places on hot prospects
Poaching Emphasis Multiplier[Firm]= 0.1
DmnI
Emphasis sales force places on purchasers (since they already purchased, relatively less emphasis)




Emphasis sales force places on prospects
Total Normal Hot Prospect Generation Rate = SUM ( Normal Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm!]
Prospects/Year
Total Normal Poaching Rate = SUM ( Normal Poaching Rate[customer!]
Prospects/Year
Total Normal Prospect Generation Rate = SUM ( Normal Prospect Generation Rate[Firm!])
Prospects/Year
The total rate at which potential prospects might be converted to
prospects, over all firms.
Total Normal Purchase Rate = SUM ( Normal Adopter Generation Rate[Firm!]
Prospects/Year
Weighted total prospects[Firm] = Normal Potential Prospect Generation Rate * Potential Customers Emphasis
Multiplier[Firm] + Total Normal Prospect Generation Rate * Potential Prospects Emphasis Multiplier[Firm] + Total
Normal Hot Prospect Generation Rate * Prospect Emphasis Multiplier[Firm] + Total Normal Purchase Rate * Hot
Prospect Emphasis Multiplier[Firml + Total Normal Poaching Rate * Poaching Emphasis Multiplier[Firm]
Prospects/Year
Number of prospects weighted by relative importance of prospects vs. hot
prospects vs. purchasers for the purpose of applying sales effort
************ *** ******** *********** **********************
.Energy Prices and Carbon Policy
C02 Emission per kWh=0.000606
tons/kWh
US average value in 1998-2000. or 1.34 pounds/kWh see
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/co2_report/co2report.html
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2/3 * 0.05/kw (gas) + 1/3 * 0.15/kw (electricity)
Carbon Tax=RAMP ( Carbon Tax Increase Rate, Carbon Tax Start Time, Carbon Tax Phase In End Time)
$/kWh
If there's a carbon tax, then it will ramp up to its final carbon tax
starting at start time and taking the amount of time specified by ramp time.
Carbon Tax Increase Rate=Final Carbon Tax per kWh/Carbon Tax Phase In Time
$/kWh/Year [0,1,0.01]
What fraction initial competitor cost will change based on carbon policy
(0.1 = 10% increase, 1 = double, -1 means it goes to 0)
Carbon Tax Phase In Time=5
Year [0,?]
Time it takes for carbon policy to take full effect
*************************************** ****** ***********
.Features Under Development
Feasible Feature Development Rate[startup,featuretype]=Product Development Effort[startup,featuretype] / Engineer
Hours Required per Feature[featuretype]
Feasible Feature Development Rate[incumbent,featuretype]=100000
Features/Year
Given the engineering resources we have, and the amount of time it takes
to develop a feature, how many features can we develop per month
Feature Completion Rate 1[vendor,featuretype]=MIN ( Features Under Development 1[vendorfeaturetype] / ( Average
Feature Development Time[vendor] / 3), Feasible Feature Development Rate[vendorfeaturetype]
Features/Year
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by
how many features were started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete
them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Completion Rate 2[vendorfeaturetype]=MIN ( Features Under Development 2[vendorfeaturetype] /Average
Feature Development Time[vendor] / 3, Feasible Feature Development Rate[vendorfeaturetype]
Features/Year
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by
how many features were started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete
them in the avg feature devI time
Feature Completion Rate 3[vendorfeaturetype]=MIN ( Features Under Development 3[vendorfeaturetype] / Average
Feature Development Time[vendor] / 3, Feasible Feature Development Rate[vendorfeaturetype]
Features/Year
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by
how many features were started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete
them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Start Rate[startup1,featuretype]=Switch for Game*Feasible Feature Development Rate[startup1,featuretype]
+ (1-Switch for Game)*MIN ( Feasible Feature Development Rate[startupl,featuretype] , Desired Feature
Development Rate[startupl,featuretype] )
Feature Start Rate[startup2,featuretype]=MIN(Feasible Feature Development Rate[startup2,featuretype], Desired
Feature Development Rate[startup2,featuretype])




Start features at the rate at which we can develop them. When Swtich for
game is on, feature start rate depends on product development effort and
not constrained by desired feature development rate. Players can adjust
the feature development by adjusting the number of engineers.
Features Under Development 1[vendor,featuretype] = INTEG( Feature Start Rate[vendorfeaturetype] - Feature
Completion Rate 1[vendor,featuretype] , 0)
Features
1st stage of feature development
Features Under Development 2[vendorfeaturetype] = INTEG( Feature Completion Rate 1[vendor,featuretype] -
Feature Completion Rate 2[vendor,featuretype] , 0)
Features
2nd stage of feature development
Features Under Development 3[vendorfeaturetype] = INTEG( Feature Completion Rate 2[vendorfeaturetype] -
Feature Completion Rate 3[vendorfeaturetype] , 0)
Features
3rd stage of feature development
Average Feature Development Time[vendor]=1
Year [0.2,2,0.11
How long, on average, does it take to develop a feature, regardless of how
many engineers are working on it
*************************************************** *****
.Financial Markets
Base for Growth Rate Calculation = le+006
$/Year
The minimum base revenue rate used to estimate sales growth when the firm is very small.
Breakup Value[vendor] = MAX ( 0, Working Capital[vendor] - Total Liabilities[vendor])
The minimum value of the firm is its breakup or liquidation value, given
by its cash, plus a fraction of its nonliquid assets, less its
liabilities. The Salvage Value Ratio is typically < 1 because the firm
will realize less than book value for its assets if forced to liquidate
them. Breakup value is not less than zero.
Effective Sales Revenue for Expected Growth[vendor] = MAX ( Base for Growth Rate Calculation, Revenue[vendor]
$/Year
The fractional growth rate for startups is close to infinite since the
base is so small. Investors and managers do not expect such rates to
continuestead base their estimates of growth on a minimum revenue level.
Expected Growth in Revenue[vendor] = SMOOTHI ( Indicated Growth in Revenue[vendor]. Time to Adjust Sales
Growth Expectations , Initial Expected Revenue Growth[vendorl)
1/Year
The expected fractional growth rate in sales revenue adjusts exponentially to the indicated rate.
Expected Net Income[vendor] = Weight on Actual Net Income for Valuation[vendor] * Recent Net Income[vendor] +
1- Weight on Actual Net Income for Valuation[vendor]) * Expected Steady State Net Income[vendor]
$/Year
The expected profit of the firm used to value the firm is a weighted
average of current profit and the expected steady state profit the firm is
expected to achieve. The weight on actual net income is low during the
startup honeymoon period, when investors are willing to tolerate losses
while the firm invests in growth (through high expenditures and low
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prices). After the startup honeymoon, however, investors revert to
traditional valuation measures based on the actual profitability of the firm.
Expected Steady State Net income[vendor] = Expected Long Run Return on Sales[vendor]* Recent Sales Revenue for
Growth Rate[vendor]
$/Year
Investors expect the profits of the firm, over the long haul, to be a
certain fraction of recent sales revenue.
Financial Results Reporting Time = 0.25
Year
The time required for the firm to report financial results.
Historic Horizon for Sales Growth = 2
Year
The historic horizon for the estimation of future growth in revenue.
Historic Sales Revenue[vendor] = SMOOTHI ( Recent Sales Revenue for Growth Rate[vendor], Historic Horizon for
Sales Growth, Recent Sales Revenue for Growth Rate[vendor] / ( 1 + Initial Expected Revenue Growth[vendor] *
Historic Horizon for Sales Growth)
$/Year
The historic sales rate used to estimate future growth is formed by
exponential smoothing of recent sales. Initialized in steady state at the
initial expected growth rate. See Sterman (2000) Chapter 16.




The length of the honeymoon period during which investors ignore current
losses and value the firm using an expected steady state return on sales.
Indicated Growth in Revenue[vendor] = ZIDZ ( ( Recent Sales Revenue for Growth Rate[vendor] - Historic Sales
Revenue[vendor] ), ( Historic Sales Revenue[vendor] * Historic Horizon for Sales Growth))
1/Year
The indicated growth rate in revenue is the annualized fractional
difference between recent and historic sales revenue. Set to zero if
historic revenue is zero.
Indicated Industry Return on Sales[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE (Time > Honeymoon Period End Date[vendor} , Industry
Average Return on Sales , Initial Expected Return on Sales)
Dimensionless
The indicated value of industry return on sales, to which investors'
expectations adjust. Set to the initial expectation until a sufficient
time has passed for investors to compile data on and assess industry experience.
Industry Average Return on Sales = SUM ( Market share[vendor!] * Return on Sales[vendor!]
Dimensionless
Industry average return on sales is the return on sales of each firm weighted by its market share.
Initial Expected Return on Sales = 0.15
Dimensionless [0,0.2,0.01]
The initial expectation of investors for steady state return on sales revenue.
Initial Expected Revenue Growth[vendorl = 0
1/Year
The initial expectation for sales growth for the firm in the capital markets.
Pre IPO Discount[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE (Time <= IPO Date[vendor] , 0.75, 1)
Dimensionless
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The stock valuation is discounted prior to an IPO as the stock is less liquid as an investment.
Recent Net Income[vendor] = SMOOTH ( Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor] , Financial Results Reporting Time)
$/Year
The financial results of the firm are reported with a delay.
Recent Sales Revenue for Growth Rate[vendor] = SMOOTHI ( Effective Sales Revenue for Expected Growth[vendor],
Financial Results Reporting Time , Effective Sales Revenue for Expected Growth[vendor] / ( 1 + Initial Expected
Revenue Growth[vendor] * Financial Results Reporting Time)
$/Year
Recent sales averages sales over a short period to filter out noise.
Initialized in steady state at the initial expected growth rate. See
Sterman (2000) Chapter 16. Effective sales revenue for expected growth is
the greater of actual sales or a base that represents a minimum revenue
level, so that expected growth rates remain reasonable when sales are very
small (the growth rate on the first sale is infinite, but expectations will not rise to infinity).
Return on Sales[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Recent Net Income[vendor] , Recent Sales Revenue for Growth Rate[vendor]
Dimensionless
Net income as a fraction of sales revenue. Set to zero if recent sales revenue is zero.
Sensitivity of Valuation to Rapid Growth = 1.05
Dimensionless [0.9,1.2,0.01]
This parameter determines the responsiveness of the price/earnings
multiple assigned by the capital markets is to the expected growth in
revenue when the expected growth rate exceeds the discount rate.
Time to Adjust Expected Long Run Return on Sales = 3
years [3,5,0.5]
The time over which investor expectations for the long run steady state
return on sales of the industry adjust to the indicated value based on
actual experience.
Time to Adjust Sales Growth Expectations = 0.5
Year
It takes time for expectations of growth to adjust to the indicated value.
Total Market = SUM ( Revenue[vendor!]
$/Year
The total market is the sum of the revenues of all firms.
Valuation Weight Adjustment Time = 1
Year
The time period over which the weight on actual net income for valuation
adjusts to the indicated value, once the startup honeymoon period ends.
Weight on Actual Net Income After Startup Honeymoon Period[vendor] = Step ( 1, Honeymoon Period End
Date[vendor] )
Dimensionless
After the honeymoon period for startups ends, the financial markets will
use actual net income in their assessment of the firms value. The actual
weight adjusts gradually to this level.
Weight on Actual Net Income for Valuation[vendor] = SMOOTH3i ( Weight on Actual Net Income After Startup
Honeymoon Period[vendor] , Valuation Weight Adjustment Time, 0)
Dimensionless
The weight investors give to actual net income in their valuation of the
firm. Adjusts with a delay of the specified order to the indicated value
of 1 once the startup honeymoon period ends.
Market share[vendorl = ZIDZ ( Revenue[vendor] , Total Market)
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Dimensionless
Market share is calculated by comparing the company's sales revenue to
total sales revenue in the industry.
Total Liabilities[vendor] = Current Liabilities[vendor]
This measures the total liabilities of the company. There is no long term debt in this model.
Company in Operation Switch[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE ( Time >= Startup Date[vendor] :AND: Bankruptcy
Switch[vendor]=0, 1, 0)
Dimensionless
This switch is used to decide whether a given company has already begun
its operations. Prior to the start of operations the key flows for the company are zero.
Discount Rate = 0.12
1/Year
The discount rate used to evaluate the present value of expected profits.
Startup Date[startuplj=0
Startup Date[startup2J = Startup2 Start Date
Startup Date[incumbent] = Incumbent Startup Date
Year [0,21,1]
The date at which companies enter the market and begin operations.
Working Capital [vendor]= INTEG (Cash In[vendor] - Cash Out[vendor] + Follow on Funding[vendor] + Initial
Funding[vendor],Initial Investment[vendor])
This stock tracks the amount of cash currently held by the company.
********* ************ ***** ******** ******** ***** ****** ***
.Firm Attractiveness
********* ***************** ******** ***** *** *** ** *********~.
Firm Attractiveness from Payback Period[vendor]=Function for Firm Attractiveness from Payback Period(Payback
Period[vendor]/Maximum Payback Period for Customer Consideration)
Dimensionless
Firm attractiveness from customer payback period. Lower payback period, higher the firm
attractiveness.
Function for Firm Attractiveness from Customer Support([(0,0.4)-
(1,1)],(0,0.5),(0.2,0.55),(0.4,0.65),(0.6,0.8),(0.8,0.93),(1,1))
Dimensionless
Higher the customer service quality, higher the firm attractiveness.
Function for Firm Attractiveness from Payback Period([(O,O)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.1,0.97),(0.2,0.92),(0.3,0.84),(0.4,0.7),(0.5,0.5),(0.6,0.35),(0.7,0.25),(0.8,0.15),(0.9,0.07),(1,0.01))
Dimensionless
Lower payback period, higher the firm attractiveness.
Incumbent Firm Attractiveness=0
Dimensionless
Initial Market Share[startupl] = ( 1 - Initial Market Share[incumbent] ) / 2
Initial Market Share[startup2] = ( 1 - Initial Market Share[incumbent] ) / 2
Initial Market Share[incumbent] = 0.9
Dimensionless
Initial market share for incumbent, and startups




Higher the customer service quality, more attractive the product is.
Firm Attractiveness from Marketing Effort[vendor] =IF THEN ELSE ( Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Marketing Effort
<> 0, Indicated Attractiveness from Marketing Effort[vendor] , 1)
Dimensionless
Attractiveness from brand equity is the indicated value when the
sensitivity is nonzero, and 1 otherwise.
Firm Attractiveness from WOM[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE ( Sensitivity of Attractiveness to WOM <> 0, Indicated
Attractiveness from WOM[vendor] , 1)
Dimensionless
Attractiveness from brand equity is the indicated value when the
sensitivity is nonzero, and 1 otherwise.
Indicated Attractiveness from Marketing Effort[vendor] = Maximum Attractiveness from Marketing Effort / ( 1 + exp
Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Marketing Effort * ( Marketing Effort at Half Saturation - Marketing Effort Relevant to
Consumers[vendor] ) / Reference Marketing Effort))
Dimensionless
The effect of brand equity on the attractiveness of the firm. Formulated
as a logistic function of brand equity, such that attractiveness = 1 when
brand equity equals the reference value, and attractiveness approaches the
maximum when brand equity approaches infinity. The effect is half the
maximum at the half saturation point.
Indicated Attractiveness from WOM[vendorl = Maximum Attractiveness from WOM / ( 1+ exp ( Sensitivity of
Attractiveness to WOM * ( WOM at Half Saturation - WOM Relevant to Consumers[vendor] ) / Reference WOM
Dimensionless
The effect of WOM on the attractiveness of the firm. Formulated as a
logistic function of WOM, such that attractiveness = 1 when WOM equals the
reference value, and attractiveness approaches the maximum when WOM
approaches infinity. The effect is half the maximum at the half saturation point.
Marketing Effort at Half Saturation = Reference Marketing Effort * ( 1 + ZIDZ ( LN (Maximum Attractiveness from
Marketing Effort - 1) , Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Marketing Effort)
$/Year
Value of brand equity where the impact on attractiveness reaches half the
saturation value. Determined by the other parameters governing the impact
of brand equity, particularly the maximum attractiveness.
Marketing Effort Relevant to Consumers[vendor]=Maximum Relevant Marketing Effort * Billing for Marketing
Spending[vendor] / ( Maximum Relevant Marketing Effort + Billing for Marketing Spending[vendorl ) ) / ( Switch to
include initial market share in marketing effort relevant to consumers * Initial Market Share[vendor] + 1 - Switch to
include initial market share in marketing effort relevant to consumers)
$/Year
The level of brand equity relevant to consumers in the assessment of
attractiveness is the lesser of actual brand equity or maximum relevant
brand equity determined by consumer preferences (too much advertising and
marketing is not useful). Instead of a minimum function, with a sharp
discontinuity, a continuous function is used that gradually saturates at
the maximum level.
Maximum Attractiveness from Marketing Effort = 10
Dimensionless
Maximum attractiveness from brand equity. Key points: Half saturation
levels (for Sensitivity = 1), in format (Max Attractiveness, Half Sat
value): (1.5, .31), (2, 1), (3, 1.69), (4, 2.10), (5, 2.39), (10, 3.20),
(20, 3.94), (30, 4.37), (40, 4.66), (50, 4.89), (100, 5.60), (200, 6.29),
(300, 6.70).
Maximum Attractiveness from WOM= 1.2
Dimensionless
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Maximum attractiveness from WOM. Key points: Half saturation levels (for
Sensitivity = 1), in format (Max Attractiveness, Half Sat value): (1.5,
.31), (2, 1), (3, 1.69), (4, 2.10), (5, 2.39), (10, 3.20), (20, 3.94),
(30, 4.37), (40, 4.66), (50, 4.89), (100, 5.60), (200, 6.29), (300, 6.70).
Maximum Relevant Marketing Effort = le+010
$/Year [0,6e+010]
The maximum level of brand equity relevant to consumers when evaluating
the value of the product.
Maximum Relevant WOM = le+007
Prospects/Year [0,6e+010]
The maximum level of WOM relevant to consumers when evaluating the value of the product.
Reference Marketing Effort = le+006
$/Year
The reference level of brand equity used in evaluating attractiveness.
Reference WOM = 1000
Prospects/Year
The reference level of WOM used in evaluating attractiveness.
Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Marketing Effort= 0.5
Dimensionless [0,1,0.01]
The sensitivity of attractiveness to brand equity.
Sensitivity of Attractiveness to WOM= 0.5
Dimensionless [0,1,0.011
The sensitivity of attractiveness to brand equity.
Switch to include initial market share in marketing effort relevant to consumers = 0
Dmnl
Solar sim has this (I believe the reason is to make initial calibration of
order share match the initial market share)
Switch to include initial market share in WOM relevant to consumers = 0
Dimensionless
Solar sim has this (I believe the reason is to make initial calibration of
order share match the initial market share)
Total Firm Attractiveness = SUM ( Firm Attractiveness[vendor!]
Dimensionless
Total firm attractiveness as the sum of all firm attractiveness.
WOM at Half Saturation = Reference WOM * ( 1 + ZIDZ ( LN ( Maximum Attractiveness from WOM - 1), Sensitivity of
Attractiveness to WOM)
Prospects/Year
Value of WOM where the impact on attractiveness reaches half the
saturation value. Determined by the other parameters governing the impact
of WOM, particularly the maximum attractiveness.
WOM Relevant to Consumers[vendor]=( Maximum Relevant WOM * Total WOM[vendor] / ( Maximum Relevant WOM
+ Total WOM[vendor] ) ) / (Switch to include initial market share in WOM relevant to consumers * Initial Market
Share[vendor] + 1 - Switch to include initial market share in WOM relevant to consumers
Prospects/Year
The level of WOM relevant to consumers in the assessment of attractiveness
is the lesser of actual WOM or maximum relevant WOM determined by consumer
preferences. Instead of a minimum function, with a sharp discontinuity, a
continuous function is used that gradually saturates at the maximum level.
Total WOM[Firm]=WOM Contact Frequency from Adopters * Total Prospects and Adopters by Firm[Firm]
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Prospects/Year
The volume of WOM generated is the WOM generated by all installed base.
WOM Contact Frequency from Adopters = 3
1/Year
Rate of contact between adopters and potential prospects (relatively high)
****************** **************************************
.Income Statement
Consumer Price After Subsidy[vendor]=Price[vendor]*(1-Government Subsidy Percentage/100)
$/Unit
Salary as Fraction of Operating Expenses[vendor]=Salary Expense[vendor]/Operating Expenses[vendor]
Dimensionless
Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendor]=Consumer Price After Subsidy[vendor]* Annual Service Fee Relative to
Price[vendor]*Switch for Customer Support
$/Unit/Year
Service fee per year after a product is purchased, calculated as a fraction of the purchase price.
Annual Service Fee Relative to Price[vendor]=0.05
1/Year [0,1,0.01]
Service fee per year as a fraction of purchase price.
Average Loss Carry Forward Period = 5
years
The average carry forward period for losses.
Carry Forward Loss[vendor] = MAX ( 0, -Taxable Income[vendor]
$/Year
The firm can accumulate losses and use them to offset future profits in calculating taxable income.
Carry Forward Loss Applied to Current Tax Liability[vendor] = MIN ( Maximum Carry Forward Loss Applicable to
Current Tax Liability[vendor] , MAX (0, Taxable Income[vendor]
$/Year
The carry forward loss applied to offset current taxable income is the
lesser of current taxable income or the total carry forward credit
available.
Cumulative Carry Forward Losses[vendor] = INTEG( Carry Forward Loss[vendor] - Decrease in Carry Forward
Losses[vendor] , 0)
The firm's cumulative losses carried forward to offset potential future
profit; increased by the net loss, decreases as the carry forward is used or expires.
Cumulative Losses[vendor] = INTEG( Losses[vendor] , 0)
Cumulative Profit[vendor]= INTEG (Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor],0)
Cumulative (undiscounted) net income.
Cumulative Startup Losses[vendor] = INTEG( Startup Losses[vendor] , 0)
Date of First Profit[vendor] = INTEG( Recording of Profitability Date[vendor] , 0)
Year
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Decrease in Carry Forward Losses[vendor] = Expiration of Unused Carry Forward Losses[vendor] + Carry Forward Loss
Applied to Current Tax Liability[vendor]
$/Year
Carry forward losses can be used or expire.
Defaults on AR[vendor] = Accounts Receivable[vendor] * Default Rate[vendor]
Dollars/Year
Dollars per month we're losing due to customer defaults on their bills
Discount Factor = exp ( - Discount Rate for NPV of Profit * Time)
Dimensionless
Profit is discounted at a user-defined rate.
Discount Rate for NPV of Profit = 0.04
1/Year
The discount rate used to compute the NPV of firm profits.
"Economies of Scale for G&A" = 0.8
Dimensionless
Determines the strength of the scale economy effect for G&A expenses.
Effective Tax Rate = 0
Dimensionless
The effective corporate tax rate.
Expiration of Unused Carry Forward Losses[vendor] = Cumulative Carry Forward Losses[vendor] / Average Loss Carry
Forward Period
$/Year
Carry forward losses expire after a specified time.
"Fixed G&A Expense" [vendor]=200000
$/Year
The fixed, minimum component of the firm's administrative and overhead expenses.
Gross Margin[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Gross Profit[vendor] , Revenue[vendor]
Dimensionless
Losses[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE ( Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor] < 0, Net Income Net of Profit
Sharing[vendor] , 0)
$/Year
Rate to track losses.
Maintenance COGS[vendor]=lnstalled Base[vendor] *Operating and Maintenance Costs[vendor]
Dollars/Year
The costs for providing maintenance service.
Maintenance Margin[vendor]=(Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendorl-Operating and Maintenance
Costs[vendor])/Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendor]
Dmnl
The fraction of the maintenance charge which is profit. Target value is 40%.
Maximum Carry Forward Loss Applicable to Current Tax Liability[vendor] = Cumulative Carry Forward Losses[vendor] /
TIME STEP
$/Year
The maximum rate the firm can draw down its prior losses to offset current
tax liabilities. The time constant is assumed to be very short, so is set
to the simulation time step, allowing the entire carry forward loss to be
used in one time step if needed.
Min Gross Margin[vendor] = 0
Dmnl [-1,1,0.05]
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Minimum margin company will charge (can be negative if wish to sell at
below cost to gain initial sales)
NPV of Profit[vendor] = INTEG( Present Value of Profit[vendor] , 0)
The Net Present Value of the firm's profits, discounted at a user-specified rate.
Present Value of Profit[vendor]=Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor] * Discount Factor
$/Year
The discounted value of current profits.
Product COGS[vendor] = Unit Cost[vendor] * Adopter Generation Rate[vendor] * Unit Purchased per Adopter
Dollars/Year
Cost of goods sold for products sold
Profitability Shutoff[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE ( Date of First Profit[vendor] > 0, 0, 1)
Dimensionless
Recording of Profitability Date[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE ( Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor] > 0, Time / TIME
STEP , 0) * Profitability Shutoff[vendor]
Dimensionless
"Reference Volume for G&A Expenses" = 1.5e+007
$/Year
"Salary and G&A Expense"[vendor] = Salary Expense[vendorl + General and Administrative Expense[vendorl
$/Year
This calculates all salary expenses and G&A of the company.
Startup Losses[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE ( Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor] < 0, Net Income Net of Profit
Sharing[vendor] , 0) * Profitability Shutoff [vendor]
$/Year
Rate to track initial losses.
Taxable Income[vendor] = Net Income Before Tax[vendor]
$/Year
Taxable income is NIBT, that is, operating income less any extraordinary charges.
Taxable Income After Carry Forward Losses[vendor] = MAX ( 0, Taxable Income[vendor]) - Carry Forward Loss Applied
to Current Tax Liability[vendor]
$/Year
Taxable income after carry forward losses are applied. Carry forward losses reduce taxable income.
"Unit G&A Expense"[vendorl=1000
$/Unit
The variable overhead and administrative cost per item sold.
"Variable G&A Expense"[vendor] = "Reference Volume for G&A Expenses" * ( "Unit G&A Expense"[vendor] * Purchase
Rate[vendor] / "Reference Volume for G&A Expenses") A "Economies of Scale for G&A"
$/Year
The variable component of administrative overhead depends on order volume.
Price[startup1]= GAME (Switch for Game * Price for Game + ( 1 - Switch for Game) * Endogenous Price[startup1])
Price[startup2] = Endogenous Price[startup2]
Price[incumbent]=lncumbent Price
$/Unit
Price of startup1 can be set endogenously or by game player.
Operating and Maintenance Costs[vendorl = Initial Operating and Maintenance Costs * Effect of Functionality on
Operating and Maintenance Costs[vendor]
$/Year/Unit
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Adopter Generation Rate[vendor]=lNTEGER(SUM ( Firm Specific Adopter Generation Rate[Firm!,vendor] ) + 0.5)
Prospects/Year
Total Prospects and Adopters by Firm[Firm] = Potential Prospects[Firm] + Prospects[Firm] + Hot Prospects[Firm] +
Adopters[Firm] + Lost Prospects[Firm]
Prospects
The sum of the prospects and adopters of each firm's product.
Unit Cost[vendor]=lnitial Unit Cost[vendor] *Effect of Learning Curve on Unit Cost[vendor]*Cost Adjustment Fraction
Due To Policy
Dollars/Unit
Cost to manufacture/produce/provide product to purchasers. IF THEN ELSE is
used to prevent floating error when initial cumulative purchase = 0.
********************************************* ***********
.Job Attractiveness
Expected Present Value of Salary[vendordepartment]=(Experienced Salary[vendordepartment]+Value of Company
Mission to Employees[vendordepartment]) / Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor]
$/Person
The present value of the employee's salary, computed assuming employees
will be paid the salary for the experienced workers, plus the intrinsic
value of working for a green company, discounted at a specified rate. Used
to determine the total present value of the employee compensation package,
including salary and options.
Expected Present Value of Total Compensation[vendordepartment]=Expected Present Value of
Salary[vendor,department] + Expected Present Value of Profit Sharing[vendordepartment] + Expected Present Value
of Stock Options[vendordepartment] + Expected Present Value of Stock Grants[vendordepartment]
$/Person
The expected present value of total employee compensation is the EPV of
the salary component plus the EPV of the option component.
Normalized Expected Present Value of Total Compensation[vendor, department]=Expected Present Value of Total
Compensation[vendor,department]/Reference Present Value of Total Compensation[department]
Dimensionless





Higher the compensation, higher job attractiveness. Estimated using NBER
Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples.
:SUPPLEMENTARY





Higher the compensation, higher job attractiveness. Estimated using NBER
Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples.




Effective Work Effort[vendor, department]=Rookie Effective Work Effort[vendordepartment]+Experienced Effective
Work Effort[vendordepartment]
Person*Hour/Year
Job Attractiveness for Existing Employees[vendor, department]=Job Attractiveness from Financial
Compensation[vendordepartment]+Non Financial Job Attractiveness [vendordepartment] + Reference Job
Attractiveness
Dimensionless
Job attractiveness for existing employees comes from the relative
financial compensation and the non-financial factors such as burnout.
Addictive instead of multiplicative form is used since the regression
estimates from the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset is in additive form.
Participation Culture by Department[vendor, department]=Average Participation[vendordepartment]/Average
Participation Experience Needed for Participation Culture
Dimensionless
Overall company participation culture indexed between 0 and 1. When hours
of average participation reaches the maximum participation hours needed,
the participation culture reaches 1.
Working Hours per Year[vendordepartment]=Current Workweek[vendordepartment]*Workweek per Year
Hours/Year
Number of working hours per year.
Profit Sharing Amount[vendor]=MAX(0, Net Income Before Profit Sharing[vendor]*Profit Sharing as Percentage of Net
income[vendor]/100)
$/Year
Profit sharing amount equals net income times profit sharing as percentage
of net income, provided that net income is positive.
Profit Sharing as Percentage of Net Income[vendor]= GAME (0)
Dimensionless [0,100,11
Perceived Liquidity[vendor] = xIDZ ( Working Capital[vendorl , Target Cash on Hand[vendor] , 1)
Dimensionless
Perceived liquidity is the ratio of cash on hand to target cash required
to support the firm's expenditures. Neutral before operations begin. Note
that we assume there is no significant delay or bias in the employee's
perception of the firm's cash position (we assume transparency). This
assumption could be relaxed by including delays or biases that would for
example prevent employees from discovering that a firm was in financial
difficulty, as at Enron and WorldCom.
Desired Engineering Effort[vendor] = Desired Product Development Effort[vendor] + Desired Customer
Support[vendor]
Person* Hours/Year
Desired Sales Effort[vendor] = Desired Sales Effort for Potential Prospects[vendor] + Desired Sales Effort for
Prospects[vendor] + Desired Sales Effort for Hot Prospects[vendor] + Desired Sales Effort for Potential
Customers[vendor] + Desired Sales Effort for Poaching[vendorl
Person *Hours/Year
Desired sales effort is the sum of desired sales efforts for all prospects in the prospect chain.
Experienced Salary[vendor, department]=Reference Total Compensation[department]*Salary as Percentage of
Industry Average[vendor]/100
$/(Year*People)
Desired Grantseeking Effort by Department[vendordepartment] = Desired Grantseeking Effort[vendor] / 2
Person*Hours/Year
Desired grantseeking effort is assumed to come from sales and engineer proportionally.
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Indicated Work Pressure[vendordepartment=xDZ ( Desired Work Effort[vendordepartment] , Effective Work
Effort[vendor,department], 10)
Dimensionless
The ratio of the staff required relative to the existing staff available. Drives the workweek.
Average Employee Shares Outstanding[vendor, department]=ZIDZ((Employee Shares Outstanding from Exercised
Options[vendor,department]+Employee Shares[vendordepartment]), Total Employees per
Department[vendor,department)
shares/Person
Job Attractiveness from Financial Compensation[vendor, department]=Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Financial
Compensation*Function for Job Attractiveness from Financial Compensation(Normalized Expected Present Value of
Total Compensation[vendordepartment])
Dimensionless
If Sensitivity = 0, the effect is switched off, then job attractiveness =
1. Used because indicated attractiveness does not = 1 when sensitivity = 0.
Effect of Job Attractiveness on Workweek[vendor, department]=1+Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on
Workweek*(Function of Effect of Job Attractiveness on Willingness to Work Hard(Job Attractiveness for Existing
Employees[vendor,department])-1)
Dimensionless
This capture the moderating effect of job attractiveness (JA) on the
effect of schedule pressure on workweek (ESPW). The higher the job
attractiveness, the higher willingness to work hard, thus given the same
schedule pressure, actual workweek increases.
Employee Ownership Stake Relative to Salary[vendor, department]=ZIDZ(Value of Average Employee Shares
Outstanding[vendor,department], Average Salary [vendor])
Year
Value of the accumulative employee shares relative to average salary (how
many years of salary would it take to equal the current value of the
average employee's shares). This measure is chosen because the survey data
available from the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset.
Expected Present Value of Profit Sharing[vendor, department]=Expected Profit Sharing per
Employee[vendor,department]/Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor]
$/Person
Expected Profit Sharing per Employee[vendordepartment]=SMOOTHI(Profit Sharing per
Employee[vendor,department], Time to Adjust Expected Profit Sharing
,0)
$/(Person*Year)
Expected Present Value of Stock Grants[vendor, department]=Stock Granted per Existing
Employee[vendordepartment] *Expected Value of Non Vested Stock Grants[vendordepartment]/Discount Rate for
Total Compensation[vendor]
$/Person
Expected Value of Stock Options Relative to Market Capita lization[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ(Expected Value of Non
Vested Stock Options[vendordepartment], Market Capitalization[vendor])
1/Person





A sudden jump in psychological job attractiveness arises from any employee
ownership stake. The psychological impact of employee ownership rises
gradually and at a slightly diminishing rate as the average employee
ownership stake becomes larger relative to the average annual salary.
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Function for Job Attractiveness from Financial Compensation([(0,-1)-(2,0.4)],(0,-1),(0.07,-0. 68 070 2),(0.2 ,-





Higher the compensation, higher job attractiveness. Estimated using NBER
Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples.





Higher the compensation, higher job attractiveness. Estimated using NBER
Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples.
Function for Job Attractiveness from Option Grants([(0,-0.006)-(1500,0.2)],(0,0),(0.0001,-0.005),(0.4,-
0.001),(1,0.001),(2,0.003),(10,0.009),(25,0.015),(50,0.022),(100,0.032),(200,0.044),(3 7 5,0.0 6 ),(60 0,0.075),(1000,0.09),
(1500,0.1))
Dimensionless
Cumulative options less than 1 basis point lowers job attractiveness due
to feeling of insult, increase positively once passes 1 basis point,
saturate at the 1500 basis point as one possesses all 15% option pool.




A sudden jump of psychological job attractiveness effect from having the
first 1000 options, additional options increase job attractiveness at
small rate, signaling psychological effect of option grants come more
from having it or not as oppose to the quantity. The financial effect from
the expected value of options is captured separately in the Job
Attractiveness from Financial Compensation. This only capture the
psychological effect of having the options regardless of their worth.
Estimated using NBER Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples.
Function for Job Attractiveness from Participation({(0,0)-
(1,0.1)],(0,0),(0.3,0),(0.43,0.01),(0.55,0.03),(0.65,0.055),(0.75,0.075),(0.88,0.09),(1,0.1))
Dimensionless
Higher the participatory culture (after a certain threshold), higher the job attractiveness.




Estimated using NBER Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples. The
initial drop of job attractiveness when given only 1% of profit sharing as
% of salary can be interpreted as people resent the company being
hypocritical by calling itself profit sharing when only giving 1%.











The higher the job attractiveness, the higher the willingness to work
hard. Estimated using NBER Shared Capitalism dataset of 38,000 samples.
Function of Effect of Layoff on Job Attractiveness([(0,-0.2)-(1,0)],(0,0),(0.05,-0.003),(0.11,-0.007),(0.17,-0.014),(0.25,-
0.028),(0.35,-0.043),(0.43,-0.056),(0.53,-0.072),(0.63,-0.083),(0.78,-0.093),(1,-0.1))
Dimensionless
The higher the perceived fraction of total employees in each department
being laid off, the lower the job attractiveness in that department
Function of Reporting Time for Job Attractiveness([(0,0)-(2,0.6)1,(0,0.083),(1,0.25),(2,0.5))
Year
As company expands and the number of employees grows, the longer it takes
to survey and report job attractiveness, formally or informally.
Job Attractiveness for New Hires[vendordepartment]=Job Attractiveness from Financial
Compensation[vendor,department]+Perceived Non Financial Job Attractiveness[vendordepartment] + 3
Dimensionless
Job attractiveness for new hires is driven by the financial compensation
and the perceived job satisfaction. Addictive instead of multiplicative
form is used to match the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset.
Job Attractiveness from Burnout[vendor, department]=Sensitivity of Burnout Effect*Function of Effect of Burnout on
Job Attractiveness(Recent Average Workweek[vendordepartment]/Normal Workweek)
Dimensionless
Job Attractiveness from Employee Ownership Stake[vendor,department]=Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from
Employee Ownership* Function for Job Attractiveness from Employee Ownership(Employee Ownership Stake Relative
to Salary[vendordepartment]/Reference Employee Ownership Stake Relative to Salary)
Dimensionless
Job Attractiveness from Layoff[vendor, department]=Sensitivity of Layoff Effect*Function of Effect of Layoff on Job
Attractiveness(Perceived Layoff Fraction[vendor,department])
Dimensionless
Job Attractiveness from Option Gra nts[vendordepa rtment]=Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Option
Grants*Function for Job Attractiveness from Option Grants (Cumulative Options per Employee as Basis Point of Shares
Outstanding[vendor]/Minimum Basis Point of Cumulative Options for Positive Psychological Effect)
Dimensionless
Job Attractiveness from Participation[vendor, department]=Function for Job Attractiveness from
Participation(Participation Culture by Department[vendordepartment])*Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from
Participation
Dimensionless
Job Attractiveness from Profit Sharing[vendor, department]=Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Profit
Sharing*Function for Job Attractiveness from Profit Sharing(Profit Sharing as Percentage of
Salary[vendor,department])
Dimensionless
Job attractiveness from the psychological effect of profit sharing as % of
salary. The financial effect of profit sharing is captured through the
total compensation effect.
Job Attractiveness from Psychological Ownership[vendor, department]=Job Attractiveness from Profit
Sharing[vendor,department]+Job Attractiveness from Employee Ownership Stake[vendordepartment]+Job
Attractiveness from Option Grants[vendordepartment]+Job Attractiveness from Participation[vendordepartment]
Dimensionless
Job attractiveness from psychological effects of employee ownership,
participation and profit sharing.
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Minimum Basis Point of Cumulative Options for Positive Psychological Effect=1
1/Person
Non Financial Job Attractiveness[vendor, department]=Job Attractiveness from Burnout[vendordepartmentl + Job
Attractiveness from Psychological Ownership[vendordepartment] +Job Attractiveness from Layoff[vendor,
department]
Dimensionless
Job attractiveness is the sum of effects from burnout, layoff and
psychological ownership. Addictive instead of multiplicative form is used
to match the NBER Shared Capitalism dataset.
Past Layoff Forgotten [vendordepartment]=Perceived Layoffs[vendordepartment]/Time to Forget Past Layoff
People/Year
Perceived Layoff Fraction [vendordepartment]=MIN(ZIDZ(Perceived Layoffs[vendordepartment],Total Employees per
Department[vendor,department]), 1)
Dimensionless
Perceived layoff fraction is the perceived layoffs in people's memory
divided by total employees, constrained to be less or equal to 1.
Perceived Layoffs[vendor,department]= INTEG (Layoff Perceived[vendordepartment]-Past Layoff
Forgotten[vendor,department],0)
People
Perceived Non Financial Job Attractiveness[vendor, department]=SMOOTH(Non Financial Job
Attractiveness[vendor,department], Time to Perceive Job Satisfaction)
Dimensionless
It takes time for job applicants to perceive non financial job
satisfaction occurred inside the company. New hires takes the perceived job
satisfaction into consideration.
Profit Sharing as Percentage of Salary[vendor, department]=ZIDZ(Expected Profit Sharing per
Employee[vendor,department], Average Salary[vendor]) * 100
Dimensionless
Profit sharing as percentage of the average salary of employees.
Profit Sharing per Employee[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ(Profit Sharing Amount[vendor],Total Employees[vendor])
$/Person/Year
Profit sharing amount in dollars per employee in each department.
Reference Employee Ownership Stake Relative to Salary=1
Year
Used to normalized the table function.




Reported Average Job Attractiveness[vendorl=SUM(Reported Job Attractiveness[vendordepartment!I *Total
Employees per Department[vendordepartment!])/SUM(Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment!])
Dimensionless
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Average job attractiveness for all employees from all departments.
Reported Job Attractiveness[vendor, department]=SMOOTH(Job Attractiveness for Existing
Employees[vendor,department],Reporting Time for Job Attractiveness[vendor])
Dimensionless
Reporting Time for Job Attractiveness[vendor]=Function of Reporting Time for Job Attractiveness(Total
Employees[vendor]/Reference Employees for Reporting Time)
Year
The time it takes to survey and report job attractiveness of existing
employees is a function of the number of total employees.
Sensitivity of Burnout Effect= 1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Employee Ownership=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Financial Compensation=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Option Grants=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.11
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Participation=0
Dimensionless [0,2,0.11
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness from Profit Sharing=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Sensitivity of Job Attractiveness on Workweek=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Sensitivity of Layoff Effect=1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.1]
Time to Adjust Expected Profit Sharing=0.5
Year
Time to Forget Past Layoff=0.5
Year
It takes half an year to forget about past layoff. This captures the
negative effect of layoff (job insecurity) persists a certain time after the time of layoff.
Time to Perceive Job Satisfaction=0.5
Year
It takes 6 months to for outside job applicants to perceive job
satisfaction from inside the company.
Value of Average Employee Shares Outstanding[vendor, department]=Average Employee Shares
Outstanding[vendor,depa rtment]*Stock Price[vendor]
$/Person





The time period over which fatigue and burnout develop and dissipate.
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Change in Average Workweek[vendordepartment]=( Current Workweek[vendordepartment] - Recent Average
Workweek[vendor,department] ) / Burnout Time[vendor]
Hours/(Year*week)
The average workweek is an exponential moving average of the work week.
Active only after the firm begins operations.
Current Workweek[vendordepartment]=Normal Workweek*Effect of Work Pressure on Workweek(Work
Pressure[vendordepartment])*Effect of Job Attractiveness on Workweek[vendor, department]
Hours/week
The workweek is determined by schedule pressure, which is the ratio of the
staff needed in a given department to the staff available in that
department. Workweek is a nonlinear function of schedule pressure.
Desired Work Effort[vendorsales] = Desired Grantseeking Effort by Department[vendorsales] + Required VC Financing
Effort by Department[vendorsales] + Required Experienced Employee Time for Coaching Rookies[vendorsales] +
Desired Sales Effort[vendor]
Desired Work Effort[vendorengineer] = Desired Grantseeking Effort by Department[vendorengineer] + Required VC
Financing Effort by Department[vendor,engineer] + Required Experienced Employee Time for Coaching
Rookies[vendor,engineer] + Desired Engineering Effort[vendor]
Hours* Person/Year
Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor] = Normal Discount Rate for Compensation + Expected Layoff or Failure
Hazard Rate[vendor]
1/Year
The discount rate used to value the NPV of total compensation. Assumes a
normal discount rate to capture the time value of money and a risk premium
based on the probability of being laid off or of the firm failing.
Effect of Work Pressure on Workweek([(O,O)-(4,2)],(0,0.6),(0.25,0.65),(0.5,0.7 5),(0.7 5,0. 87 ),(1,1),(1.25 ,1.15),
(1.5,1.28),(1.75,1.39),(2,1.48),(2.25,1.57),(2.5,1.62),(2.75,1.66),(3,1.68),(4,1.7))
Dimensionless
The workweek as it depends on schedule pressure. There are minimum and
maximum limits on the workweek.
Expected Layoff or Failure Hazard Rate[vendor=xIDZ ( Normal Layoff or Failure Hazard Rate, Relevant Liquidity for
Hazard Rate[vendor], le+006)
1/Year
The hazard rate (per year) that the firm will fail or lay off its
employees. Rises as perceived liquidity falls. For simplicity we assume
the annual hazard rate of failure is a normal rate divided by perceived
liquidity, that is, the hazard rises in inverse proportion to liquidity.
Expected per Share Option Value[vendordepartment] = Average Strike Price of Non Vested
Options[vendor,department] * Option Value as Fraction of Strike Price[vendordepartment]
$/share
The per share value of the non vested options of each employee is a
function of the difference between the expected share price and the
average strike price of their non vested options. The function represents
the subjective valuation, in the minds of employees, of the option value
(roughly the Black-Schools value but potentially biased by employee
optimism about future share value or volatility.
Expected Present Value of Stock Options[vendordepartment] = Expected Value of Non Vested Stock
Options[vendor,department] * exp ( - Discount Rate for Total Compensation[vendor] * Vesting
Period[vendor,departmentl )
$/Person
The present value of the average employee's non vested option holdings.
Discounted at a specified rate over the vesting period: the higher the
discount rate or longer the vesting period, the lower the present value of the options held.
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Expected Value of Non Vested Stock Options[vendordepartment] = Expected per Share Option
Value[vendor,department] * Non Vested Options per Employee[vendordepartment]
$/Person
This variable calculated the value of a typical employees non vested
options if they were converted today. Only the value of non vested options
matters to the quit decision since those with vested options can exercise
them even after they leave the firm.
Fractional Option Value[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( ( Expected Stock Price[vendor] - Average Strike Price of Non
Vested Options[vendordepartment] ) , Average Strike Price of Non Vested Options[vendordepartment)
Dimensionless
The current average of non vested options relative to the average strike
price. Zero if no options are issued.
Function for Expected Option Value([(-1,0)-(3,3)],(-1,0),(-0.5,0.05),(0,0.25),(0.5,0.6),(1,1),(2,2),(1000,1000))
Dimensionless
Function for the subjective valuation by employees of their stock options.
When stock options are in the money, employees value them close to the
current value. As they begin to go underwater, the subjective value
gradually declines to zero.
Normal Discount Rate for Compensation = 0.05
1/Year
The normal discount rate for total compensation represents the time value of money.
Normal Layoff or Failure Hazard Rate = 0.1
1/Year
The normal hazard rate of layoff or business failure, per year.
Normal Workweek=40
Hours/week
The standard workweek is assumed to be 40 hours.
Option Value as Fraction of Strike Price[vendordepartment] = Function for Expected Option Value( Fractional Option
Value[vendor,departme nt] )
Dimensionless
The option value (relative to the average strike price of the non vested
options outstanding) is a function of the difference between the current
stock price and the strike price. This function represents the employee's
subjective valuation of the options, and roughly follows the Black-Schools concept.
Recent Average Workweek[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Change in Average Workweek[vendordepartment] , Normal
Workweek)
Hours/week
The recent average workweek, used to indicate fatigue and burnout due to
sustained high work hours.
Reference Present Value of Total Compensation[department]=Reference Total Compensation[department] / ( Normal
Discount Rate for Compensation + Normal Layoff or Failure Hazard Rate)
$/Person
The reference level for the expected present value of total compensation.
Represents the employees' aspiration for the present value of their salary
and non vested options. Computed as the NPV of the reference total annual
compensation employees desire, discounted at a rate that measures the time
value of money plus the normal probability of layoff or business failure people assess.
Time to Perceive Work Pressure = 0.083333
years
The time required to recognize and react to changes in the balance between
the work effort required and the work effort available.
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Expected Value of Non Vested Stock Grants[vendor, department]=Expected Stock Price[vendor] * exp (-Discount Rate
for Total Compensation[vendorl*Stock Grant Vesting Period[vendordepartment])
$/share
Relevant Liquidity for Hazard Rate[vendor]=MIN(1, Perceived Liquidity[vendor])
Dimensionless
Liquidity relevant for affecting hazard rate is when liquidity is lower
than 1. When >1, hazard rate stays at the normal rate.
Salary as Percentage of Industry Average[vendor]=100
Dimensionless [50,150,11
Startup's compensation as a fraction of the industry average. 1 means the
same as the industry average.
Value of Company Mission to Employees[vendordepartment]=Reference Total Compensation[department]*Value of
Company Mission to Employees Relative to Reference Compensation[vendordepartment]
$/(Year*Person)
Intrinsic value of working for a company dedicated to environmental
sustainability expressed in dollar terms.
Value of Company Mission to Employees Relative to Reference Compensation[startup,department]=0
Value of Company Mission to Employees Relative to Reference Compensation[incumbent,department]=0
Dimensionless [0,1]
Value of company mission to employees as a fraction of reference
compensation. This is to capture the idea that people may be willing to
work for a green company for a lower financial compensation, or for the
same compensation, green company may be able to attract a higher quality
people. Only effective for green startups and none for incumbent.
Average Salary[vendor]=ZDZ(Salary Expense[vendor], Total Employees[vendor])
$/(Year*People)
Average salary equals the total salary expense divided by total employees.
Required Experienced Employee Time for Coaching Rookies[vendordepartment]=Rookie
Employees[vendor,department] * Normal Work Hours per Year
* Fraction of Experienced Employee Time Needed per Rookie
Hours* Person/Year
Each rookie requires a certain amount of coaching, training and mentoring.
The total person-hours of effort needed to do so depends on the total
number of rookies and the fraction of an FTE experienced persons' time
needed to provide the required amount of coaching.
Work Pressure[vendordepartment] = SMOOTHI ( Indicated Work Pressure[vendor,department] , Time to Perceive
Work Pressure , 1)
Dimensionless
It takes employees a short time to perceive and react to changes in the
balance between the work to be done and the effective work effort
available..
Stock Grant Vesting Period[vendor,department] = 3
Year
The average vesting period for restricted stock grants.
Reference Total Compensation[department]=100000
$/(Year*Person)
The annual value of total compensation employees expect to earn. $100,000 base salary.
Stock Granted for Existing Employees as Percentage of Industry Compensation[vendor]=0
Dimensionless [0,200,51
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Stock Granted per Existing Employee[vendordepartment]=Value of Stock Granted per Existing
Employee[vendor,department]/MAX(1,Stock Price[vendor]) * Switch for Stock Grants
sha res/(Year* Person)
Shares granted per existing employees equals the total value of stock
granted per employees ($/year*person) divided by the stock price
($/share), capped at minimum stock price = 1 to prevent extremely large
shares granted when stock price is infinitely small.
Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment] = Experienced Employees[vendordepartment] + Rookie
Employees[vendor,department]
People
Total employees by department.
Desired Options Granted per Employee per Year as Basis Point of Shares Outstanding[vendor]= GAME (0)
1/Person/Year [0,100,1]
Options granted per employee per year calculated as the basis point of the
total shares outstanding. This measure is used to make the options granted
more meaningful (than the absolute number of options) as it compares
relative to the total shares.
Expected Stock Price[vendor] = SMOOTH ( Stock Price[vendor] , Time for Adjust Expectations for Stock Price)
$/share
Employees' expectations about the future stock price, which are used here
to affect their decision to remain with the firm or quit, adjust slowly to
the actual price (the decision to quit is not based on short term changes in share values).
Time for Adjust Expectations for Stock Price = 0.25
years
The time period over which employees' expectations for the share price
change (used to affect their decision to quit or remain with the firm).
Average Strike Price of Non Vested Options[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( Total Basis of Non Vested
Options[vendor,department] , Non Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment])
$/share
The average basis cost of nonvested options is the total of all strike
prices divided by the number of non vested options outstanding. Set to
zero if there are no non vested options.
Cumulative Options per Employee as Basis Point of Shares Outstanding[vendor]=ZIDZ ( Cumulative Options per
Employee[vendor] , Total Shares Outstanding[vendor] )*Basis Point
1/Person
The number of options held by employees as a fraction of the total number
of existing shares. Zero prior to entry.
Non Vested Options per Employee[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( Non Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] ,
Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment]
shares/Person
Average non vested options per employee is the ratio of total non vested
employees to employees (by department).
Vesting Period[vendordepartment] = 3
Year
The average vesting period for options.
Required VC Financing Effort by Department[vendor,department]=Required VC Financing Effort[vendorl*Proportion of
Feasible VC Financing Effort by Department[vendordepartment]
Person* Hours/Year
Desired VC financing effort is assumed to come from sales and engineer proportionally.
**** ****************************** *********** ***********
.Operating and System Costs
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Energy and Operating Costs[vendor]=Energy Costs[vendor]+Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendor]
$/Year/Unit
Energy and Operating Costs as Fraction of Incumbent[vendor]=Energy and Operating Costs[vendor]/Energy and
Operating Costs[incumbent]
Dimensionless
Energy and Operating Costs Shortfall as Fraction of lncumbent[vendor]=Energy and Operating Costs as Fraction of
Incumbent[vendor]-Targeted Energy and Operating Costs as Fraction of Incumbent[vendor]
Dimensionless
Incumbent Feature Growth Percentage=0
Dimensionless [0,1001
Initial Feature Relative to Incumbent=4
Dimensionless [0,10]
Initial Incumbent Feature Value=lnitial Feature Value[incumbent]
Features
Switch for Product Development[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE(Energy and Operating Costs Shortfall as Fraction of
Incumbent[vendor>0, 1, 0)
Dimensionless
Targeted Energy and Operating Costs as Fraction of Incumbent[vendor=0
Dimensionless
Amortized Capital Cost[vendor]=Switch for Lump Sum Payment * Consumer Price After Subsidy[vendor] * Fractional
Annualized Capital Cost + Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendor] + ( 1 - Switch for Lump Sum Payment) * Annualized
Purchase Price[vendor] + Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendorl
$/Year/Unit
Switch = 1 if annualized capital cost is calculated as ..... Switch = 0 if
annualized capital cost equals annualized price of the product plus the maintenance billing.
Annualized Purchase Price[vendor]=Consumer Price After Subsidy[vendor] / Product Useful Life
$/Year/Unit
Effect of Functionality on Energy Use[vendor] = Minimum Effect of Functionality on Energy Use
+ ( 1 - Minimum Effect of Functionality on Energy Use ) * Normalized Total Features
[vendor] A Sensitivity of Effect of Functionality on Energy Use
Dimensionless
Energy Costs[vendorl = Energy Price * Energy Use[vendor]
$/Year/Unit
Energy Intensity Reduction per Doubling of Features=0.5
Dimensionless
The reduction in the energy intensity of the product per doubling of
features. The larger this is, the faster energy intensity falls as the
features and functionality of the product improve.
"Energy, Operating and System Costs"[vendor]=Energy and Operating Costs[vendor]+ Amortized Capital Cost[vendor]
$/Year/Unit
Fractional Annualized Capital Cost = Discount Rate + ( 1 / Product Useful Life
1/Year
Minimum Effect of Functionality on Energy Use=0
277
Dimensionless




Sensitivity of Effect of Functionality on Energy Use = ( LN ( 1 - Energy Intensity Reduction per Doubling of Features ) /
LN ( 2) )
Dimensionless
The energy intensity of the product falls with feature development (one of
the key features is energy efficiency). Energy intensity falls according
to a standard learning curve.
Switch for Lump Sum Payment = 1
Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Feature Value[vendor] = Features[vendor,nonappropriable] * Nonappropriable Feature Multiple +
Features[vendor,appropriable]
Features
Value of combined appropriable and nonapprobriable features
**** ******************* *** ********** ********* ***********
.Price





The price of a traditional HVAC system for a building.




Initial Price[vendor] = ( 1 + Initial Markup Ratio ) * Initial Unit Cost[vendor]
$/Unit
The initial equilibrium price of the product. Set as an industry
parameter. The initial price for each firm may differ from this level
according to its supply/demand balance and other pressures. The initial
price = 0 before a firm enters.
Average Competitor Price[vendor] = SUM ( Price[vendor!] * Order Share[vendor!]
$/Unit
average price of all firms.
Change in Traditional Price[vendor] = ((Indicated Price[vendor] -Traditional Price(vendor] ) / Time to Adjust Expected
Price)
$/Unit/Year
Managers' beliefs about the underlying equilibrium price adjust in
response to the gap between the indicated price and the current
traditional price level. Expected underlying price adjusts via first-order
adaptive expectations to the actual price, constrained to be greater than
a minimum level. The Change in Traditional Price for New Entrant is zero
unless a firm enters after the start of the simulation. When a firm enters
after the start of the simulation the traditional price jumps to the level
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of the new entrant, determined by unit costs and other factors. If the
firm exits, the traditional price is set to zero through the Change in
Traditional Price on Exit.
Competitor Target Price Premium = 1
Dimensionless [0,2,0.05]
Competitors' target price premium relative to firm l's price.
Desired Price Premium Relative to Competition[startupl] = Our Target Price Premium
Desired Price Premium Relative to Competition[startup2] = Competitor Target Price Premium
Desired Price Premium Relative to Competition[incumbent] = Competitor Target Price Premium
Dimensionless
The fractional premium (if > 1) or discount (if < 1) the firm desires to
achieve relative to the competitor price.
Effect of Competitor Price on Price[vendor] = 1 + Sensitivity of Price to Competitor Price * ( Function for Effect of
Competitor Price on Price ( ZIDZ ( Indicated Price Relative to Competition[vendor] , Traditional Price[vendorl ) ) - 1)
Dimensionless
Price rises when indicated price relative to the competition exceeds the
firm's expected price. The strength of the effect is controlled by the sensitivity parameter.
Effect of Costs on Price[vendor] = 1 + Sensitivity of Price to Costs * ( Function for Effect of Costs on Price( ZIDZ ( Unit
Cost[vendor] , Traditional Price[vendor] ) ) - 1)
Dimensionless
Price responds to the gap between traders' beliefs about the underlying
equilibrium price and their beliefs about the costs of production. When
expected costs rise above the expected price, prices tend to rise, and
vice versa. Total unit costs include unit fixed and variable costs and the
expected level of indirect costs per unit. The function saturates for high
and low ratios of costs to the traditional price to ensure robustness.
Endogenous Price[vendor] = Traditional Price[vendor] * Effect of Costs on Price[vendor] * Effect of Competitor Price
on Price[vendor] * Company in Operation Switch[vendor] + Initial Price[vendor] * ( 1 - Company in Operation
Switch[vendor] )
$/Unit
When price is set endogenously it is based on the traditional price,
modified by various pressures including the level of price relative to
unit costs and the competitor price, the demand/supply balance, and the
firm's market share relative to its goal for market share.
Expected Competitor Price[vendor] = SMOOTHI (Average Competitor Price[vendor] , Time to Respond to Competitor
Price , Traditional Price[vendor]
$/Unit
Firm's beliefs about the prices of their competitors. Adjust to the actual
average competitor price with a lag representing the time required to
update perceptions and beliefs about competitor prices.
Function for Effect of Competitor Price on Price ( [(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,0.25),(0.2,0.33),(0.4,0.45),(0.6,0.6),(0.8,0.8),(1,1),(1.2,1.2),(1.4,1.4),(1.6,1.55),(1.8,1.67),(2,1.75))
Dimensionless
Function determining the impact of competitor prices on price. Linear in
the normal operating region, the function saturates for high and low ratios
of competitor price to the traditional price to ensure robustness.
Function for Effect of Costs on Price ( [(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,0.1),(0.2,0.2),(0.4,0.4),(0.6,0.6),(0.8,0.8),(1,1),(1.2,1.2),(1.4,1.4),(1.6,1.6),(1.8,1.7),(2,1.75)
Dimensionless
Function determining the impact of units costs on price. Linear in the
normal operating region, the function saturates for high and low ratios of
unit costs to the traditional price to ensure robustness.
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Indicated Price[vendor] = MAX ( Min Price[vendor] , Price[vendor]
$/Unit
Beliefs about the underlying equilibrium price are never less than a
minimum price level capturing the variable costs of goods.
Indicated Price Relative to Competition[vendor] = Expected Competitor Price[vendor] * ( Desired Price Premium
Relative to Competition[vendor]
$/Unit
The price indicated by expected competitor prices and the firm's desired
premium or discount relative to competitors.
Min Price[vendor] = Unit Cost[ve ndor] / ( 1 - Min Gross Margin[vendor])
Dollars/Unit
min price - unit cost = min price * min gross margin, rearrange terms to get min price.
Our Target Price Premium = GAME( 1)
Dimensionless [0,2,0.051
The fractional premium (if > 1) or discount (if < 1) the firm desires to
achieve relative to the competitor price.
Price as Fraction of Industry Average[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Price[vendor] , Average Competitor Price[vendor]
Dimensionless
Our price as a fraction of the industry average price. Use to signal how
far we are away from the average.
Price for Game=Unit Cost[startupl] * ( 1 + Price Markup for Game / 100)
$/Unit
When used in gaming mode this is the price of the product as the player
sets the price markup.
Price Markup for Game=30
Dimensionless
Price markup as % of the unit cost, set by the game player.
Sensitivity of Price to Competitor Price = 0.2
Dimensionless [0,1,0.05]
Strength of the impact of competitor prices on the firm's pricing decision.
Sensitivity of Price to Costs = 0.2
Dimensionless
Controls the response of price to discrepancies between the expected price
and the expected cost of production.
Time to Adjust Expected Price=5
Year
Trader's belief about the underlying equilibrium price adjust to actual prices over this period.
Time to Respond to Competitor Price = 0.5
Year [0,2]
The mean time required to update information and beliefs about competitor prices.
Traditional Price[vendor] = INTEG( Change in Traditional Price[vendor] , Initial Price[vendor]
$/Unit
The traditional price is the price managers believe would clear the market
if demand and supply were in balance, and no other pressures to change price existed.
Order Share[vendor]=ZIDZ(Firm Attractiveness[vendor], Total Firm Attractiveness)
Dimensionless
Firm's order share determined by its individual attractiveness comparing
with the sum of all firms' attractiveness.
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.Product Development




Maximum Feasible Feature Factor=10
Dimensionless





Avg amount of time a feature is useful for
Desired Feature Completion Rate[vendorfeaturetype] = MAX ( 0, Feature Shortfall[vendor,featuretype] / Desired Time
to Catch Up Features[vendor,featuretype] + Feature Obsolescence Rate[vendor,featuretype]
Features/Year
How many features we'd like to develop per month to obtain stock of
features we'd like (taking into account features we're losing from
obsolescence) -- allowed to go negative
Desired Time to Catch Up Features[vendor,featuretype] = 0.167, 0.333; 0.167, 0.333; 0.167, 0.333;
Year [0,80,0.1]
How soon we'd like our features to reach the desired level
Feature Under Development Adjustment Time[vendorfeaturetype] = 0.2
Year [0,10,0.1]
How long to take to adjust FUD to desired level
Initial Features per Type[startup,featuretype]=lncu mbent Features[featuretype]*Initial Feature Relative to Incumbent
Initial Features per Type[incumbent,featuretype]=lncumbent Features[featuretype]
Features [0,300,0.1]
Amount of features product has when firm starts compared to competitors. 110, 4; 110, 4; 110, 4
Nonappropriable Feature Multiple=10
Dimensionless
Avg multiple of value of appropriable features that nonapprobriable features have
initial Features[vendor] = SUM ( Initial Features per Type[vendorfeaturetype!]
Features
Feature Value Relative to Incumbent[vendor] = Feature Value[vendor] / Feature Value[incumbent]
Dmnl
Features of our company compared to incumbent (0 is no features, 1 is
equiv features to incumbent)
Adjustment for Feature Under Development[vendor,featuretype] = ( Desired Feature Under
Development[vendor,featuretypel - Product Features Under Development[vendorfeaturetype] ) / Feature Under
Development Adjustment Time[vendorfeaturetype]
Features/Year
How many features per month we need to add (or subtract) from FUD
Desired Feature Under Development[vendorfeaturetype] = Desired Feature Completion Rate[vendor,featuretype] *
Average Feature Development Time[vendor]
Features
How many features we need under development to maintain the rate of
feature development we desire
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Desired Features[startup,featuretype]= Maximum Feasible Features[startup,featuretype]
Desired Features[incumbent,featuretype]=MIN(Maximum Feasible Features[incumbent,featuretype],
Features[incumbent,featuretype] *(1+lncumbent Feature Growth Percentage/100))
Features
How many features we desire (based on how many features competitors have,
and how we want to compare to competitors)
Feature Completion Rate[vendor,featuretype] = Feature Completion Rate 3[vendor,featuretype]
Features/Year
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by
how many features were started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete
them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Obsolescence Rate[vendorfeaturetype] = Features[vendorfeaturetype] / Average Feature
Lifetime[vendor,featuretype]
Features/Year
Features that go out of date per month
Feature Shortfall [vendorfeaturetypel=(Desired Features[vendor,featuretype] - Features[vendor,featuretype])*Switch
for Product Development[vendor]
Features
How many features we're missing compared to what we desire.
Featu res[ve ndorfeatu retype] = INTEG( Feature Completion Rate [vendorfeaturetype] - Feature Obsolescence
Rate[vendor,featuretype] , Initial Features per Type[vendor,featuretype])
Features
Features of the product
Product Features Under Development[vendorfeaturetype] = INTEG( Feature Start Rate[vendor,featuretype] - Feature
Completion Rate [vendor,featuretype] , 0)
Features
Features that are being worked on by the engineering staff




Normal Adopter Generation Time Scale=0.1
Dimensionless
Normal Hot Prospect Generation Time Scale= 0.3
Dimensionless
Normal Prospect Generation Time Scale=0.1
Dimensionless
Potential Prospect Generation Time Scale=0.5
Dimensionless
Total Prospect Sales=Total Prospects*Unit Purchased per Adopter
Unit
Sum up all prospect sales contacted by each firm, since they call be
prospect sales for a firm, i.e. a firm a "steal" a prospect contacted by other firms.
Initial Adopters = 0
Prospects
The initial number of Adopters (active users of the product).
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Initial Hot Prospects = 0
Prospects
Initial Potential Prospects = 0
Prospects [0,100,101
Initial Prospects = 0
Prospects
Start with no prospects
Total Current Prospects[Firm]=Potential Prospects[Firm] + Potential Prospects[Firm] + Prospects[Firm] + Hot
Prospects[Firm]
Prospects
Total non purchasers and adopters.
Addressable Fraction of Population = SUM ( Firm Attractiveness[vendor!] ) / Total Attractiveness Including Alternative
Dimensionless
Addressable Fraction of Population is the sum of all startups over the
total including the incumbent.
Attractiveness of Current Practice=1
Dimensionless
Effect of Sales Effort on Adoptor Generation Rate[Firm,vendor] = Function for Prospect Generation Rate ( ZIDZ
Potential Adopter Generation Rate From Sales Effort[Firm,vendor] , Normal Adopter Generation Rate[Firm] ))
DmnI
Effect of Sales Effort on Hot Prospect Generation Rate on Potential Hot Prospect Generation[Firm] = Function for
Prospect Generation Rate ( ZIDZ ( Potential Hot Prospect Generation Rate From Sales Effort[Firm] , Normal Hot
Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] ) )
Dimensionless
Effect of Sales Effort on Poaches[customer] = Function for Prospect Generation Rate ( ZIDZ ( Potential Poaches From
Sales Effort[customer] , Normal Poaching Rate[customer]
Dimensionless
Effect of Sales Effort on Potential Prospect Generation = Function for Prospect Generation Rate ( ZIDZ ( Potential
Potential Prospect Generation Rate From Sales Effort , Normal Potential Prospect Generation Rate)
Dimensionless
Effect of Sales Effort on Prospect Generation Rate on Potential Prospect Generation[Firm] = Function for Prospect
Generation Rate ( ZIDZ ( Potential Prospect Generation Rate From Sales Effort[Firm] , Normal Prospect Generation
Rate[Firm] ) )
Dimensionless
Firm Specific Adopter Generation Rate[customervendorl = IF THEN ELSE ( customer <> vendor, Potential Adopter
Generation Rate[customervendor) * Order Share[vendor] , 0)
Firm Specific Adopter Generation Rate[Firm,none] = 0
Firm Specific Adopter Generation Rate[none,vendorl = Potential Adopter Generation Rate[none,vendor] * Order
Share[vendor]
Prospects/Year
Firm specific adopter generation rate [customer, vendor] is the adopter
generate rate switching from prospects currently adopting [customer] to
[vendorl's product. It is determined by the potential adopter generation
rate (induced by vendor firm's sales effort) times the [vendor]'s order
share. It is assumed that after prospects of [customer] being contacted by
[vendor], prospect [customer] compares all firms' attractiveness and
switch to [vendor] according to [vendor]'s relative attractiveness. The
rest drops out into lost prospects and no switching to other competitor
since direct sales effort is assumed to be needed to switch.
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Function for Prospect Generation Rate ( [(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,0),(0.25,0.33),(0.5,0.62),(0.75,0.85),
(1,1),(1.25,1.1),(1.5,1.17),(1.75,1.22),(2,1. 25)
Dimensionless
Fuzzy min function with maximum set at 1.25 times of normal prospect
generation rate.
Hot Prospect Generation Rate[customer] = Potential Hot Prospect Generation Rate[customer] * Prospect Generation
Fraction[customer]
Hot Prospect Generation Rate[nonej = Potential Hot Prospect Generation Rate[none]
Prospects/Year
Hot prospect loss rate[Firm] = SUM ( Potential Adopter Generation Rate[Firm,vendor!] - Firm Specific Adopter
Generation Rate[Firm,vendor!] )
Prospects/Year




Lost Prospect Regain Time = 1
Year
Amount of time before a lost prospect will reconsider becoming a prospect
Lost Prospects[Firm] = INTEG( Hot prospect loss rate[Firm] + Potential Prospect Loss Rate [Firm] + Prospect Loss
Rate[Firm] - Prospect Regain Rate(Firm] , 0)
Prospects
Former prospects who currently are not considering adopting the product
Normal Adopter Generation Time=Normal Adopter Generation Time Scale*Sales Cycle Time
Year [0,21
Minimum amount of time it takes to persuade a prospect to trial the product
Normal Hot Prospect Generation Time=Normal Hot Prospect Generation Time Scale*Sales Cycle Time
Year [0,1]
Average amount of time it takes to persuade a prospect to seriously consider purchasing
Normal Poach Time=10
Year [0,?]
Average amount of time it takes for an adopter to be poached by other firms.
Normal Potential Prospect Generation Time=Potential Prospect Generation Time Scale*Sales Cycle Time
Year [0,?]
Average amount of time it takes for a potential prospect to become aware
of product and become a prospect
Normal Prospect Generation Time=Normal Prospect Generation Time Scale*Sales Cycle Time
Year [0,1]
Average amount of time it takes for a potential prospect to become aware
of product and become a prospect
Percentage Growth Rate in Total Population=0
1/Year [0,20,1]
Percentage growth rate per year in the total population of firms in the target industry.
Poaches[customer] = Potential Poaches[customer] * Prospect Generation Fraction[customer]
Poaches[none] = 0
Prospects/Year
Population Growth=(Percentage Growth Rate in Total Population/100) * Total Population
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Prospects/Year
Potential Adopter Generation Rate[Firm,vendor]= Normal Adopter Generation Rate[Firm] * Effect of Sales Effort on
Adoptor Generation Rate[Firm,vendor]
Prospects/Year
The rate at which prospects convert to purchasers (or dropout and remain
with their current provider) is modeled using the fuzzy min function which
caps at 1.25 times of normal purchaser generation rate.
Potential Customers=MAX ( Initial Potential Customers, Indicated Adopters - Total Adopters and Prospects)
Prospects
Potential customer is determined by the addressable market less total
adopters and prospects. This is an auxiliary variable since it is fully
determined by indicated adopters and total adopters and prospects.
Potential Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] = Normal Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] * Effect of Sales Effort on
Hot Prospect Generation Rate on Potential Hot Prospect Generation[Firm]
Prospects/Year
The rate at which prospects convert to hot prospects (or dropout and
remain with their current provider) is modeled using the fuzzy min
function which caps at 1.25 times of normal hot prospect generation rate.
Potential Poaches[customerl = Normal Poaching Rate[customer] * Effect of Sales Effort on Poaches[customer]
Prospects/Year
The rate at which potential prospects convert to prospects (or dropout and
remain with their current provider) is modeled using the fuzzy min
function which caps at 1.25 times of normal prospect generation rate.
Potential Poaches From Sales Effort[customer] = SUM ( Sales Productivity[vendor!] * Sales Effort for Targeted
Adopters[customer,vendor!] )
Prospects/Year
Potential prospect generation from sales effort equals sales effort times its productivity.
Potential Potential Prospect Generation Rate From Sales Effort = SUM ( Sales Productivity[vendor!] * Effective Sales
Effort for Potential Customers[vendor!]
Prospects/Year
Potential prospect generation from sales effort equals sales effort times its productivity.
Potential Prospect Generation[none] = Normal Potential Prospect Generation Rate * Effect of Sales Effort on Potential
Prospect Generation
Potential Prospect Generation[customer] = 0
Prospects/Year
Potential Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] = Normal Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] * Effect of Sales Effort on Prospect
Generation Rate on Potential Prospect Generation [Firm]
Prospects/Year
The rate at which potential prospects convert to prospects (or dropout and
remain with their current provider) is modeled using the fuzzy min
function which caps at 1.25 times of normal prospect generation rate.
Potential Prospect Generation Rate From Sales Effort[Firm] = SUM ( Sales Productivity[vendor!] * Sales Effort for
Targeted Potential Prospects[Firm,vendor!]
Prospects/Year
Potential prospect generation from sales effort equals sales effort times
its productivity, summing from all vendors.
Potential Prospect Loss Rate[Firm] = Potential Prospect Generation Rate[Firm) - Prospect Generation Rate[Firm]
Prospects/Year
Those potential prospects exposed to sales effort who do not become
prospects become lost prospects.
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Prospect Generation Fraction[vendor] = 1 - Order Share[vendor]
Dimensionless
The fraction of potential prospects converting to prospects is the sum of
the fractions choosing one of the startups, which is the complement of the
fraction choosing to stay with the incumbent.
Prospect Generation Rate[customer] = Potential Prospect Generation Rate[customer] * Prospect Generation
Fraction [customer]
Prospect Generation Rate[none] = Potential Prospect Generation Rate[none]
Prospects/Year
Prospect Loss Rate[Firm] = Potential Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] - Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm]
Prospects/Year
Those prospects exposed to sales effort who do not become hot prospects become lost prospects.
Prospect Regain Rate[Firm] = Lost Prospects[Firm] / Lost Prospect Regain Time
Prospects/Year
Rate at which lost prospects become potential prospects again.
Sales Effort for Targeted Adopters[customervendor] = Effective Sales Effort for Poaching[vendor] * Share of Targeted
Adopters[customer]
Person* Hours/Year
Sales effort by [vendor] that targets potential prospects [Firm].
Sales Effort for Targeted Hot Prospects[Firm,vendor] = Effective Sales Effort for Hot Prospects[vendor] * Share of
Targeted Hot Prospects[Firm]
Person* Hours/Year
Sales effort by [vendor] that targets hot prospects [Firm].
Sales Effort for Targeted Potential Prospects[Firm,vendor] = Effective Sales Effort for Potential Prospects[vendor] *
Share of Targeted Potential Prospects[Firm]
Person*Hours/Year
Sales effort by [vendor] that targets potential prospects [Firm].
Sales Effort for Targeted Prospects[Firm,vendorl = Effective Sales Effort for Prospects[vendor] * Share of Targeted
Prospect[Firm]
Person*Hours/Year
Sales effort by [vendor] that targets hot prospects [Firm].|
Share of Targeted Adopters[customerl = ZIDZ ( Adopters[customer] , Total Adopters)
Dimensionless
Share of Targeted Hot Prospects[Firm] = ZIDZ ( Hot Prospects[Firm] , Total Hot Prospects)
DmnI
Share of Targeted Potential Prospects[Firm] = ZIDZ ( Potential Prospects[Firm] , Total Potential Prospects)
Dimensionless
Share of Targeted Prospect[Firm] = ZIDZ ( Prospects[Firm] , Total Prospects)
Dmnl
The share of prospects currently using [Firm] firm's product out of total prospects.
Total Adopters = SUM ( Adopters[customer!]
Prospects
Sum of all potential prospects, including the existing and new.
Total Adopters and Prospects = SUM ( Total Prospects and Adopters by Firm[Firm!]
Prospects
The total existing population of prospects who have adopted any one of the
products from incumbent or startups is the sum of all those in the
existing prospect chain, including adopters.
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Total Attractiveness Including Alternative = SUM ( Firm Attractiveness[vendor!] ) + Attractiveness of Current Practice
Dimensionless
Total Hot Prospects = SUM ( Hot Prospects[Firm!])
Prospects
Sum of all hot prospects.
Total Lost Prospects = SUM ( Lost Prospects[Firm!]
Prospects
The sum of all lost prospects by their current provider status.
Total Potential Prospects = SUM ( Potential Prospects[Firm!]
Prospects
Sum of all potential prospects, including the existing and new.
Total Prospects = SUM ( Prospects[Firm!]
Prospects
Sum of all hot prospects.
Total Population = INTEG( Population Growth, Initial Population)
Prospects
Total population grows at an exogenous rate.
.Salary
Average Salary by Department[vendordepartment]=xIDZ(Salary Expense per Department[vendordepartment],Total
Employees per Department[vendordepartment],Reference Total Compensation[department])
$/Year/People
Average yearly cost per employee is determined by the total salary divided
by total employee in each department.
Rookie Salary[vendor, department]=Experienced Salary[vendordepartment]*Rookie Compensation Relative to
Experienced
$/(Year*People)
Employee Proportion by Department[vendordepartmentl = ZIDZ ( Total Employees per
Department[vendor,department] , Total Employees[vendor])
Dimensionless
Proportion of workforce made up of people from each department.
Rookie Compensation Relative to Experienced=0.667
Dimensionless
The fraction of the compensation of an experienced employee paid to a new hire.
Salary Expense per Department[vendordepartment]=Rookie Employees[vendordepartmentl * Rookie
Salary[vendor,departmentl + Experienced Employees[vendordepartment] * Experienced Salary[vendordepartment]
Dollars/Year
Total Loaded Salary for entire company by department.
Sales Force Fraction[vendor,sales] = ZIDZ ( Total Employees per Department[vendorsales] , Total Employees[vendor]
Dimensionless
Total sales employees as a fraction of total work force.
Value of Options Granted for Existing Employees[vendor] = SUM ( Value of Options Granted per Existing




Effective Sales Effort[vendor]=Rookie Effective Work Effort[vendor,sales]+Experienced Work Effort for Non
Administrative Work[vendorsales]
Person* Hours/Year
Effort devoted to sales after allocated to grant and VC applications.
Effective Sales Effort for Hot Prospects[vendor] = Fractional Sales Effort for Hot Prospects[vendor] * Effective Sales
Effort[vendor]
Persons*Hours/Year
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on decisions per month
Effective Sales Effort for Poaching[vendor] = Fractional Sales Effort for Poaching[vendor] * Effective Sales
Effort[vendor]
Person* Hours/Year
Effective Sales Effort for Potential Customers[vendor] = Fractional Sales Effort for Potential Customers[vendor] *
Effective Sales Effort[vendor]
Person*Hours/Year
Sales effort by [vendor] that targets potential prospects [Firm].
Effective Sales Effort for Potential Prospects[vendor] = Fractional Sales Effort for Potential Prospects[vendor] *
Effective Sales Effort[vendor]
Persons*Hours/Year
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on persuasion per month
Effective Sales Effort for Prospects[vendor] = Fractional Sales Effort for Prospects[vendorl * Effective Sales
Effort[vendor]
Persons*Hours/Year
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on persuasion per month
Hot Prospects[Firm] = INTEG( Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] - Hot prospect loss rate[Firm] - SUM ( Firm Specific
Adopter Generation Rate[Firm,vendor!] ) Initial Hot Prospects)
Prospects
Prospects who have been qualified to be more likely to purchase and/or are trialing the product
Potential Adopter Generation Rate From Sales Effort[Firm,vendor] = Sales Effort for Targeted Hot
Prospects[Firm,vendorl * Sales Productivity[vendor]
Prospects/Year
Potential purchaser generation from sales effort equals sales effort times its productivity.
Potential Hot Prospect Generation Rate From Sales Effort[Firm] = SUM ( Sales Effort for Targeted
Prospects[Firm,vendor!] * Sales Productivity[vendor!])
Prospects/Year
Potential hot prospect generation from sales effort equals sales effort times its productivity.
Potential Prospects[Firml = INTEG( Potential Prospect Generation[Firm] + Poaches[Firm] + Prospect Regain Rate[Firm]
- Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] - Potential Prospect Loss Rate[Firm] , Initial Potential Prospects)
Prospects
Potential prospects [X] are adopters who use X's product but are potential
prospects targeted by other competitor firms.
Prospects[Firml = INTEG( Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] -Hot Prospect Generation Rate[Firm] - Prospect Loss
Rate[Firm] , Initial Prospects )
Prospects
Potential customers that have been selected to apply sales effort to persuade to trial the product.
Fractional Sales Effort for Hot Prospects[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Total Normal Purchase Rate * Hot Prospect Emphasis
Multiplier[vendor] , Weighted total prospects[vendor])
Dimensionless [0,11
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Percent of effort of sales people applied to persuading prospects to seriously consider purchasing
Fractional Sales Effort for Poaching[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Total Normal Poaching Rate * Poaching Emphasis
Multiplier[vendor] , Weighted total prospects[vendor])
Dimensionless
Fraction of sales effort to make sure purchasers start using product
Fractional Sales Effort for Potential Customers[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Normal Potential Prospect Generation Rate
* Potential Customers Emphasis Multiplier[vendorl , Weighted total prospects[vendor])
Dimensionless
Fractional Sales Effort for Potential Prospects[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Total Normal Prospect Generation Rate
* Potential Prospects Emphasis Multiplier[vendor] , Weighted total prospects[vendor])
Dimensionless
Percent of sales effort devoted to converting potential prospects to prospects
Fractional Sales Effort for Prospects[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Total Normal Hot Prospect Generation Rate *
Prospect Emphasis Multiplier[vendor] , Weighted total prospects[vendorl
Dimensionless [0,1]
Percent of effort of sales people applied to persuading prospects to trial
******* *********** *** ******* **** ******* ** **** ********* **
.Sales Productivity
Competition Shock Startup Time=6
Year [0,15,11




Sales Productivity[vendor]=Normal Sales Productivity*Firm Attractiveness[vendor]
Prospects/(Person* Hour)
Sales productivity is boosted by firm attractiveness. The more attractive
the product is, the more productive sales rep is.
Normal Sales Productivity=(Reference Sales Effort Productivity-Sales Productivity Change from Shock)/(Sales Cycle
Time/Reference Sales Cycle Time)
Prospects/(Person*Hour)
Reference sales productivity is determined by the reference sales cycle
time of 1 year, i.e. sales productivity given 1 year sales cycle. When one
shorten sales cycle time, normal sales productivity increases
proportionally, i.e. sales effort is more productive with a shorter sales cycle.
Effect of Firm Attractiveness on Sales Productivity[vendor]=1 + ( Maximum Effect of Firm Attractiveness on Sales
Productivity - 1) * Sensitivity of Firm Attractiveness on Sales Productivity*Firm Attractiveness[vendor]
Dimensionless
The higher the attractiveness, the higher the sales productivity, capped at the max effect.
Maximum Effect of Firm Attractiveness on Sales Productivity=1.2
Dimensionless
The maximum increase in sales productivity from feature, relative to the
value of sales productivity in the situation where there is no feature.
Reference Sales Cycle Time=1
Year





Sales Cycle Time determines the normal time it takes to move sales.
However, the actual sale rate is determined by sales productivity. A short
sales cycle can be represented by a high sales productivity + short sales
cycle time together, so one is how long it take to move sales by sales
people, the other is the normal rate.
Firm Attractiveness[startupl]=Firm Attractiveness from Payback Period[startupl]* Firm Attractiveness from Customer
Support[startupl] *Firm Attractiveness from WOM [startupl]* Firm Attractiveness from Marketing Effort[startupl]
Firm Attractiveness[startup2]=Firm Attractiveness from Payback Period[startup2] *Firm Attractiveness from Customer
Support[startup2]*Firm Attractiveness from WOM [startup2]* Firm Attractiveness from Marketing
Effort[startup2]*Company in Operation Switch[startup2]
Firm Attractiveness[incumbent]=lncumbent Firm Attractiveness
Dimensionless
Attractiveness depends on various factors such as total operating and
system costs (which is driven by better product development and lower
amortized capital cost from lower price), customer support, WOM and
marketing. Attractiveness is zero if Company in Operation Switch is turned off.
Reference Sales Effort Productivity=0.043
Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,0.1,0.0011
Sales effort productivity attained at the reference sales experience level.
********************************************* ***********
.Shares Outstanding
* * * ** * ** ********************* *** * ******* * ***************~
Total Former Employee Shares[vendor]=SUM(Former Employee Shares[vendordepartment!])
shares
Former Employee Net Worth[vendor]=Market Capitalization[vendor]*Percentage of Former Employee
Ownership[vendor]/100
Percentage of Former Employee Ownership[vendor]=Total Former Employee Shares[vendor]/Total Shares
Outstanding[vendor]*100
Dimensionless
Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor]=Net Income Before Profit Sharing[vendor]-Profit Sharing Amount[vendor]
$/Year
Net income after subtracting profit sharing.
Gross Profit[vendor] = Revenue[vendor] - Billing for COGS[vendor]
$/Year
Gross profit is the difference between revenue and COGS.
TIME STEP = 0.0625
Year [0,?]
The time step for the simulation.
Financing Required[vendor] = MAX ( 0, Adjustment to Financing for Cash[vendor] - Cash Flow Before
Financing[vendor] )
$/Year
The financing the firm requires is (nonnegative part of) the amount needed
to adjust the cash balance to the target level less the firm's cash flow
before financing. Note that we do not model the possibility of share
buybacks (financing required is constrained to be nonnegative).
290
Expected Long Run Return on Sales[vendor] = SMOOTH3i ( Indicated Industry Return on Sales[vendor] , Time to Adjust
Expected Long Run Return on Sales , Initial Expected Return on Sales)
Dimensionless
Investors' expectation for operating profit as a fraction of sales revenue
in the long run. Adjusts gradually from the initial level to the indicated level.
Expected Present Value of Profit[vendor] = MAX ( 0, Expected Net Income[vendor] ) / Growth Adjusted Discount
Factor[vendor]
The expected present value of the firm's profit is the net present value
of expected net income, adjusted for future expected growth. The growth
adjusted discount factor is based on the discount rate for earnings,
adjusted to reflect investors' expectations for future growth in earnings.
Constrained to be nonnegative (in the case where expected net income is
negative, such as when the firm consistently loses money).
Growth Adjusted Discount Factor[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE ( Discount Rate - Expected Growth in Revenue[vendor] >
0.04, Discount Rate - Expected Growth in Revenue[vendor] , 0.04 * exp ( Sensitivity of Valuation to Rapid Growth *
Discount Rate - Expected Growth in Revenue[vendor] - 0.04))
1/Year
The discount rate used to value the expected earnings of the firm is a
nonlinear function of the discount rate and the expected rate of growth in
future earnings. Based on the formula for the NPV of an exponentially
growing earnings stream, E(0)/(d-g), where E(0) is current earnings, d
is the discount rate, and g is expected growth. The nonlinear function
keep the effective discount rate nonnegative when denominator < 0. The
minimum value of the function is the inverse of the maximum P/E ratio the
capital markets are willing to pay.
IPO Date[incumbent]=1000
IPO Date[startup]= GAME (1000)
Year [0,21,11
The date at which the company goes public by selling a substantial amount of its equity for cash.
Recent Sales Revenue[vendor] = SMOOTHI ( Revenue[vendor] , Financial Results Reporting Time , 0)
$/Year
Perceived Sales revenue. Actual sales revenue delayed by the time it takes
to report financial results.
Shares Outstanding[vendor]= INTEG (IPO Shares[vendor]+New Shares Issued to Public[vendor]+Shares Issued to
VCs[vendor]+Shares to Employees from Option Exercise[vendor]+Shares to Employees from Stock Grants[vendor],
Founders Shares Outstanding[vendor])
shares
The number of shares outstanding increases when new shares are issued for
fundraising purposes, or when employees exercise options.
Market Capitalization[vendorl = MAX ( Breakup Value[vendor] , Expected Present Value of Profit[vendor] * Pre IP0
Discount[vendor] ) * Company in Operation Switch[vendor]
The market value of the firm is the greater of the expected present value
of future profits or the breakup value of the firm. Expected profits are
discounted prior to the IPO.
Public Shares Outstanding[vendor] = INTEG( Increase in Public Shares[vendor] , 0)
shares
Total Employee Shares Outstanding from Stock Grants[vendor]=SUM(Employee Shares[vendordepartment!])
shares
Increase in Public Shares[vendor]=IPO Shares[vendor] + New Shares Issued to Public[vendor]
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shares/Year
Average Employee Net Worth[vendor]=ZDZ(Employee Net Worth[vendor], Total Employees[vendor])
$/Person
EO Error[vendor]=Percentage of Employee Ownership[vendor]-Percentage of Employee Stock Grants[vendor]-
Percentage of Exercised Options[vendor]-Percentage of Employee Options[vendor]
Dimensionless
Founders Shares Outstanding for Game Display[vendor]=Founders Shares Outstanding[vendor]
shares
IPO Likelihood[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE(Expected Present Value of Profit[vendor]>Funds to be Raised in IPO[vendor], 1,
0)
Dimensionless
When expected present value of profit is greater than the funds to be
raised in IPO, investors are willing to invest, IPO is likely to be
accepted by the market.
Shares Outstanding Plus Options[vendor]=Shares Outstanding[vendor]+Cumulative Employee Options[vendor]
shares
Shares Outstanding Error[vendorl=(Total Shares Outstanding[vendor]-Shares Outstanding Plus
Options[vendor])/Shares Outstanding Plus Options[vendor]
Dimensionless
Shares to Employees from Stock Grants[vendor]= SUM (Stock Grants Vested[vendordepartment!])
shares/Year
Stock Valuation Factor for VC Financing=3
Dimensionless
This is the factor used to determine stock valuation for VC financing. The
internal stock price at the beginning is determined by the initial capital
the founders have, which does not reflect the full value of the firm. By
multiplying this factor, it reflects other valuation factor such as the
value of the technology the firm has.
Stock Valuation for VC Financing[vendor]=Stock Price[vendor]*Stock Valuation Factor for VC Financing
$/share
Earnings per Share[vendor] = Net Income Net of Profit Sharing[vendor] / Shares Outstanding[vendor]
$/(Year*shares)
Earnings per share is net income divided by the number of shares outstanding.





The number of shares outstanding when the company starts business.
Fraction of Financing from Equity[vendor] = Function for Fraction of Financing from Equity( ZIDZ ( Expected Present
Value of Profit[vendor] , Required Present Value of Profits[vendor]
Dimensionless
The fraction of financing required raised through stock sales to the
public declines as the market's expectations of the NPV of future profits
falls relative to the value investors require.
Function for Fraction of Financing from Equity ( [(,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.2,0),(0.4,0.05),(0.6,0.15),(0.8,0.9),(1,1),(100,1))
Dimensionless
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The firm's willingness to sell additional shares to the public falls as
the stock price drops relative to the indicated level.
Funds Raised From VCs[vendor]=Switch for VC Application Period[vendorl*Switch for Adequate VC Financing
Effort[vendor]*VC Decision Switch[vendor] * PULSE ( Time, 0) * MIN ( Available VC Financing[vendor], VC Financing
Asking Amount[vendor] ) / TIME STEP + Follow On Investments[vendor]
$/Year
Funds raised from VCs at the VC decision date is the lesser of what VCs
are willing to invest and what the firm is asking.
Funds to be Raised from Equity Sales[vendor]=Fraction of Financing from Equity[vendor] * Financing Required[vendor]
$/Year
The firm seeks to raise a fraction of its financing needs through sale of shares to the public.
Gross Margin per Share[vendor] = Gross Profit[vendor] / Shares Outstanding[vendor]
$/(Year*share)
The ratio of total gross margin to the number of shares outstanding.
Increase in Employee Shares from Exercised Options[vendor, department]=Options Exercised[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Increase in VC Shares[vendor] = Shares Issued to VCs[vendor]
shares/Year
Indicated Shares to be Issued at IPO[vendor]=ZIDZ ( Funds to be Raised in IPO[vendor], Stock Price[vendor])
shares
The number of shares sold to the public in the IPO. Determined by the
funds raised and the share price.
IPO Shares[vendor]=IPO Likelihood[vendor]*PULSE ( IPO Date[vendor] , TIME STEP) * Indicated Shares to be Issued at
IPO[vendor] / TIME STEP
shares/Year
The shares issued at the IPO date. The entire value of the IP0 is issues
in one time step.
Minimum Return on Sales for Valuation = 0.02
Dimensionless [0,0.1,0.011
The minimum return on sales investors would require to be willing to buy
secondary issues.
Minimum Returns Required at IPO = le+007
The minimum capital the firm needs to raise in their IPO.
New Shares Issued to Public[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Funds to be Raised from Equity Sales[vendor] , Stock Price[vendor] ) *
Switch to Allow Secondary Sales[vendor]
shares/Year
The firm issues shares to the public to finance its cash flow requirements
and maintain normal liquidity. Prior to the IPO, these shares represent
the equity sold to venture capitalists in private placements. After the
IPO they represent secondary public offerings.
Percentage of Employee Ownership[vendor]=Employee Shares Outstanding and Options[vendor] / Total Shares
Outstanding[vendor] * 100
Dimensionless
Employee ownership calculated from both employee shares from exercised
options and direct shares granted.
Percentage of Exercised Options[vendor]=Total Employee Shares Outstanding from Exercised Options[vendor]/ Total
Shares Outstanding [vendor] * 100
Dimensionless
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Employee ownership calculated from both employee shares from exercised
options and direct shares granted.
Percentage of Founders Ownership[vendor] = Founders Shares Outstanding[vendor] / Total Shares
Outstanding[vendor] * 100
Dimensionless
Percentage of Public Ownership[vendor] = Public Shares Outstanding[vendor] / Total Shares Outstanding[vendor] *
100
Dimensionless
Percentage of VC Ownership[vendor] = VC Shares Outstanding[vendor] / Total Shares Outstanding[vendor] * 100
Dimensionless
Price Earnings Ratio[vendor] = MAX ( 0, ZIDZ ( Stock Price[vendor] , Earnings per Share[vendor]
Year
The Price Earnings Ratio is the ratio of the stock price to earnings per
share. It is set to zero if earnings are zero or less.
Price over Gross margin Ratio[vendor] = MAX ( 0, ZIDZ ( Stock Price[vendor] , Gross Margin per Share[vendor] ))
Year
The ratio of the stock price to gross margin per share. Set to zero if gross margin is negative.
Required Present Value of Profits[vendor] = Recent Sales Revenue[vendorl * Return on Sales for Valuation[vendor] /
Growth Adjusted Discount Factor[vendor]
The market valuation the firm would have given recent sales and the
expected return on sales, and discounted by the growth adjusted rate. Does
not include the breakup value of the firm's assets.
Return on Sales for Valuation[vendor] = MAX ( Minimum Return on Sales for Valuation , Expected Long Run Return on
Sales[vendor] )
Dimensionless
The return on sales investors expect to be willing to buy shares.
Shares Issued to VCs[vendor]=ZIDZ ( Funds Raised From VCs[vendor] , Stock Valuation for VC Financing[vendor])
shares/Year
Shares to Employees from Option Exercise[vendor] = SUM ( Options Exercised[vendordepartment!]
shares/Year
The number of shares outstanding increases with the sum of the options
exercised by all types of employees.
Switch to Allow Secondary Sales[vendor] = IF THEN ELSE (Time > IPO Date[vendor] , 1, 0)
Dimensionless
Secondary sales cannot occur until after the firm has gone public.
VC Financing Asking Amount[vendor]= GAME (MAX(0, Financing Required[vendor]*Desired Years of Runway[vendor]))
$ [0,1e+007]
The amount a firm asks for from VC financing is the desired cash for the
desired years of runway which equals to financing required times desired
years of runway.
VC Shares Outstanding[vendor] = INTEG( Increase in VC Shares[vendor] , 0)
shares
Additional Funds to be Raised in IPO=0
Employee Net Worth[vendor]=Market Capitalization[vendor] *Percentage of Employee Ownership[vendor]/100
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Employee Shares Outstanding and Options[vendor]=Total Employee Shares Outstanding from Exercised
Options[vendor]+Total Employee Shares Outstanding from Stock Grants[vendor]+Cumulative Employee
Options[vendor]
shares
Founders Net Worth[vendor]=Market Capitalization[vendor]*Percentage of Founders Ownership[vendor]/100
Founder's net worth is the total market cap times its percentage of ownership.
Funds to be Raised in IPO[vendor]=MAX(Minimum Returns Required at IPO, VC Financing Asking
Amount[vendor]+Additional Funds to be Raised in IPO)
Percentage of Employee Stock Grants[vendor]=Total Employee Shares Outstanding from Stock Grants[vendor]/ Total
Shares Outstanding [vendor] * 100
Dimensionless
Employee ownership calculated from both employee shares from exercised
options and direct shares granted.
Public Net Worth[vendor]=Market Capitalization[vendor]*Percentage of Public Ownership[vendor]/100
VC Net Worth[vendor]=Market Capitalization[vendor]*Percentage of VC Ownershipfvendor]/100
Former Employee Shares[vendordepartment]= INTEG (Employee Shares Exiting[vendordepartment]-Repurchased
Employee Shares[vendor, department],0)
shares
Shares owned by ex-employees who leave the company.
Stock Price[vendor]= ACTIVE INITIAL (Market Capitalization[vendor) / Shares Outstanding[vendor],1)
$/share
The stock price per share is the firm's total market value divided by the
number of shares outstanding.
Employee Shares[vendordepartment]= INTEG (Stock Grants Vested[vendor,department]-Employee Shares
Exiting[vendor,department]+Repurchased Employee Shares[vendor, department], 0)
shares
The number of vested stock grants increases as non vested stock grants vest.
Stock Grants Vested[vendordepartment]=Non Vested Stock Grants[vendordepartment]/Stock Grant Vesting
Period[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Restricted stocks vest over an average vesting period. Stocks vest only if
the company is in operation.
Total Shares Outstanding[vendor]=Founders Shares Outstanding[vendor] + Employee Shares Outstanding and
Options[vendor] + VC Shares Outstanding[vendorl + Total Former Employee Shares[vendor] + Public Shares
Outstanding[vendor]
shares
Percentage of Employee Options[vendor]=Cumulative Employee Options[vendor]/Total Shares
Outstanding[vendor]*100
Dimensionless




Total Employees[vendor] = SUM ( Rookie Employees[vendordepartment!] + Experienced
Employees[vendor,department!])
People
Cumulative Employee Options[vendor] = SUM ( Non Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment!] ) + SUM ( Vested
Employee Options[vendor,department!]
shares
The sum of the options, vested and non vested, held by employees of all types.
Options Exercised[vendordepartment] = Fraction of Options Exercised[vendordepartment] * Vested Options Reaching
Expiration Date[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Employees exercise a fraction of their vested options approaching their expiration date.
Switch for Options = 1
Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Switch = 1 firm gives out options to both new and existing employees, 0 otherwise.
************************************ ****** *** ***********
.Stock Grants
Cost of Repurchased Employee Shares per Employee[vendor, department]=Stock Price[vendor] *Repurchased
Employee Shares per Employee[vendordepartmentl
$/(Year*People)
Costs of buying back employee shares per employee.
Employee Shares Exiting[vendor, department]=Total Quit Rate[vendordepartment]*Shares per
Employee[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
When employees quit, they take their vested stocks with them and become
non-employee owner of the shares assuming the company does not buy them back.
Former Employees[vendor, department]= INTEG (Experienced Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]+Experienced Quit
Rate[vendor,department]+Rookie Layoff Rate[vendordepartment]+Rookie Quit Rate[vendor,department],0)
People
Fraction of Repurchased Employee Shares Upon Termination[vendor]=0
Dimensionless [0,1,0.1]
fraction of employee shares sold back to company upon leaving the company.
Repurchased Employee Shares per Employee[vendor, department]=ZIDZ(Repurchased Employee
Shares[vendor,department], Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment])
shares/(Person*Year)
Annual repurchased shares from former employee per employee.
Shares per Former Employee[vendor, department]=ZIDZ(Former Employee Shares[vendordepartment], Former
Employees[vendor,department])
shares/Person
Repurchased Employee Shares[vendordepartment]=Employee Shares Exiting[vendordepartment]*Fraction of
Repurchased Employee Shares Upon Termination [vendor]
shares/Year
Number of employee shares sold back to company when employees leave the
company.
Rookie Hire Rate[vendordepartment]=( Employee Vacancies[vendordepartment] / Time to Fill Employee
Vacancies[vendor, department] ) * ( 1 - Bankruptcy Switch[vendor] ) * Company in Operation Switch[vendor]
Persons/Year
Hire sales people based on how many vacancies have been created and the
avg time to fill them
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Total Quit Rate[vendordepartment] = Experienced Quit Rate[vendordepartment] + Rookie Quit
Rate[vendor,department]
People/Year
The total quit rate is the sum of Rookies and Experienced Employees
leaving the firm, by department.
Initial Non Vested Stock Grants[vendordepartment]=Total Employees per Department[vendordepartmentl * Stock
Granted per Hire [vendordepartment]
shares
The number of nonvested options granted to each type of employee at the start of the simulation.
Non Vested Stock Grants[vendordepartment]= INTEG (Stock Grants Awarded[vendordepartmentl-Non Vested Stock
Grants Expiring[vendordepartment]-Stock Grants Vested[vendordepartment],Initial Non Vested Stock
Grants[vendor,department])
shares
The total number of non vested stocks held by employees. Increases as
stocks are awarded; decreases as stocks vest or expire on the attrition of employees.
Non Vested Stock Grants Expiring[vendor,department]= Non Vested Stock Grants per Employee[vendordepartment] *
Total Quit Rate[vendordepartmentl
shares/Year
Non vested options expire when the employees holding them leave the firm.
Each employee leaving reduces the stock of non vested options by the
average number of non vested options per employee.
Non Vested Stock Grants per Employee[vendor,department] = ZIDZ ( Non Vested Stock Grants[vendordepartment] ,
Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment])
shares/Person
Average non vested options per employee is the ratio of total non vested
employees to employees (by department).
Stock Granted per Hire[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( Target Value of Stock Grants for New Hires[vendordepartmentl ,
Stock Price[vendorl ) * Switch for Stock Grants
shares/Person
Each new hire should receive options worth the Target Value. The current
share price is used to determine the number of shares awarded. Zero if the share price is zero.
Stock Grants Awarded[vendordepartmentl = Stock Grants Awarded to New Hires[vendordepartment] + Stock Grants
Awarded to Existing Employees[vendor,departmentl
shares/Year
Stock grants are awarded to each new hire and, potentially, to each continuing employee.
Stock Grants Awarded to Existing Employees[vendordepartment]=Stock Granted per Existing
Employee[vendor,department] * Total Employees per Department[vendor,department]
shares/Year
Each employee receives a certain grant of options each year.
Stock Grants Awarded to New Hires[vendor,department) = Stock Granted per Hire[vendordepartment] * Rookie Hire
Rate[vendor,department]
shares/Year
Each new hire receives a certain number of options.
Switch for Stock Grants = 1
Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Switch = 1 firm gives out options to both new and existing employees, 0 otherwise.
Target Value of Stock Grants for New Hires[vendor,department] = 0
$/Person [0,?]
The target value of the option package for new hires. This is part of the
compensation package for employees and is assumed constant throughout the simulation.
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Shares per Employee[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( Employee Shares[vendordepartment] , Total Employees per
Department[vendor,department])
shares/Person
Average vested grants per employee is the ratio of total vested employees
to employees (by department).
Cost Sharing Switch = 0
Dimensionless [0,1,11







Number of Firms = 3
DmnI
startup : startupl,startup2
Value of Stock Granted per Existing Employee[vendordepartment]=Reference Total Compensation[department] *
Stock Granted for Existing Employees as Percentage of Industry Compensation[vendor] / 100
$/(Year*People)
Dollar value of the direct shares granted to employees as part of the compensation.
vendor : startupl,startup2,incumbent
Index
The model tracks three competing companies.




A basis point is 1/100 of 1%.
Cumulative Options per Employee[vendor]=Cumulative Employee Options[vendor]/Total Employees[vendor]
shares/Person
Desired Options Pool Fraction=0.15
Dimensionless [0,1,0.011
Indicated Time to Exhaust Options Pool=(1-Switch for Game)*Time to Exhaust Options Pool+Switch for Game*TIME
STEP
Year
Option Wealth[vendor]=Expected Stock Price[vendor]-Strike Price of New Options[vendor]
$/share
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Options Granted per Employee per Year as Basis Point of Shares Outstanding[vendor]=MIN(Desired Options Granted
per Employee per Year as Basis Point of Shares Outstanding[vendor],Remaining Basis Point for Granting Options per
Employee per Year[vendor])
1/Person/Year [0,100,1]
Options granted per employee per year calculated as the basis point of the
total shares outstanding. This measure is used to make the options granted
more meaningful (than the absolute number of options) as it compares
relative to the total shares.
Options Pool Fraction [vendor]=(Cumulative Employee Options[vendor]+Tota I Employee Shares Outstanding from
Exercised Options[vendorl)/Total Shares Outstanding[vendor]
Dimensionless
Percentage of Non Vested Options[vendor]=ZDZ(SU M(Non Vested Employee
Options[vendor,department!]),Cumulative Employee Options[vendorl)*100
Dimensionless
The fraction of non vested options among all outstanding options. Zero if there are no options.
Remaining Basis Point for Granting Options[vendor]=(Desired Options Pool Fraction-Options Pool
Fraction[vendor])*Basis Point
Dimensionless
Remaining Basis Point for Granting Options per Employee per Year[vendor]=Remaining Basis Point for Granting
Options[vendor/MAX(1, Total Employees[vendor])/Time to Exhaust Options Pool
1/(Person*Year)




1 = game is on. Model takes inputs from game player.
Experienced Compensation[vendordepartment]=O
$/(Year*Person)
The annual salary of an experienced employee. This is part of the
compensation package for employees and is assumed constant throughout the simulation.
Average Life of Vested Options[vendor] = 5
years
The average life of a vested option.
Average Strike Price of Vested Options[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( Total Basis of Vested Options[vendordepartment]
Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment])
$/share
The average strike price of vested options is the total of all strike
prices divided by the number of vested options outstanding. Set to zero if
there are no vested options.
Fraction of Options Exercised[vendordepartment] = IF THEN ELSE ( Stock Price[vendor] > Average Strike Price of
Vested Options[vendordepartment] , 1, 0)
Dimensionless
Options are exercised only if they are in the money.
Indicated Repricing of Non Vested Options[vendordepartment] = MAX ( 0, Average Strike Price of Non Vested
Options[vendor,department] - Stock Price[vendor] ) / Time to Reprice Options
$/(Year*share)
If the firm finds its employees' options are underwater they can elect to
reprice them to a lower strike price. Options are only repriced if the
Switch to Reprice Options is active and if they are underwater (that is,
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if the current stock price is less than the average strike price). The
adjustment time determines how quickly the firm reprices existing options.
Indicated Repricing of Vested Options[vendordepartment = MAX ( 0, Average Strike Price of Vested
Options[vendor,department] - Stock Price[vendor}) / Time to Reprice Options
$/(Year*share)
If the firm finds its employees' options are underwater they can elect to
reprice them to a lower strike price. Options are only repriced if the
Switch to Reprice Options is active and if they are underwater (that is,
if the current stock price is less than the average strike price). The
adjustment time determines how quickly the firm reprices existing options.
Initial Non Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] = ( Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment] ) *
Options Granted per Hire[vendordepartment]
shares
The number of nonvested options granted to each type of employee at the
start of the simulation.
Non Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Options Awarded[vendordepartment] - Options
Vesting[vendor,department] - Non Vested Options Expiring[vendordepartment] , Initial Non Vested Employee
Options[vendor,department])
shares
The total number of non vested options held by employees. Increases as
options are awarded; decreases as options vest or expire on the attrition of employees.
Non Vested Options Expiring[vendordepartment] = Non Vested Options per Employee[vendordepartment] * Total
Quit Rate[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Non vested options expire when the employees holding them leave the firm.
Each employee leaving reduces the stock of non vested options by the
average number of non vested options per employee.
Option Price Relative to Share Price = 1
Dimensionless
The ratio of the option strike price to the current share price. Options
are issued at par (100% of the current share price).
Options Awarded[vendordepartment] = Options Awarded to New Hires[vendordepartment] + Options Awarded to
Existing Employees[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Options are awarded to each new hire and, potentially, to each continuing employee.
Options Awarded to Existing Employees[vendor,department]=Options Granted per Existing Employee per Year[vendor]
* Total Employees per Department[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Each employee receives a certain grant of options each year.
Options Awarded to New Hires[vendordepartment] = Options Granted per Hire[vendordepartment\
] * Rookie Hire Rate[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Each new hire receives a certain number of options.
Options Granted for Existing Employees as Percentage of Compensation[vendor]= GAME (0)
Dimensionless [0,100]
Options Granted per Existing Employee per Year[vendor]=Shares Outstanding[vendor]*Options Granted per Employee
per Year as Basis Point of Shares Outstanding[vendor]/Basis Point
shares/(Year*Person) [0,10000,1000]
Options granted per existing employees is the total shares outstanding
times the options granted per employee as basis point of shares
outstanding. Dividing by 10,000 to convert the basis point measure.
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Options Granted per Hire[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( Target Value of Options for New Hires[vendordepartmentl ,
Stock Price[vendor] ) * Switch for Options
shares/Person
Each new hire should receive options worth the Target Value. The current
share price is used to determine the number of shares awarded. Zero if the
share price is zero.
Options Vesting[vendordepartment] = ( Non Vested Employee Optionslvendordepartment]/ Vesting
Period[vendordepartment] ) * Company in Operation Switch[vendor]
shares/Year
Options vest over an average vesting period. Options vest only if the company is in operation.
Percentage of Vested Options[vendor]=ZIDZ ( SUM ( Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] ) , Cumulative
Employee Options[vendorl )*100
Dimensionless
The fraction of vested options among all outstanding options. Zero if there are no options.
Repricing of Non Vested Options[vendor,department] = Switch to Reprice Options * Indicated Repricing of Non Vested
Options[vendor,department] * Non Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment]
$/Year
If the firm finds the options of its employees are significantly
underwater, they can choose to reprice the options at a lower strike price.
Repricing of Vested Options[vendor,department] = Switch to Reprice Options * Indicated Repricing of Vested
Options[vendor,department] * Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment]
$/Year
If the firm finds the options of its employees are significantly
underwater, they can choose to reprice the options at a lower strike price.
Strike Price of New Options[vendor] = Stock Price[vendor] * Option Price Relative to Share Price
$/share
Options are issued with a strike price set at a specified ratio to the current stock price.
Switch to Reprice Options = 0
Dimensionless [0,1,11
Switch to enable repricing of employee options that are underwater. 1 means repricing is active.
Target Value of Options for New Hires[vendordepartment] = 0
$/Person
The target value of the option package for new hires. This is part of the
compensation package for employees and is assumed constant throughout the simulation.
Time to Reprice Options = 1
years
The time period over which a firm will reprice employee options that are
underwater, if they elect to do so (if the Switch to Reprice Options is active).
Total Basis of New Options[vendordepartment] = Options Awarded[vendordepartment] * Strike Price of New
Options[vendor]
$/Year
The total basis cost of all non vested options increases by the product of
the strike price of each option and the rate at which options are issued.
Total Basis of Non Vested Options[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Total Basis of New Options[vendordepartment] -
Total Strike Price of Options Vesting[vendordepartment] -Total Basis of Options Expiring[vendordepartment] -
Repricing of Non Vested Options[vendor,department] , Initial Non Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] *
Strike Price of New Options[vendor]
The total basis cost of all non vested options. The ratio of this stock to
the number of non vested options outstanding is the average strike price
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of the non vested options. Increases as options are granted; decreases as
options vest, expire, or are repriced.
Total Basis of Options Exercised[vendordepartment] = Options Exercised[vendor,department] * Average Strike Price of
Vested Options[vendordepartment]
$/Year
Options are exercised by employees at the average strike price for all vested options.
Total Basis of Options Expiring[vendordepartment] = Average Strike Price of Non Vested Options[vendordepartment]
* Non Vested Options Expiring[vendordepartment]
$/Year
Options expiring reduce the total basis cost of all non vested options by
the average strike price.
Total Basis of Vested Options[vendor,departmentj = INTEG( Total Strike Price of Options Vesting[vendordepartmentl -
Total Basis of Options Exercised[vendordepartment] -Total Basis of Vested Options Expiring[vendordepartment] -
Repricing of Vested Options[vendordepartment] , Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] * Strike Price of New
Options[vendor])
The total cost basis of all vested options. The ratio of this stock to the
number of vested options outstanding is the average strike price of the
vested options. Increases as options are vested; decreases as options are
exercised or repriced.
Total Basis of Vested Options Expiring[vendordepartmentl = Vested Options Expiring[vendordepartment] * Average
Strike Price of Vested Options[vendordepartment]
$/Year
The total basis cost per year of the vested options that expire.
Total Strike Price of Options Vesting[vendordepartment] = Options Vesting[vendordepartment] * Average Strike Price
of Non Vested Options[vendordepartment]
$/Year
Options vesting are assumed to be priced at the average strike price for non vested options.
Value of Options Granted per Existing Employee[vendordepartment]=Experienced Compensation[vendor,department]
* Options Granted for Existing Employees as Percentage of Compensation[vendor] / 100
$/(Year*People)
Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] = INTEG( Options Vesting[vendordepartment] - Options
Exercised[vendor,department] - Vested Options Expiring[vendor,department] , 0)
shares
The number of vested options increases as non vested options vest and
decreases when these options are exercised or expire.
Vested Options Expiring[vendordepartment] = ( 1 - Fraction of Options Exercised[vendordepartmentl ) * Vested
Options Reaching Expiration Date[vendordepartment]
shares/Year
Vested options reaching their expiration date that employees choose not to exercise expire.
Vested Options per Employee[vendordepartment] = ZIDZ ( Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] , Total
Employees per Department[vendordepartmentl)
shares/Person
Average vested options per employee is the ratio of total vested employees
to employees (by department).
Vested Options Reaching Expiration Date[vendordepartment] = Vested Employee Options[vendordepartment] /
Average Life of Vested Options[vendor]
shares/Year
The rate at which vested options reach their expiration date depends on
the number of options and their average life.
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******* ** ************************************ ***********
.Unit Cost
Effect of Learning Curve on Unit Cost[vendor]=(Cumulative Purchases[vendor] / Reference Production for Initial Cost)
A Sensitivity of Unit Costs to Experience
Dimensionless
Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy = 1 + ( Subsidy Policy Switch * RAMP ( Subsidy Policy Effect on Cost / Subsidy
Policy Ramp Time, Subsidy Policy Start Time, ( Subsidy Policy Start Time + Subsidy Policy Ramp Time)
Dimensionless
If there's a subsidy policy, then effect on our cost will ramp up to it's
full effect starting at start time and taking the amount of time specified by ramp time.
Initial Unit Cost[startupl=61538
Initial Unit Cost[incumbent]=Initial Incumbent Unit Cost
Dollars/Unit
Effect of Functionality on Operating and Maintenance Costs[vendor]=(Feature Value[vendor]/Initial Feature
Value[vendor])A Sensitivity of Effect of Functionality on Operating and Maintenance Costs
Dimensionless
Initial Operating and Maintenance Costs=2400
$/Year/Unit
"O&M Cost Reduction per Doubling of Features"=0.5
Dimensionless
The reduction in the operating and maintenance costs of the product per
doubling of features. The larger this is, the faster O&M costs fall as the
features and functionality of the product improve
Sensitivity of Effect of Functionality on Operating and Maintenance Costs = LN ( 1 - "O&M Cost Reduction per Doubling
of Features" ) / LN ( 2)
Dimensionless
The unit operating and maintenance costs of the product falls with feature
development. O&M costs fall according to a standard learning curve.
Initial Feature Value[vendor] = Initial Features per Type[vendor,nonappropriable] * Nonappropriable Feature Multiple
+ Initial Features per Type[vendorappropriablel
Features
Total values of initial features.
Cost Reduction per Doubling of Experience=0.025
Dmnl
Fractional decrease in costs to produce the products per double the amount produced (i.e. sold)
Cumulative Purchases[vendor]= INTEG (Purchase Rate[vendor], Reference Production for Initial Cost)
Unit
Total number of purchases made (regardless of how purchases used)
Reference Production for Initial Cost=5
Unit
Initial Cost is assuming already produced this many of product
Sensitivity of Unit Costs to Experience = LN ( 1 - Cost Reduction per Doubling of Experience) / LN ( 2)
Dimensionless
Following standard learning curve theory, the exponent in the learning
curve is set so that there is a given fractional cost reduction per
doubling of cumulative production experience.
Share of Installed Base[vendor] = ZIDZ ( Cumulative Purchases[vendor] , SUM ( Cumulative Purchases[vendor!] ))
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Dimensionless
Our installed base as a share of total industry installed base.
******* ******** ***** *** ********* **** ***** **** **** *******
.Venture Capital
Effect of Existing Sales on VC Willingness to Invest[vendor]=Function for VC Willingness to Invest Due to Existing
Sales(Installed Base[vendor]/Reference Installed Base)
Dimensionless
Effect of Founder Ownership on VC Willingness to Invest[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE(Percentage of Founders
Ownership[vendor]<Minimum Founders Ownership for VC Investing, 0, 1)
Dimensionless
Estimated Profit per Unit=10000
$/Unit
Estimated Total Profit[vendor]=Potential Market Size[vendor] *Estimated Profit per Unit
Flush of VC Decision Switch Stock[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE ( VC Decision Switch[vendor] = 1, VC Decision Switch
Stock[vendor] / TIME STEP, 0)
Dimensionless
Function for VC Willingness to Invest Due to Existing Sales([(0,0.4)-(10,1)],(0,0.5),(1,0.5),(1,0.75),(2.5,0.88),
(5,0.95),(10,1))
Dimensionless
Before the first sale, VC's willingness to invest low and only based on
the potential market size. Once the startup has its first sales, VC's
willingness increases gradually as the install based accumulates, showing
confidence on the marketability of the products.






Maximum Potential VC Net Worth[vendor]=Market Capitalization[vendor]*Maximum VC Ownership VC Willing to
Invest/(1-Maximum VC Ownership VC Willing to Invest)
Maximum net worth VC is willing to invest.
Maximum VC Ownership VC Willing to invest=0.9
Dimensionless [0,11
Maximum VC ownership that VC is willing to invest. Once this is reached,
VC will no longer invest in order to give the managers incentive to stay
working for the company.
Minimum Founders Ownership for VC Investing= 10
Dimensionless
Potential VC Financing from Market Opportunity[vendor]=Estimated Total Profit[vendor]/Required Factor of Return
Proportion of Feasible VC Financing Effort by Department[vendordepartment]=ZIDZ(Feasible VC Financing Effort by





Required Factor of Return=10
Dimensionless
Switch for Adequate VC Financing Effort[vendorj=IF THEN ELSE(SUM(Feasible VC Financing Effort by
Department[vendordepartment!])<Required VC Financing Effort[vendor], 0, 1)
Dimensionless
0 if there is inadequate VC financing effort when feasible is less than required effort.
Time for VC Application=1.5
Year [?,?,0.25]
The time it takes to go from the start of VC application date to the VC decision date.
VC Decision Switch[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE ( VC Decision Switch Stock[vendor] >= Time for VC Application , 1, 0)
Dimensionless





An exogenous index of investment climate signaling the macroeconomic
conditions and availability of VC funding. 0 means a depressed market
with no VC investing. 2 means a booming market with many available funding.
VC Willingness to Invest[vendor]=lF THEN ELSE(Potential Market Size[vendor]>Minimum Market Size for VC Financing
:AND: Payback Period[vendor]<Maximum Payback Period for Customer Consideration, 1, 0)
Dimensionless
VC willingness to invest = 1 when potential market size > than the minimum
market size acceptable to VC and when firm has good enough technology such
that its payback period < minimum payback period required by VC.
Maximum Payback Period for Customer Consideration=10
Year
Maximum payback period before customers start considering the product.
Customers will not buy the product for any period greater than this.
Payback Period[vendor]=xIDZ(Consumer Price After Subsidy[vendor]-Price[incumbent], MAX(0, Energy Cost
Savings[vendor]-Annual Service Fee per Unit[vendor]), Infinity)
Year
Payback period for customer = (Startup Price - Incumbent Price) / (Energy
Cost Savings - Service Fee)
Follow On Investments[vendor]=lnv2 Amt[vendor]/TIME STEP * PULSE ( Inv2 Time, 0) + Inv3 Amt[vendor]/TIME STEP
* PULSE( Inv3 Time, 0) + Inv4 Amt[vendor]/TIME STEP * PULSE ( Inv4 Time, 0) + InvS Amt[vendor]/TIME STEP * PULSE
(Inv5 Time , 0)
Dollars/Year
Investments made after the initial investment
Inv2 Amt[vendor]=4e+006
$ [0,le+007,5000001









Inv4 Time = 3
Year
Installed Base[vendorl = Total Prospects and Adopters by Firm[vendor] * Unit Purchased per Adopter
Unit
Total installed base of product in the market, calculated as total
adopters multiplied by unit purchased per adopter. Note that the total
adopters of each vendor includes those who have adopted but are
considering switching to another vendor. Until they do, they remain
customers of their current vendor, hence the installed base includes
adopters and the total number of adopters of each vendor who are in the
prospect chain while considering a switch to another vendor.
Indicated Adopters = Total Population * Addressable Fraction of Population
Prospects
This is the total addressable market size.
Unit Purchased per Adopter = 1
Units/Prospect [0,20,2e-0051
Average number of units each adopter purchases/uses at a time
Desired Years of Runway[vendor]=5
Year
Desired years of runway used for calculating the financing required from VC.
Available VC Financing[vendor]=IF THEN ELSE(Expected Present Value of Prof it[vendor]>O, Potential VC Financing from
Market Opportunity[vendorl*Effect of Existing Sales on VC Willingness to Invest[vendor]*VC Investment Climate, 0)
Available VC financing is determined by the Potential VC Financing driven
by potential market size times the effect of existing sales (as more sales
increases willingness to invest) times Investment Climate which indicates
the macroeconomic conditions.
Experienced Work Effort Net of Grantseeking[vendordepartment]=Experienced Effective Work
Effort[vendor,department] - Grantseeking Effort by Department[vendordepartment]
Persons*Hours/Year
Work effort from experienced employees after subtracting coaching effort
and grantseeking effort. It is assumed that coaching and grantseeking take
precedent before work effort on VC financing, product development and sales.
Feasible VC Financing Effort by Department[vendordepartment] = Experienced Work Effort Net of
Grantseeking[vendor,department] * Maximum Fraction for VC Financing Effort
Person* Hours/Year
Feasible VC financing effort from experienced sales and engineers.
Maximum Allowable VC Financing[vendor]=MAX(O, Maximum Potential VC Net Worth[vendor-VC Net Worth[vendor])
Maximum VC financing a VC will invest is what is remaining before VC reach
the maximum VC ownership share.
Maximum Fraction for VC Financing Effort = 0.9
Dimensionless [0,1]
Maximum fraction of work effort from sales and engineers to work on VC
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financing. A high value represents the firm is willing to abandon other
efforts to devote to VC financing, a possibility when the firm is running out of cash.
Minimum Market Size for VC Financing=1250
Unit
Minimum market size for VC to consider as worthwhile investment.
Potential Market Size[vendor]=(Indicated Adopters - SUM (Adopters[vendor!])) *Unit Purchased per Adopter
Unit
Potential market size is what VC considers whether to invest or not. It is
the total prospects minus the existing adopters, times the unit per adoptor.
Required VC Financing Effort[vendor]=VC Financing Asking Amount[vendor] * VC Financing Effort per Dollar *Switch
for VC Financing[vendor]
Person* Hours/Year
Desired VC financing effort is determined by financing needed and effort
needed to raise each VC dollar.
Switch for VC Application Period[vendor]=lF THEN ELSE ( VC Financing Asking Amount[vendor] > 0, 1, 0) * (1-Switch to
Allow Secondary Sales[vendor]) * Switch for VC Financing[vendor]
Dimensionless [0,1,11
Switch for VC application date is on when financing required is positive,
i.e. firm starts applying for VC funding the moment it has financing
needs which itself depends on the desired cash coverage. It is turned off
after IPO when Switch for Allow 2nd Sales = 1.
Switch for VC Financing[vendor]=O
Dimensionless (0,1,11
Switch to allow the possibility of VC financing.
VC Financing Effort by Department[vendordepartment] = Switch for VC Application Period[vendor] * MIN ( Required
VC Financing Effort by Department[vendordepartment] , Feasible VC Financing Effort by
Department[vendor,department] )
Person* Hours/Year
VC financing effort from each department is the lesser of the desired and
the feasible effort, effective only during the VC application period.
VC Financing Effort per Dollar=0.001
Person*Hours/Year/$
VC financing effort needed per VC dollar amount.
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